Lachlan passed away in January 2010.  As a memorial, this site remains as he left it.
Therefore the information on this site may not be current or accurate and should not be relied upon.
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(This Webpage Page in No Frames Mode)

Welcome to Lachlan Cranswick's Personal Homepage in Melbourne, Australia

Extracts from "The Open Society and Its Enemies Volume 2: The High Tide of Prophecy: Hegel, Marx and the Aftermath" by Karl Raimund Popper (Originally published 1945)

(click here for Vol 1 of "The Open Society and Its Enemies")

"Bertrand Russell described this study, with its companion volume on Plato, as ' a work of first-class importance which ought to be widely read for its masterly criticism of the enemies of democracy, ancient and modern. His (Popper's) attack on Plato, while unorthodox, is in my opinion thoroughly justified. His analysis of Hegel is deadly. Marx is dissected with equal acumen, and given his due share of responsibility for modern misfortunes. The book is a vigorous and profound defence of democracy, timely, very interesting, and very well written."
"The general guiding principle for public policy put forward in The Open Society is: 'Minimize avoidable suffering'." Followed by: "Maximize the freedom of individuals to live as they wish" - quoted in "Philosophy and the Real World : An Introduction to Karl Popper" by Bryan Magee, ISBN: 0875484360 (Chapter 6)

"The vital question is not 'Who should rule?' but 'How can we minimize misrule?" - quoted in "Philosophy and the Real World : An Introduction to Karl Popper" by Bryan Magee, ISBN: 0875484360 (Chapter 6)

Lachlan's Homepage is at http://lachlan.bluehaze.com.au

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[Galbraith: The Great Crash: 1929] | [Galbraith: Culture of Contentment] | [Galbraith: Money]
[Popper: Open Society and its Enemies vol 1] | [Popper: Open Society and its Enemies vol 2]
[Maggee: on the Philosphy of Karl Popper] | [Popper: Poverty of Historicism]
[Beard: An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States]

For a concise background summary of "The Open Society and Its Enemies Volume" by Karl Popper refer to Extracts from "Philosophy and the Real World : An Introduction to Karl Popper" by Bryan Magee Published by Open Court Pub Co, July 1985, ISBN: 0875484360

Top notch warts and All Obituary of Karl Popper: THE BRITISH ACADEMY: Obituary of Karl Raimund Popper: 1902 - 1994: by John Watkins: London School of Economics: (Published (December 1997) in Proceedings of the British Academy, Volume 94, pp. 645 to 684): http://www.britac.ac.uk/pubs/src/popper/

Biography and assessment of Karl Popper (at the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy): http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/popper/


samizdat: [Russ., lit., self published.] a system by which manuscripts denied official publication in the Soviet Union are circulated clandestinely in typescript or in mimeograph form, or are smuggled out for publication.

verisimilitude: [L. verisimilitudo, from verisimilis; see verisimilar]

  1. the appearance of being true or real
  2. something that has the mere apearance of being true or real

Routledge On... Karl Popper ("In 1945 Routledge and Kegan Paul published the first book by an unknown author, Karl Popper. Originally entitled A Social Philosophy for Everyman, it had been turned down by a considerable number of publishers when Herbert Read, then a director of Routledge, determined to take it on. It came out under the title, The Open Society and Its Enemies"): http://www.routledge.com/popper/

Karl Popper links

Web and literature references on the Toxicology and effects of Hemlock on humans and animals (For those curious about effects of Hemlock vs the reported accounts of deaths of Socrates (by Plato!) and Seneca; and pondering whether the reported toxicology is consistent.)

Extracts from "Egypt, Greece and Rome Civilizations of the Ancient Mediterranean" by Charles Freeman (Pub. 1999)

Starting Quote

Extract from "The Open Society and Its Enemies Volume 2: Hegel and Marx" by Karl Raimund Popper (Originally published 1945) (Edition extracts taken from version published by Routledge and Kegan Paul, 5th Edition, 1973 reprint, ISBN 0 7100 4626 X) (Ordering Routledge books)
(Also refer to versions published by Princton University Press - Open Society Vol 1. | Open Society Vol 2.)

"To the debacle of liberal science can be
traced the moral schism of the modern world
which so tragically divides enlightened men"

Walter Lippmann.

Plato, Aristotle and Slavery

From: The Rise of Oracular Philosphy: Chapter 11: The Aristotelian Roots of Hegelianism

Extract from "The Open Society and Its Enemies Volume 2: Hegel and Marx" by Karl Raimund Popper (Originally published 1945) (Edition extracts taken from version published by Routledge and Kegan Paul, 5th Edition, 1973 reprint, ISBN 0 7100 4626 X) (Page 2)
(Ordering Routledge books) | (Also refer to versions published by Princton University Press - Open Society Vol 1. | Open Society Vol 2.)

"Aristotle's throught is entirely dominated by Plato's. Somewhat grudglingly, he followed his great teacher as closely as his temperament permitted, not only in his general political outlook but practially everywhere. So he endorsed, and systematized, Plato's naturalistic theory of slavery: 'Some men are by nature free, and others slaves; and for the latter, slavery is fitting as well as just. . . A man who by nature not his own, but another's, is by nature a slave. . . Hellenes do not like to call themselves slaves, but confine this term to barbarians. . . The slave is totally devoid of any faculty of reasoning', while free women have just a little of it. (We owe to Aristotle's criticisms and denunciations most of our knowledge of the Athenian movement against slavery. By arguing against the fighters of freedom, he preserved some of their utterances.)"

Hegel philosophy of human relations: Master and Slave

From: The Rise of Oracular Philosphy: Chapter 11: The Aristotelian Roots of Hegelianism

Extract from "The Open Society and Its Enemies Volume 2: Hegel and Marx" by Karl Raimund Popper (Originally published 1945) (Edition extracts taken from version published by Routledge and Kegan Paul, 5th Edition, 1973 reprint, ISBN 0 7100 4626 X) (Page 8 to 9)
(Ordering Routledge books) | (Also refer to versions published by Princton University Press - Open Society Vol 1. | Open Society Vol 2.)

"Indeed, Hegel points out that all personal relations can thus be reduced to the fundamental relation of master and slave, of domination and submission. Each must strive to assert and prove himself, and he who has not the nature, the courage, and the general capacity for preserving his independence, must be reduced to servitude. This charming theory of personal relations has, of course, its counterpart in Hegel's theory of international relations. Nations must assert themselves on the Stage of History; it is their duty to attempt the domination of the World.

All these far-reaching historicist consequences, which will be approached from a different angle in the next chapter, were slumbering for more than twenty centuries, 'hidden and undeveloped' in Aristotle's essentialism. Aristotelism was more fertile and promising than most of its many admirers know.

"The chief danger to our philosophy, apart from
laziness and woolliness, is scholasticism, . . which
is treating what is vague as if it was precise. . ."

F. P. Ramsey."

age of dishonesty

From: The Rise of Oracular Philosphy: Chapter 11: The Aristotelian Roots of Hegelianism

Extract from "The Open Society and Its Enemies Volume 2: Hegel and Marx" by Karl Raimund Popper (Originally published 1945) (Edition extracts taken from version published by Routledge and Kegan Paul, 5th Edition, 1973 reprint, ISBN 0 7100 4626 X) (Page 21)
(Ordering Routledge books) | (Also refer to versions published by Princton University Press - Open Society Vol 1. | Open Society Vol 2.)

"This romantic period of oracular philosophy, called by Schopenhaur the 'age of dishonesty', is described by him as follows: 'The character of honesty, that spirit of undertaking an inquiry together with the reader, which permeates the works of all previous philosophers, disappears here completely. Every page witnesses that these so-called philosophers do not attempt to teach, but to bewitch the reader.'

A similar result was produced by Aristotle's doctrine of definition. First it lead to a good deal of hairsplitting. But later, philosophers began to feel that one cannot argue about definitions. In this way, essentialism not only encouraged verbalism, but it also led to the disillusionment with argument, that is, with reason. Scholasticism and mysticism and despair with reason, these are the unavoidable results of the essentialism of Platon and Aristotle. And Plato's open revolt against freedom becomes, with Aristotle, a secret revolt against reason."

Christian authoritirianism of the Middle Ages

From: The Rise of Oracular Philosphy: Chapter 11: The Aristotelian Roots of Hegelianism

Extract from "The Open Society and Its Enemies Volume 2: Hegel and Marx" by Karl Raimund Popper (Originally published 1945) (Edition extracts taken from version published by Routledge and Kegan Paul, 5th Edition, 1973 reprint, ISBN 0 7100 4626 X) (Page 24 to 26)
(Ordering Routledge books) | (Also refer to versions published by Princton University Press - Open Society Vol 1. | Open Society Vol 2.)

"However this may be, it can hardly be argued that with Justinian's persecution of non-Christians, heretics and philosophers (A.D. 529), the dark ages began. The Church followed in the wake of Platonic-Aristotelian totalitarianism, a development that culminated in the Inquisition. The theory of the Inquisition, more especially, can be described as purely Platonic. It is set out in the last three books of the laws and especially of religious practice and theory, even if they have to kill the wolf, who may admittedly be an honest and honerable man whose diseased conscience unfortunately does not permit him to bow to the threats of the mighty.

It is one fo the characteristic reactions to the strain of civilisation in our own time that the alledgedly 'Christian' authoritarianism of the Middle Ages has, in certain intellectualist circles, become one of the latest fashions of the day. This, no doubt, is due not only to the idealisation of an indeed more 'organic' and 'integrated' past, but also to an understandable revulsion against modern agnosticism which has increased this strain beyond the limit of responsibility. All this has to be admitted. But I do not doubt that the Middle Ages were, even from the point of view of Christianity, not better ruled than out Western democracies. For we can read in the Gospels that the founder of Christianity was questioned by a certain 'doctor of law' about a criterion by which to distinguish between a true and a false interpretation of His words. To this He replied by telling the parable of the priest and the Levite who both, seeing a wounded man in great distress, 'passed by on the other side', while the Samaritan bound up his wounds, and looked after his material needs. This parable, I think, should be remembered by those ' Christians' who long not only for a time when the Church suppressed freedom and conscience, but also for a time in which, under the eye and with the autohrity of the Church, untold oppression drove the people to despair. As a moving comment upon the suffering of the people in those days and, at the same time, upon the 'Christianity' of the now so fashionable romantic medievalism wihch wants to bring these days back, a passage may be quoted here from H. Zinsser's book, Rats, Lice, and History, in which he speaks about epidemics of dancing mania in the Middle Ages, known as 'St. John's dance', 'St. Vitus' dance', etc. (I do not wich to invoke Zinsser as an authority on the Middle Ages - there is no need to do so since the facts at issue are hardly controversial. But his comments have the rare and peculiar touch of the practical Samaritan - of a great and humane physician.) 'These strange seizures, though not unheard of in earlier times, became common during and immediately after the dreadful miseries of the Black Death. For the most part, the dancing manias present none of the characteristics which we associate with epidemic infectious diseases of the nervious system. They seem, rather, like mass hysterias, brought on by terror and despair, in populations oppressed, famished, and wretched to a degree almost unimaginable today. To the miseries of constant war, political and social disintegration, there was added the dreadful affliction of inescapable, mysterious, and deadly disease. Mankind stood helpless as though trapped in a world of terror and peril against which there was no defence. God and the devil were living conceptions to the men of those days cowered under the afflictions which they believed imposed by supernatural forces. For those who broke down under the strain there was no road to escape except to the inward refuge of mental derangement which, under the circumstances oft he times, took the direction of religious fanaticism.' Zinsser then goes on to draw some parallels between these events and certain reactions of our time in which, he says, 'economic and political hysterias are substituted for religious ones of earlier times'; and after this, he sums up his characterization of people who lived in those days of authoritarianism as 'a terror-stricken and wretched population, which had broken down under the stress of almost incredible hardship and danger'. It is necessary to ask which attitude is mroe Christian, one that longs to return to the 'unbroken harmony and unity' of the MIddle Ages, or one that wishes to use reason in order to free mankind from pestilence and oppression?

But some part at least of the authoritarian Church of the Middle Ages succeeded in branding such practical humanitarianism as 'wordly', as characteristic of 'Epicureanism', and of men who desire only to 'fill their bellies like the beasts'. The terms 'Epicureanism', 'materialism', and 'empiricism', that is to say, the philosophy of Democritus, one of the greatest of the Great Generation, became in the way synonyms of wickedness, and the tribal Idealism of Platon and Aristotle, was exalted as a kind of Christianity before Christ. Indeed, this is the source of the immense authority, of Plato and Aristotle, even in our own day, that their philosophy was adopted by medieval authoritarianism. But it must not be forgotten that, outside the totalitarian camp, their fame has outlived their practical influence upon our lives. And although the name of Democritus is seldom remembered, his science as well as his morals still live with us."

On Hegel

From: The Rise of Oracular Philosphy: Chapter 12: Hegel and the New Tribalism

Extract from "The Open Society and Its Enemies Volume 2: Hegel and Marx" by Karl Raimund Popper (Originally published 1945) (Edition extracts taken from version published by Routledge and Kegan Paul, 5th Edition, 1973 reprint, ISBN 0 7100 4626 X) (Page 27)
(Ordering Routledge books) | (Also refer to versions published by Princton University Press - Open Society Vol 1. | Open Society Vol 2.)

"The philosophy of Hegel, then, was . . a scrutiny
of thought so profound that it was for the most
part unintelligible"

J. H. Stirling.

"Hegel, the source of all contemporary historicism, was a direct follower of Heraclitus, Platon, and Aristotle. Hegel achieved the most miraculous things. A master logician, it was child's play for his powerful dialectical methods to draw real physical rabbits out of purely metaphysical silk-hats. Thus, starting from Plato's Timaeus and it number-mysticism, Hegel succeeded in 'proving' by purely philosophical methods (114 years after Newton's Principia) that the planets must move according to Kepler's laws. He even accomplished the deduction of the actual position of the planets, thereby provinn that no planet could be situated between Mars and Jupiter (unfortunately, it had escaped his notice that such a planet had been discovered a few months earlier)"

On Hegel

From: The Rise of Oracular Philosphy: Chapter 12: Hegel and the New Tribalism

Extract from "The Open Society and Its Enemies Volume 2: Hegel and Marx" by Karl Raimund Popper (Originally published 1945) (Edition extracts taken from version published by Routledge and Kegan Paul, 5th Edition, 1973 reprint, ISBN 0 7100 4626 X) (Page 28)
(Ordering Routledge books) | (Also refer to versions published by Princton University Press - Open Society Vol 1. | Open Society Vol 2.)

"There are still some who still believe in Hegel's sincerity, or who still doubt whethr his secret might not be profundity, fullness of thought, rather than emptiness. I should like them to read carefully the last sentence--the only intelligible one--of this quotation, because in this sentence, Hegel gives himself away. For clearly it means nothing but: 'The heating up of sounding bodies. . is heat . . together with sound.' The question arises whether Hegel deceived himself, hypnotized by his own inspiring jargon, or whether he boldly set out to deceive and bewitch others. I am satisfied that the latter is the case, especially in view of what Hegel wrote in one of his letters. . . . "

On Hegel

From: The Rise of Oracular Philosphy: Chapter 12: Hegel and the New Tribalism

Extract from "The Open Society and Its Enemies Volume 2: Hegel and Marx" by Karl Raimund Popper (Originally published 1945) (Edition extracts taken from version published by Routledge and Kegan Paul, 5th Edition, 1973 reprint, ISBN 0 7100 4626 X) (Page 29)
(Ordering Routledge books) | (Also refer to versions published by Princton University Press - Open Society Vol 1. | Open Society Vol 2.)

"And one can way that outside the continent of Europe, especially in the last twenty years, the interest of philosophers in Hegel has slowly been vanishing.

But if this is so, why worry any more about Hegel? the answer is that Hegel's influence has remained a most powerful force, in spite of the fact that scientists never took him seriously, and that (aprat from the 'evolutionists') many philosophers are beginning to lose interest in him. Hegel's influence, and especially his cant, is still very powerful in moral and social philosophy and in the social and political sciences (with the sole exception of economics). Especially the philosophers of history, of politics, and of education are still to a very large extent under his sway. In politics, this is shown most drastically by the fact that the Maxist extreme left wing, as well as the conservative centre, and the fascist extreme right, all base their political philosophies on Hegel; the left wing replaces the war of nations which appears in Hegel's historicist scheme by the war of classes, the extreme right replaces it by the war of races; but both follow him more or less consciously. (The conservative centre is as a rule less conscious of its indebtedness to Hegel.)

How can this immense influence be explained? My main intention is not so much to explain this phenomenon as to combat it. But I may make a few explanatory suggestions. For some reason, philosophers have kept around themselves, even in our day, something of the atmosphere of the magician. Philosophy is considered as a strange and abstruse kind of thing, dealing wiht those mysteries with which religion deals, but not in a way which can be 'revealed unto babes' or to common people; it is considered too profound for that, and to be the religion and theology of the intellectuals, of the learned and wise. Hegelianism fits these views admirably; it is exactly what this kind of popular superstition supposes philosophy to be. It knows all about everything. It has a ready answer to every question. And indeed, who can be sure that the answer is not ture?

But this is not the main reason for Hegel's sucess. His influence, and the need to combat it, can perhaps be better understood if we briefly consider the general historical situation...."

On Hegel

From: The Rise of Oracular Philosphy: Chapter 12: Hegel and the New Tribalism

Extract from "The Open Society and Its Enemies Volume 2: Hegel and Marx" by Karl Raimund Popper (Originally published 1945) (Edition extracts taken from version published by Routledge and Kegan Paul, 5th Edition, 1973 reprint, ISBN 0 7100 4626 X) (Page 32 to 33)
(Ordering Routledge books) | (Also refer to versions published by Princton University Press - Open Society Vol 1. | Open Society Vol 2.)

"My assertion that Hegel's philosophy was inspired by ulterior motives, namely, by his interest in the restoration of the Prussian government of Frederick William III, and that it cannot therefore be taken seriously, is not new. the story is well known to al who knew the political situation, and it was freely told by the few who were independent enough to do so. The best witness is Schopenhauer, himself a Platonic idealist and a conservative if not a reactionary, but a man of supreme integrity who cherished truth beyond anything else. There can be no doubt that he was as competent a judge in philosophical matters as could be found at the time. Schopenhauer, who had the pleasure of knowing Hegel personally and who suggested that use of Shakespeare's words, 'such stuff as madmen tongue and brain not', as the motto of Hegel's philosophy, drew the following excellent picture of the master: 'Hegel, installed from above by that powers that be, as the certified Great Philosopher, was a flat-headed, insipid, nausiating, illiterate charlatan, who reached the pinnacle of audacity in scribbling together and dishing up the craziest mystifying nonsense. This nonsense has been noisily proclaimed as immortal wisdom by mercenary followers and readily accepted as such by all fools, who thus joined in as a perfect chorus of admiration as had ever been heard before. The extensive field of spiritual influence with which Hegel was furnished by those in power has enabled him to achieve the intellectual corruption of a whole generation.' And in another place, Schopenhauer describes the political game of Hegalianism as follows: 'Philosophy, brought afresh repute by Kant. . . had soon to become a tool of interests; of state interests from above, of personal interests from below. . . The driving forces of this movement are, contrary to all solemn airs and assertations, not idea; they are very real purposes indeed, namely personal, official, clerical, political, in short, material interests. . . Party interests are vehemently agitating the pens of so many pure lovers of wisdom. . . Truth is certainly the last thing they have in mind. . . Philosophy is misused, from the side of the state as a tool, from the other side as a means of gain. . . Who can really believe that the truth also will thereby come to light, just as a by-product?. . Governments make of philosophy a means of serving their state interests, and scholars make of it a trade. . .' "

Influence of Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason"

From: The Rise of Oracular Philosphy: Chapter 12: Hegel and the New Tribalism

Extract from "The Open Society and Its Enemies Volume 2: Hegel and Marx" by Karl Raimund Popper (Originally published 1945) (Edition extracts taken from version published by Routledge and Kegan Paul, 5th Edition, 1973 reprint, ISBN 0 7100 4626 X) (Page 38)
(Ordering Routledge books) | (Also refer to versions published by Princton University Press - Open Society Vol 1. | Open Society Vol 2.)

"Kant, in his Critique of Pure Reason, asserted under the influence of Hume that pure speculation or reason, whenever it ventures into a field in which it cannot possibly be checked by experience, is liable to get involved in contradictions or 'antinomies' and to produce what he unambigously described as 'mere fancies'; 'nonsense'; 'illusions'; 'a sterile dogmatism'; and 'a superficial pretension to the knowledge of everything'. He tried to show that to every metaphysical assertion or thesis, concerning for example the beginning of the world in time, or the existance of God, there can be contrasted a counter-assertion or antithesis; and both, he held, may proceed from the same asumptions, and can be proved with an equal degree of 'evidence'. In other words, when leaving the field of experience, our speculation can have no scientific status, since to every argument there must be an equally valid counter-argument. Kan't intention was to stop once and forever the 'accursed fertility' of the scribblers to use rational argument; they only gave up the attempt to teach, but not the attempt to bewitch the public (as Schopenhauer puts it). For this development, Kant himself undoubtedly bears a very considerable share of the blame; for the obscure style of his work (which he wrote in a great hurry, although only after long years of meditation) contributed considerably to a further lowering of the low standard of clarity in German theoretical writing."

Dialectics

From: The Rise of Oracular Philosphy: Chapter 12: Hegel and the New Tribalism

Extract from "The Open Society and Its Enemies Volume 2: Hegel and Marx" by Karl Raimund Popper (Originally published 1945) (Edition extracts taken from version published by Routledge and Kegan Paul, 5th Edition, 1973 reprint, ISBN 0 7100 4626 X) (Page 43)
(Ordering Routledge books) | (Also refer to versions published by Princton University Press - Open Society Vol 1. | Open Society Vol 2.)

"As a second example of this use of dialectics, I select Hegel's treatment of the demand for a political constitution, which he combines with his treatment of equality and liberty. In order to appreciate the problem of the constitution, it must be remembered that Prussian absolutism knew no constitutional law (apart from such principles as the full sovereignty of the king) and that the slogan of the campaign for democratic reform in the various German principalities was that the prince should 'grant the country a constitution'. But Frederick William agreed with his councillor Ancillon in the conviction that he must never give way to 'the hotheads, that very active and loud-voice group of persons who for some years have set themselves up as the nation and have cried for a constitution'. And although, under great pressure, the king promised a constitution, he never fulfilled his word. (There is a story that an innocent comment on the king's 'constitution' led to the dismissal of his unfortunate court- physician.) Now how does Hegel treat this ticklish problem?"

Paradox of Freedom

From: The Rise of Oracular Philosphy: Chapter 12: Hegel and the New Tribalism

Extract from "The Open Society and Its Enemies Volume 2: Hegel and Marx" by Karl Raimund Popper (Originally published 1945) (Edition extracts taken from version published by Routledge and Kegan Paul, 5th Edition, 1973 reprint, ISBN 0 7100 4626 X) (Page 44)
(Ordering Routledge books) | (Also refer to versions published by Princton University Press - Open Society Vol 1. | Open Society Vol 2.)

"Now this argument which tries to show that a 'liberty' is the same as 'a liberty' and therefore the same as 'law', from which it follows that the more laws, the more liberties is clearly nothing than a clumsy statement (clumsy because it relies on a kind of pun) of the paradox of freedom, first discovered by Plato, and briefly discussed above; a parados that can be expressed by saying that unlimited freedom leads to its opposite, since without its protection and restriction by law, freedom must lead to a tyranny of the strong over the weak. This paradox vaguely restated by Rousseau, was solved by Kant, who demanded that the freedom of each man should be restricted, but not beyond what is necessary to safeguard an equal degree of freedom for all. Hegel of course knows Kant's solution, but he does not like it, and he presents it, without mentioning its author, in the following disparaging way: 'To-day, nothing is more familiar than the idea that each must restrict his liberty in relation to the liberty of others; that the state is a condition of such reciprocal restrictions; and that the laws are restrictions. But', he goes on to criticize Kant's theory, 'this expresses the kind of outlook that views freedom as casual good-pleasure and self-will.' With this cryptic remark, Kant's equalitarian theory of justic is dismissed."

Plato, Rousseau and "Who Should Rule?"

From: The Rise of Oracular Philosphy: Chapter 12: Hegel and the New Tribalism

Extract from "The Open Society and Its Enemies Volume 2: Hegel and Marx" by Karl Raimund Popper (Originally published 1945) (Edition extracts taken from version published by Routledge and Kegan Paul, 5th Edition, 1973 reprint, ISBN 0 7100 4626 X) (Page 52)
(Ordering Routledge books) | (Also refer to versions published by Princton University Press - Open Society Vol 1. | Open Society Vol 2.)

"Plato, it will be remembered, unfortunately formulated his fundamental political problem by asking: Who should rule? Whose will should be law? Before Rousseau, the usual answer to this question as : The prince. Rousseau gave a new and most revolutionary answer. Not the prince, he maintained, but the people should rule; the not will of one man but the will of all. In this way, he was lead to invent the people's will, the collective will, or the 'general will', as he called it; and the people, once endowed with a will, had to be exalted into a super-personality; 'in relation to what is external to it' (i.e., in relation to other peoples), Rousseau says, 'it becomes one single being, one individual'. Thwere was a good deal of romatic collectivism in this invention, but no tendency towards nationalism. But Rousseau's theories clearly contain the germ of nationalism, whose most characteristic doctrine is that the various nations must be conceived as personalities. And a great practical step in the nationalist direction was made when the French Revolution inaugurated a people's army, based on national conscription."

Fichte, Kant and the "Critique of All Revelation"

From: The Rise of Oracular Philosphy: Chapter 12: Hegel and the New Tribalism

Extract from "The Open Society and Its Enemies Volume 2: Hegel and Marx" by Karl Raimund Popper (Originally published 1945) (Edition extracts taken from version published by Routledge and Kegan Paul, 5th Edition, 1973 reprint, ISBN 0 7100 4626 X) (Page 54)
(Ordering Routledge books) | (Also refer to versions published by Princton University Press - Open Society Vol 1. | Open Society Vol 2.)

"When the press extolled Fichte's work as one of Kant's, Kant was forced to make a public statement that the work was Fichte's, and Fichte, upon whom fame had suddenly descended, was made professor in Jena. But Kant was later forced to make another declaration, in order to dissociate himself from this man, a declaration in which occur the words: 'May God protect us from our friends. From our enemies, we can try to protect ourselves.'"

"Our time" and Hegel

From: The Rise of Oracular Philosphy: Chapter 12: Hegel and the New Tribalism

Extract from "The Open Society and Its Enemies Volume 2: Hegel and Marx" by Karl Raimund Popper (Originally published 1945) (Edition extracts taken from version published by Routledge and Kegan Paul, 5th Edition, 1973 reprint, ISBN 0 7100 4626 X) (Page 59)
(Ordering Routledge books) | (Also refer to versions published by Princton University Press - Open Society Vol 1. | Open Society Vol 2.)

"In our time, Hegel's hysterical historicism is still the fertilizer to which modern totalitarianism owes its rapid growth. Its use has prepared the ground, and has educated the intelligentia to intellectual dishonesty, as will be shown in section v of this chapter. We have to learn the lesson that intellectural honesty is fundamental for everything we cherish.

But is this all? And is it just? Is there nothing in the claim that Hegel's greatness lies in the fact that he was the creator of a new, or a historical way of thinking - of a new historical sense?

Many of my friends have criticized me for my attitude toward Hegel, and for my inability to see his greatness. They were, of course, quite right, since I was indeed unable to see it. (I am so still.) In order to remedy this fault, I made a systematic inquiry into the question, Wherein lies Hegel's greatness?

The result was disappointing. . . "

Quoting Kolnai: Civilised government vs Nationalist Government

From: The Rise of Oracular Philosphy: Chapter 12: Hegel and the New Tribalism

Extract from "The Open Society and Its Enemies Volume 2: Hegel and Marx" by Karl Raimund Popper (Originally published 1945) (Edition extracts taken from version published by Routledge and Kegan Paul, 5th Edition, 1973 reprint, ISBN 0 7100 4626 X) (Page 71 to 72)
(Ordering Routledge books) | (Also refer to versions published by Princton University Press - Open Society Vol 1. | Open Society Vol 2.)

"Kolnai, to whose book I am deeply indebted for a great deal of material to which I would otherwise have had no access, says most strikingly : 'All of us . . who stand for . . rational, civilized methods of government and social organisation, agree that war is in itself an evil . . ' adding that in the opinion of most of us (except the pacifists) it might become, under certain circumstances, a necessary evil, he continues: 'The nationalist attitude is different, though it need not imply a desire for perpetual or frequent warfare. It sees in a war a good rather than an evil, even if it be a dangerous good, like an exceedingly heady wine that is best reserved for rare occasions of high festivity.' War is not a common and abundant evil but a precious though rare good: - this sums up the views of Hege and of his followers.

One of Hegal's feats was the revival of the Heraclitean idea of fate;

[text deleted]

'The principle of Race', Kolnai says, 'is meant to embody and express the utter negation of human freedom, the denial of equal rights, a challenge in the face of mankind.' And he rightly insists that racialism tends to 'oppose Liberty by Fate, individual consciousness by the compelling urge of the Blood beyond the control of argument"

Hegel and reviving Fame

From: The Rise of Oracular Philosphy: Chapter 12: Hegel and the New Tribalism

Extract from "The Open Society and Its Enemies Volume 2: Hegel and Marx" by Karl Raimund Popper (Originally published 1945) (Edition extracts taken from version published by Routledge and Kegan Paul, 5th Edition, 1973 reprint, ISBN 0 7100 4626 X) (Page 72)
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"Together with the idea of fate, its counterpart, that of fame is also revived by Hegel: 'Individuals. . are instruments. . . What they personally gain . . through the individual share they take in the substantial business (prepared and appointed independently of them) is . . Fame, which is their reward.' And Stapel, a propogator of the new paganized Christianity, promptly repeats: 'All great deeds were done for the sake of fame or glory.' But this 'Christian' moralist is even more radical than Hegel: 'Metaphysical glory is the one true morality', he teaches, and the 'Categorical Imperitive' of this one true morality runs accordingly: 'Do such deeds as spell glory!'"

The tribal ideal of Heroic Man

From: The Rise of Oracular Philosphy: Chapter 12: Hegel and the New Tribalism

Extract from "The Open Society and Its Enemies Volume 2: Hegel and Marx" by Karl Raimund Popper (Originally published 1945) (Edition extracts taken from version published by Routledge and Kegan Paul, 5th Edition, 1973 reprint, ISBN 0 7100 4626 X) (Page 75)
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"The tribal ideal of the Heroic Man, especially in its fascist form, is based upon different views. It is a direct attack upon those things which make heroism admirable to most of us - such things as the furthering of civilization. For it is an attack on the idea of civil life itself; this is denounced as shallow and materialistic, because of the idea of security which it cherishes."

"The History of the World is no theatre of happiness

From: The Rise of Oracular Philosphy: Chapter 12: Hegel and the New Tribalism

Extract from "The Open Society and Its Enemies Volume 2: Hegel and Marx" by Karl Raimund Popper (Originally published 1945) (Edition extracts taken from version published by Routledge and Kegan Paul, 5th Edition, 1973 reprint, ISBN 0 7100 4626 X) (Page 75)
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"Hegel, always faithful to his historicism, basese his anti-utilitarian attitude (in distinction to Aristotle's utilitarian comments upon the 'dangers of prosperity') on his interpretation of history: 'The History of the World is not theatre of happiness. Periods of happiness are blank pages in it, for they are periods of harmony.' Thus, liberalism, freedom and reason are, as usual, objects of Hegel's attacks. The hysterical cries: We want our history! We want our destiny! We want our fight! We want our chains! resound through the edifice of Hegelianism, through this stronghold of the closed society and of the revolt against freedom."

Schopenhauer's advice to a dishonest guardian

From: The Rise of Oracular Philosphy: Chapter 12: Hegel and the New Tribalism

Extract from "The Open Society and Its Enemies Volume 2: Hegel and Marx" by Karl Raimund Popper (Originally published 1945) (Edition extracts taken from version published by Routledge and Kegan Paul, 5th Edition, 1973 reprint, ISBN 0 7100 4626 X) (Page 77 to 78)
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"And in view of the last of Heidegger's quotations, they should ask themselves whether Schopenhauer's advice to a dishonest guardian has not been successfully administered by many educationalists to many promising youths, inside and outside of Germany. I have in mind the passage: 'Should you ever intend to dull the wits of a young man and to incapacitate his brains for any kind of thought whatever, then you cannot do better than give him Hegel to read. For these monstrous accumulations of words that annul and contradict one another drive the mind into tormenting itself with vain attempts to think anything whatever in connection with them, until finally it collapses from sheer exhaustion. Thus any ability to think is so thoroughly destroyed that the young man will ultimately mistake empty and hollow verbiage for real thought. A guardian fearing that his ward might become too intelligent for his schemes might prevent this misfortune by innocently suggesting the reading of Hegel.'"

'For if we are silent, who will speak?'

From: The Rise of Oracular Philosphy: Chapter 12: Hegel and the New Tribalism

Extract from "The Open Society and Its Enemies Volume 2: Hegel and Marx" by Karl Raimund Popper (Originally published 1945) (Edition extracts taken from version published by Routledge and Kegan Paul, 5th Edition, 1973 reprint, ISBN 0 7100 4626 X) (Page 80)
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"It seems to me a fitting conclusion to this chapter if I leave the last word to Schopenhauer, the anti-nationalist who said of Hegel a hundred years ago: 'He exerted, not on philosophy alone but on all forms of German literature, a devastating, or more strictly speaking, a stupefying, one could also say, a pestiferous, influence. To combat this influence forcefully and on every occasion is the duty of everybody who is able to judge independently. For if we are silent, who will speak?'"

Introduction to Marx

Marx's Method: Chapter 13: Marx's Sociological Determinism

Extract from "The Open Society and Its Enemies Volume 2: Hegel and Marx" by Karl Raimund Popper (Originally published 1945) (Edition extracts taken from version published by Routledge and Kegan Paul, 5th Edition, 1973 reprint, ISBN 0 7100 4626 X) (Page 81 to 82)
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"The collectivists . . have the zest for progress,
the sympathy for the poor, the burning sense of
wrong, the impulse for great deeds, which have
been lacking in latter-day liberalism. But their
science is founded on a profound misunderstanding. .,
and their actions, therefore, are deeply
destructive and reactionary. So men's hearts are
torn, their minds divided, they are offered
impossible choices.

Walter Lippmann.

"It has always been the strategy of the revolt against freedom 'to take advantage of sentiments, not wasting one's energies in futile efforts to destroy them'. The most cherished ideas of the humanitarians were often loudly acclaimed by their deadliest enemies, who in this way penetrated into the humanitarian camp under the guise of allies, causing disunion and thorough confusion. This strategy has otfen been highly successful, as is shown by the fact that many genuine humanitarians still revere Plato's idea of 'justice', the medieval idea of 'Christian' authoritarianism, Rousseau's ida of the 'general will', or Fichte's and Hegel's ideas of 'national freedom'. yet this method of penetrating, dividing and confusing the humanitarian camp and of building up a largely unwitting and therefore doubly effective intellectual fifth column achieved its greatest success only after Hegelianism had established itself as the basis of a truly humanitarian movement: of Marxism, so far the purest, the most developed and most dangerous form of historicism.

It is tempting to dwell upon the similarities between Marxism, the Hegelian left-wing, and its fascist counterpart. Yet it would be utterly unfair to overlook the difference between them. Althought their intellectual origin is nearly identical, there can be no doubt of the humanitarian impulse of Marxism. Moreover, in contrast to the Hegelians of the right-wing, Marx made an honest attempt to apply rational methods to the most urgent problems of social life. The value of this attempt is unimpaired by the fact that it was, as I shall try to show, largely unsuccessful. Science progresses through trial and error. Marx tried, and although he erred in his main doctrines, he did not try in vain. He opened and sharpened our eyes in many ways. A return to pre-Marxian social science is inconceivable. All modern writers are indebted to Marx, even if they do not know it. This is especially true of those who disagree with his doctrines, as I do; and I readily admit that my treatment, for example of Platon and Hegel, bears the stamp of his influence.

One cannot do justice to Marx whiout recognizing his sincerity. His open-mindedness, his sense of facts, his distrust of verbiage, and especially of moralizing verbiage, made him one of the world' most influential fighters against hypocrisy and pharisaism. He had a burning desire to help the oppressed, and was fully conscious of the need for proving himself in deeds, and not only in words. His main talents eing theoretical, he devoted immense labour to forging what he believed to be scientific weapons for the fight to improve the lot of the vast majority of men. His sincerity in his search for truth and hit intellectual honesty distinguished him, I believe, from many of his followers (although unfortunately he did not altogether escape the corrupting influence of an upbringing in the atmosphere of Hegelian dialectics, described by Schopenhauer as 'destructive of all intelligence'). Marx's interest in social science and social philosophy was fundamentally a practical interest. He saw in knowledge a means of promoting the progress of man.

Why, then, attack Marx? In spite of his merits, Marx was I believe, a false prophet. He was a prophet of the course of history, and his prophecies did not come true; but this is not my main accusation. It is much more important that he misled scores of intelligent people into believing that historical prophecy is the scientific way of approaching social problems. Marx is responsible for the devastating influcence of the historicist method of thought within the ranks of those who wish to advance the cause of the open society."

John Stuart Mill's Psychologism

Marx's Method: Chapter 14: The Automony of Sociology

Extract from "The Open Society and Its Enemies Volume 2: Hegel and Marx" by Karl Raimund Popper (Originally published 1945) (Edition extracts taken from version published by Routledge and Kegan Paul, 5th Edition, 1973 reprint, ISBN 0 7100 4626 X) (Page 91)
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"Thus 'all phenomena of society are phenomea of human nature', as Mill said; and 'the Laws of phenomena of individual human nature. Men are not, when brought together, converted into another kind of substance. . '

This last remark of Mill's exhibits one of the most praiseworthy aspects of psychologism, namely, its sane opposition to collectivism and holism, its refusal to be impressed by Rousseau's or Hegel's romanticism - by a general will or national spirit, or perhaps, by a group mind."

Psychologism, Historicism and Conspiricy theories

Marx's Method: Chapter 14: The Automony of Sociology

Extract from "The Open Society and Its Enemies Volume 2: Hegel and Marx" by Karl Raimund Popper (Originally published 1945) (Edition extracts taken from version published by Routledge and Kegan Paul, 5th Edition, 1973 reprint, ISBN 0 7100 4626 X) (Page 94 to 96)
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"The fact that psychologism is forced to operate with the idea of a psychological origin of society constitutes in my opinion a decisive argument against it. But it is not the only one. Perhaps the most important criticism of psychologism is that it fails to understand the main task of explanatory social sciences.

This task is not, as the historicist believes, the prophecy of the future course of history. It is, rather, the discovery and explanation of the less obvious dependencies, which stand in the way of social action - the study, as it were, of the unwieldiness, the resilence or the brittleness of the social stuff, or its resistance to our attempts to mould it and to work with it.

In order to make my point clear, I shall briefly describe a theory which is widely help but which assumes what I consider the very opposite of the true aim of social sciences; I call it the 'conspiracy theory of society'. It is the view that an explanation of a social phenomenon consists in the discovery of the men or groups who are interested in the occurrence of this phenomenon (sometimes it is a hidden interest which has first to be revealed), and who have planned and conspired to bring it about.

This view of the aims of the social sciences arises, of course, from the mistaken theory, that, whatever happens in society - especially happenings such as war, unemployment, poverty, shortages, which people as a rule dislike - is the result of direct design by some poweful individuals and groups. This theory is widely help; it is older even than historicism (which, as shown by its primitive theistic form, is a derivative of the conspiracy theory). In its modern forms it is, like modern historicism, and a certain modern attitude towards 'natural laws', a typical result of the secularisation of a religious superstition. The belief in the Homeric gods whose conspiracies explain the history of the Trojan War is gone. The gods are abandoned. But their place if filled by powerful men or groups - sinister pressure groups whose wickedness is responsible for all the evils we suffer from - such as the Learned Elders of Zion, or the monopolists, or the capitalists, or the imperialists.

I do not wish to imply that conspiracies never happen. On the contrary, they are typical social phenomena. They become important, for example, whenever people who believe in the conspiracy theory get into power. And people who sincerely believe that they know how to make heaven on earth are most likely to adopt the conspiracy teory, and to get involved in a counter-conspiracy theory against non-existing conspirators. For the only explanation of their failure to produce their heaven is the evil intention of the Devil, who has a vested interest in hell.

Conspiracies occur, it must be admitted. But the striking fact which, in spite of their occurrence, disproved the conspiracy theory is that few of these conspiracies are ultimately successful. Conspirators rarely consummate their conspiracy.

Why is this so? Why do achievements differ so widely from aspirations? Because this is usually the case in social life, conspiracy or no conspiracy. Social life is not only a trial of strength between opposing groups: it is action within a more or less resilent or brittle framework of institutions and traditions, and it creates - apart from any conscious counter-action - many unforseen reactions in this framework, some of them perhaps even unforseeable.

To try to analyse these reactions and to forsee them as far as possible is, I believe, the main task of the social sciences. It is the task of analysing the unintended social repercussions of intentional human actions - those repercussions whose significance is neglected both by conspiracy theory and by psychologism, as already indicated. An action which proceeds precisely according to intention does nto create a problem for social science (except that there may be a need to explain why is this particular case no unintended repercussions occurred). One of the most primative economic actions may serve as an example in order to make the idea of unintended consequences of our actions quite clear. If a man wishes urgently to buy a house, we can safely assume that he does not wish to raise the market price of houses. But the very fact that he appears on the market as a buyer will tend to raise market prices. And analogous remarks hold for the seller. Or to take an example from a very different field, if a man decides to insure his life, he is unlikely to have the intention of encouraging some people to invest their money in insurance shares. But he will do so nevertheless. We see here clearly that not all consequences of our actions are intended consequences; and accordingly, that the conspiracy theory of society cannot be true because it amounts to the assertion that all results, even those which at first sight do not seem to be intended by anybody, are the intended results of the actions of people who are interested in these results.

The examples given do not refute psychologism as easily as they refute the conspiracy theory, for one can argue that it is the seller's knowledge of the buyer's presence in the market, and their hope of getting a higher price - in other words, psychological factors - which explain the reprecussions described. This, of course, is quite true; but we must not forget that this knowledge and this hope are not ultimate data of human nature, and that they are, in their turn, explicable in terms of the social situation - the market situation. "

Marx and Vulgar Marxists

Marx's Method: Chapter 15: Economic Historicism

Extract from "The Open Society and Its Enemies Volume 2: Hegel and Marx" by Karl Raimund Popper (Originally published 1945) (Edition extracts taken from version published by Routledge and Kegan Paul, 5th Edition, 1973 reprint, ISBN 0 7100 4626 X) (Page 100 to 101)
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"To see Marx presented in this way, that is to say, as an opponent of any psychological theory of society, may possibly surprise some Marxists as wall as some Anti-Marxists. For there seem to be many who believe in a very different story. Marx, they think, taught the all-pervading influence of the economic motive in the life of men; he succeeded in explaining its over-powering strength by showing that 'man's overmastering need was to get the means of living'; he thus demonstrated the fundamental importance of such categories as the profit motive or the motive of class interest for the actions not only of individuals but also of social groups; and he showed how to use these categories for explaining the course of history. Indeed, they thing that the very essence of Marxism is the doctrine that economic motives and espeically class interest are the driving forces of history, and that it is precisely this doctrine to which the name 'materialistic interpretation of history' or 'historical materialism' alludes, a name by which Marx and Engels tried to characterize the essence of their teaching.

Such opinions are very common; but I have no doubt that they misinterpret Marx. Those who admire him for having held them, I may call Vulgar Marxists (alluding to the name 'Vulgar Economist' given by Marx to certain of his opponents). The average Vulgar Marxist believes that Marxism lays bare the sinister secrets of social life by revealing the hidden motives of greed and lust for material gain which actuate the powers behind the scenes of history; powers that cunningly and consciously create war, depression, unemployment, hunger in the midst of plenty, and all the other forms of social misery, in order to gratify their vile desires for profit. (And the Vulgar Marxist is sometimes seriously concerned with the problems of reconciling the claims of Marx with those of Freud and Adler; and if he does not choose the one of the other of them, he may perhaps decide that hunger, love and the lust for power are the Three Greate Hidden Motives of Human Nature brought to light by Marx, Frued and Adler, the Three Great Makers of the modern man's philosophy. . .)

Whether or not such views are tenable and attractive, they certainly seem to have very little to do with the doctrine which Marx called 'historical materialism'. It must be admitted that be sometimes speaks of such psychological phenomena as greed and the profit moties, etc., but never in order to explain history. He interpreted them, rather, as symptoms of the corrupting influence of the social system, i.e. of a system of institutions developed during the course of history; as effects rather than causes of corruption; as repercussions rather than moving forces of history. Rightly or wrongly, he saw in such phenomena as war, depression, unemployment, and hunger in the midst of plenty, not the result of cunning conspiracy on the part of 'big business' or of 'imperialist war-mongers', but the unwanted social consequences of actions, directed towards different results, by agents who ware caught in the network of the social system. He looked upon the human actors ont he stage of history, including the 'big' ones, as mere puppets, irresistibly pulled by economic wires - by historical forces over which they have no control. The stage of history, he taught, is set in a social system which binds us all; it is set in the 'kingdom of necessity'. (But one day the puppets will destroy the system and attain the 'kingdom of freedom')

This doctrine of Marx's had been abandoned by most of his followers - perhaps for propagandist reasons, perhaps because they did not understand him - and a Vulgar Marxist Conspiracy Theory has very largely replaced the ingenious and highly original Marxian doctrine. It is a sad intellectual come-down, this come-down from the level of Capital to that of The Myth of the 20th Century."

Marx: Blind Puppets of the Social System

Marx's Method: Chapter 16: The Classes

Extract from "The Open Society and Its Enemies Volume 2: Hegel and Marx" by Karl Raimund Popper (Originally published 1945) (Edition extracts taken from version published by Routledge and Kegan Paul, 5th Edition, 1973 reprint, ISBN 0 7100 4626 X) (Page 112 to 114)
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"Marx gives some indication of how this process of determination works. As we leared from him in the last chapter, we can be free only in so far as we emancipate ourselves from the productive process. But now we shall learn that, in any hithero existing society, we were not free even to that extent. For how could we, he asks, emancipate ourselves from the productive process? Only by making others do the dirty work for us. We are thus forced to use them as means for our ends; we must degrade them. We can buy a greater freedom at the cost of the ruled class, the slaves. But this fact has the consequences that the members of the ruling class must pay for their freedom by a new kind of bondage. They are bound to oppress and to fight the ruled, if they wish to preserve their own freedom and their own status; they are compelled to do this, since he who does not do so ceases to belong to the ruling class. Thus the rulers are determined by their class situation; they cannot escape from their social relation to the ruled; they are bound to them since they are bound to the social metabolism. Thus all, rulers as well as ruled, are caught in the net, and forced to fight one another. According to Marx, it is this bondage, this determination which brings their struggle within the reach of scientific method, and of scientific historical prophecy; which makes it possile to treat the history of society scientifically, as the history of class struggle. This social net is which the classes are caught, and forced to struggle against one another, is what Marxism call the economic struggle of society, or the social system.

According to this theory, social systems or class systems change with the conditions of production, since on these conditions depends the way in which the rulers can exploit and fight the ruled. To every particular period of economic development corresponds a particular social system of classes; this is why we speak of 'feudalism', 'capitalism', etc. 'The hand-mill', Marx writes, 'gives you a society with the fuedal lord; the steam-mill gives you a society with the industrial capitalist.' The class relations that characterize the social system are independent of the individual man's will. The social system thus resembles a vast machine in which the individuals are caught and crushed. 'In the social production of their means of existence', Marx writes, 'men enter into definite and unavoidable relations which are independent of their will. These productive relationships correspond to the particular stage in the development of their material productive forces. The system of all these productive relationsihps constitutes the economic structure of society', i.e. the social system.

Although it has a kind of logic of its own, this social system works blindly, not reasonably. Those who are caught in its machinery are, in general, blind too - or nearly so. They cannot even forsee some of the most important repercussions of their actions. One man might make it impossible for many to procure an article which is available in large quantities; he may buy it just a trifle and thereby prevent a slight decrease of price at a crucial moment. Another may in the goodness of his heart distribute his riches, but by this contributing to a lessening of the class struggle, he may cause a delay in the liberation of the oppressed. Since it is quite impossible to forsee the more remote social repercussions of our actions, since we are one and all caught in the network, we cannot seriously attempt to cope with it. We obviously cannot influence it from outside; but blind as we are, we cannot even make any plan for its improvements from within. Social engineering is impossible, and a social technology therefore useless. We cannot impose our interest upon the social system; instead, the system forces upon us what we are led to believe to be our interests. It does so by forcing us to act in accordance with our class interest. It is vain to lay on the individual, even on the individual 'capitalist' or 'bourgeios', the blame for the injustice, for the immorality of social conditions, since it is this very system of conditions that forces the capitalist to act as he does. And it is also vain to hope that circumstances may be improved by improving men; rather men will be better if the system in which they live is better. 'Only in so far', Marx writes in Capital, 'as the capitalist is personified capital does he play a historical role. . But exactly to that extent his motive is not to obtain and to enjoy useful commodoties, but to increase the production of commodities for exchange' (his real historical task). 'Fanatically bent upon the expansion of value, he ruthlessly drives human beings to produce for production's sake. . With the miser, he shares the passion for wealth. But what is a kind of mania in the miser is in the capitalist the effect of the social mechanism in which he is only a driving-wheel. . Capitalism subjects any individual capitalist to the immanent laws of capitalist production, laws which are external and and coercive. Without respite, competition forces him to extend his capital for the sake of maintaining it.' "

Class Consciousness

Marx's Method: Chapter 16: The Classes

Extract from "The Open Society and Its Enemies Volume 2: Hegel and Marx" by Karl Raimund Popper (Originally published 1945) (Edition extracts taken from version published by Routledge and Kegan Paul, 5th Edition, 1973 reprint, ISBN 0 7100 4626 X) (Page 115)
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"In view of subsequent arguments, a linguistic remark may be added here on the Marxist terms usually translated by the words 'class-conscious' and 'class consciousness'. These terms indicate, first of all, the result of the process analysed above, by which the objective class situation (class interest as well as class struggle) gains consciousness in the minds of its members, or, to express the same through in a language less dependent on Hegel, by which member of a class become conscious of their class situation. Being class-consious, they know not only their place but their true class interest as well. But over and above this, the original German word used by Marx suggests something which is usually lost in the translation. The term is derived from, and alludes to, a common German word which became part of Hegel's jargon. Though its literal translation would be 'self conscious', this word has even in common use rather the meaning of being conscious of one's worth and powers, i.e. of being proud and rully assured of oneself, and even self-satisfied. Accordingly, the term translated as 'class-consious' means in German not simply this, but rather, 'assured or proud of one's class'. and bound to it by the consciousness of the need for solidarity. This is why Marx and the Marxists apply it nearly exclusively to the workers, and hardly ever to the 'bourgeosie'. The class-conscious proletarian - this is the worker who is no only aware of his class situation, but who is also class-proud, fully assured of his class situation, but who is also class-proud, fully assured of the historical mission of his class, and believing that its unflinching fight will bring about a better world."

Problems of taking Marx to Seriously

Marx's Method: Chapter 16: The Classes

Extract from "The Open Society and Its Enemies Volume 2: Hegel and Marx" by Karl Raimund Popper (Originally published 1945) (Edition extracts taken from version published by Routledge and Kegan Paul, 5th Edition, 1973 reprint, ISBN 0 7100 4626 X) (Page 116 to 117)
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"One of the dangers of Marx's formula is that if taken too seriously, it misleads Marxists into interpretting all political conflicts as struggles between exploiters and exploited (or else as attempts to cover up the 'real issue', the underlying calss conflict). As a consequence there were Marxists, especially in Germany, who interpreted a war such as the First World War as one between the revolutionary or 'have-not' Central Powers and an alliance of conservative or 'have' countries - a kind of interpretation which might be used to excuse any aggression. This is only one example of the danger inherant in Marx's sweeping historicist generalization.

On the other hand, his attempt to use what may be called the #logic of the class situation' to explain the working of the institutions of the industrial system seems to me admirable, in spite of certain exaggerations and the neglect of some important aspects of the situation; admirable, at least, as a sociological analysis of that stage of the industrial system which Marx has mainly in mind: the system of 'unrestrained capitalism' (as I shall call it) of one hundred years ago. "

The Impotence of All Politics

Marx's Method: Chapter 17: The Legal and the Social System

Extract from "The Open Society and Its Enemies Volume 2: Hegel and Marx" by Karl Raimund Popper (Originally published 1945) (Edition extracts taken from version published by Routledge and Kegan Paul, 5th Edition, 1973 reprint, ISBN 0 7100 4626 X) (Page 118 to 124)
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"We are now ready to approach what is probably the most crucial point in our analysis as well as in our criticism of Marxism; it is Marx''s theory of the state and - paradoxical as it may sound to some - of the impotence of all politics. "

[text deleted]

"I am far from defending Marx's theory of the state. His theory of the impotence of all politics, more particularly, and his view of democracy, appear to me to be not only mistakes, but fatal mistakes. But it must be admitted that behind these grim as well as ingenious theories, there stodd a grim and depressing experience. And although Marx, in my opinion, failed to understand the future which he so keenly wished to foresee, it seems to me that even his mistaken theories are proof of his keen sociological insight into the conditions of his own time, and of his invincible humanitarianism and sense of justice. "

[text deleted]

"But it was not only Marx's general views of the relations between the economic and the political system that were in this way influenced by his historical experience; his views on liberalism and democracy, more particularly, which he considered to be nothing but veils for the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, furnished an interpretation of the social situation of his time, which appeared to fit only too well, corroborated as it was by sad experience. For Marx lived, espeically in his younger years in a period of the most shameless and cruel exploitation. And this shameless exploitation was cynically defended by hypocritical apologists who appealed to the principle of human freedom, to the right of man to determinate his own fate, an to enter freely into any contract he considers favourable to his interests.

Using the slogan 'equal and free competition for all', the unrestrained capitalism of this period resisted successfully all labour legislation until the year 1833, and its practical execution for many years more. The consequence was a life of desolation and misery which can hardly be imagined in our day. Especially the exploitation of women and children led to incredible suffering. Here are two examples, quoted from Marx's Capital : 'William Wood, 9 years old, was 7 years and 10 months when he began to work . . He came to work every day in the week at 6 a.m., and left off about 9 p.m. . . ' 'Fifteen hours of labour for a child 7 years old!' exclaims an official report of the Children's Employment Commission of 1863. Other children were forced to start work at 4 a.m., or to work, through the night until 6 a.m., and it was not unusual for children of only six years to be forced to a daily toil of 15 hours. - 'Mary Anne Walkley had worked without pause 26 1/2 hours, together with sixty other girls, thirty of them in one room . . A doctor, Mr. Keys, called in too late, testified before the coroner's jury that "Mary Anne Walkley had died from long hours of work in an over-crowded workroom . .". Wishing to give this gentleman a lecture in good manners, the coroner's jury brought in a verdict to the effect that "the deceased had died of apoplexy, but there is reason to fear that her death had been accelerated by overwork in an overcrowded workroom".' Such were the conditions of the working class even in 1863, when Marx was writing Capital; his burning protest against these crimes, which were then tolerated, and sometimes defended, not only by professional economists but also by churchmen, will secure him forever a place among the liberators of mankind. "

[text deleted]

"I believe that the injustice and inhumanity of the unrestrained 'capitalist system' described by Marx cannot be questioned; but it can be interpreted in terms of what we called, in a previous chapter, the paradox of freedom. Freedom, we have seen, defeats itself, if it is unlimited. Unlimited freedom means that a strong man is free to bully one who is weak and to rob him of his freedom. This is why we demand that the state should limit freedom to a certain extent, so that everyone's freedom is protected by law. Nobody should be at the mercy of others, but all should have a right to be protected by the state.

Now I believe that these considerations, originally meant to apply to the realm of brute-force, of physically intimidation, must be applied to the economic realm also. Even if the state protects its citizens from being bullied by physical violence (as it does, in principle, under the system of unrestrained capitalism), it may defeat our ends by its failure to protect them from the misuse of economic power. In such a state, the economically strong is still free to bully one who is economically weak, and to rob him of his freedom. Under these circumstances, unlimited economic freedom can be just as self-defeating as unlimited physical freedom, and economic power may be nearly as dangerious as physical violence; for those who possess as surplus of food can force who are starving into a 'freely' accepted servitude, without using violence. And assuming that the state limits its activities to the suppression of violence (and to the protection of properly), a minority which is economically strong may in this way exploit the majority of those who are economically weak.

If this analysis is correct, when the nature of the remedy is clear. It must be a political remedy - a rememdy similar to the one which we use against physical violence. We must construct social institutions, enforced by the power of the state, for the protection of the economically weak from the economically strong. The state must see to it that nobody need enter into an inequitable arrangement out of fear of starvation, or economic ruin. "

[text deleted]

"As has been rightly emphasized by various writers (among them Bertrand Russell and Walter Lippmann), it is only the active intervention of the state - the protection of property by laws backed by physical sanctions - which makes of wealth a potential source of power; for without this intervention, a man would soon be without his wealth. Economic power is therefore entirely dependent on political and physical power. Russell gives historical examples which illustrate this dependence, and sometimes even helplessness, of wealth; 'Economic power within the state,' he writes, 'although ultimately derived from law and public opinion, easily acquires a certain independent. It can influence law by corruption and public opinion by properganda. It can pu politicians under obligations which interfere with their freedom. It can threaten to cause a financial crisis. But there are very definite limits to what it can achieve. Caesar was helped to power by his creditors, who saw no hope of repayment except through his success; but when he had succeeded he was poweful enough to defy them. Charles V borrowed from the Fuggers the money reuqired to buy the position of Emmporer, but when he had bcome Emporer he snapped his fingers at them and they lost what they had lent.'

The dogma that economic power is at the root of all evil must be discarded. Its place must be taken by an understanding of the dangers of any form of uncontrolled power. Money as such is not particularly dangerous. It becomes dangerous only if it can buy power, either directly, or by enslaving the economically weak who must sell themselves in order to live.

We must think in these matters in even more materialist terms, as it were, than Marx did. We must realize that the control of physical power and of physical exploitation remains the central political problem. In order to establish this control, we must establish 'merely formal freedom'. Once we have achieved this, and have learned how to use it for the control of political power, everything rests with us. We must not blame anybody else any longer, nor cry out against the sinister economic demons behind the scemes. For in a democracy, we hold the keys to the control of the demons. We can tame them. We must realize this and use the keys; we must construct institutions for the democratic control of economic power, and for our protection from economic exploitation. "

Ruling using Institutional vs Discretionary Powers

Marx's Method: Chapter 17: The Legal and the Social System

Extract from "The Open Society and Its Enemies Volume 2: Hegel and Marx" by Karl Raimund Popper (Originally published 1945) (Edition extracts taken from version published by Routledge and Kegan Paul, 5th Edition, 1973 reprint, ISBN 0 7100 4626 X) (Page 133 to 134)
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"In spite of this, the obvious policy of preferring where possible the institutional method is far from being generally accepted. The failure to accept it is, I suppose, due to different reasons. One is that it needs a certain detachment to embark on the long-term taks of re-designing the 'legal framework'. But governments live from hand to mouth, and discretionary powers belong to this style of living - quite apart from the fact that rulers are inclined to love those powers for their own sake. But the most important reason is, undoubtedly, that the significance of the distinction between the two methods is not understood. The way to its understanding is blocked to the followers of Platon, Hegel and Marx. They will never see that the old question 'Who shall be the rulers?' must be superseded by the more real one 'How can we tame them?'

VII

If we now look back at Marx's theory of the impotence of politics and of the power of historical forces, then we must admit that it is an imposing edifice. It is the direct result of his sociological method; of his economic historicism, of the doctrine that the development of the economic system, or of man's metabolism, determines his social and political development. The experience of his time, his humanitarian indignation, and the need of bringing to the oppressed thte consolation of al prophecy, the hope, or even the certainty, of their victory, all this is united in one gradiose philosophical system, comparable or even superior to the holistic systems of Platon and Hegel.

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With this, I conclude my critical analysis of Marx's philosophy of the method of social science, of his economic determination as well as of his prophetic historicism. The final test of a method, however, must be its practical results. I therefore proceed now to a more detailed examination of the main result of his method, the prophecy of the impending advent of a classless society."

The Coming of Socialism

Marx's Prophecy: Chapter 18: The Coming of Socialism

Extract from "The Open Society and Its Enemies Volume 2: Hegel and Marx" by Karl Raimund Popper (Originally published 1945) (Edition extracts taken from version published by Routledge and Kegan Paul, 5th Edition, 1973 reprint, ISBN 0 7100 4626 X) (Page 135 to 139)
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"Economic historicism is the method applied by Marx to an analysis of the impending changes in our society. According to Marx, every particular social system must destroy itself, simply because it must create the forces which produce the next historical period. A sufficeintly penetrating analysis of the feudel system, undertaken shortly before the industrial revolution, might have led to the detection of the forces which were about to destroy feudelism, and to the prediction of the most important characteristics of the coming period, capitalism, and to predict the most important characteristics of the nwe historical period which lies ahead of us. For there is surely no reason to believe that capitalism, of all social systems, will last for ever. On the contrary, the material conditions of production, and with them, the ways of human life, have never changed so quickly as they have done under capitalism. By changing its own foundations in this way, capitalism is bound to transform itself, and to produce a new period in the history of mankind.

According to Marx's method, the principles of which have been discussed above, the fundamental or essential forces which will destroy or transform capitalism must be searched for in the evolution of the material means of production. Once these fundamental forces have been discovered, it is possible to trace their influence upon the social relationships between classes as wel as upon the juridicial and political systems.

The analysis of the fundamental economic forces and the suicidal historical tendencies of the period which he called 'capitalism' was undertaken by Marx in Capital, the great work of his life. The historical period and the economic system he dealt with was that of western Europe and especially England, from about the middle of the eighteenth century to 1867 (the year of the first publication of Capital). The 'ultimate aim of this', as Marx explained in his preface, was 'to lay bare the economic law of motion of modern society', in order to prophesy its fate. A secondary aim was the refutation of the apologists of capitalism, of the economists who presented the laws of the capitalist mode of production as if they were inexorable laws of nature, declaring with Burke: 'The laws of commerce are the laws of nature, and therefore the laws of God.' Marx contrasted these allegedly inexorable laws with those which he maintained to be the only inexorable laws of society, namely, its laws of development; and he tried to show that what the economists declared to be eternal and immutable laws were in fact merely temporary regularities, doomed to be destroyed together with capitalism itself.

Marx's historical prophecy can be described as a closely knit argument. But Capital elaborates only what I shall call the 'first step' of this argument, the analysis of the fundamental economic forces of capitalism and their influence upon the relations between the classes. The 'second step', which leads to the conclusion that a social revolution is inevitable, and the 'third step', which leads t the prediction of the emergence of a classless, i.e. socialist society, are only sketched. In this chapter, I shall first explain more clearly what I call the three steps of Marxist argument, and then discuss the third of these steps in detail. In the two following chapters, I shall discuss the second and the first steps. To reverse the order of the steps in this way turns out to be the best for a detailed critical discussion; the advantage lies in the fact that it is then easier to assume without prejudice that truth of the premises of each step of the argument, and to concentrate entirely upon the question whether the conclusion reached in this particular step follows from its premises. Here are the three steps.

In the first step of his argument, Marx analyses the method of capitalist production. He finds that there is a tendency towards an increase of productivity of work, connected with technical improvements as well as with what he calls the increasing accumulation of the means of production. Starting from here, the argument leads him to conclusion that in the realm of the social relations between the classes this tendency must lead to the accumulation of more and more wealth in fewer and fewer hands; that is to say, the conclusion is reached that there will be a tendency towards an increase of wealth and misery; of wealth in the ruling class, the bourgeoisie, and of misery in the ruled class, the workers. This first step will be treated in chapter 20 ('Capitalism and its Fate').

In the second step of the argument, the result of this first step is taken for granted. From it, two conclusions are drawn; first, that all classes except a small ruling bourgeoisie and a large exploited working class are bound to disappera, or to become insignificant; secondly, that the increasing tension between these two classes must lead to a social revolution. This step will be analysed in Chapter 19 ('The Social Revolution').

In the third step of the argument, the conclusions of the second step are taken for granted in their turn; and the final conclusion reached is that, after the citory of the workers over the bourgeoisie, there will be a society consisting of one class only, and, therefore, a classless society, a society without exploitation; that is to say, socialism.

II

I now proceed to the discussion of the third step, of the final prophecy of the coming of socialism.

The main premises of this step, to be criticized in the next chapter but here to be taken for granted, are these: the development of capitalism has led to the elimination of all classes but two, a small bourgeoisie and a huge proletariat; and the increase in misery has forced the latter to revoled against its exploiters. The conclusions are, first, that the workers must win the struggle, secondly that, by eliminating the bourgeoisie, they must establish a classless society, since only one class remains.

Now I am prepared to grant the conclusion follows from the premises (in conjuction with a few premises of minor importance which we need not question). Not only is the number of the bourgeoisie small, but their physical existence, their 'metabolism', depends upon the proletariat. The exploiter, the drone, starves without the exploited; in any case, if he destroys the exploited then he ends his own career as a drone. Thus he cannot win; he can, at the best, put up a prolonged struggle. The worker, on the other hand, does not depend for his material subsistence on his exploiter; once the worker revolts, once he has decided to challenge the existing order, the exploiter has no essential social function any longer. The worker can destroy his class enemy without endangering his own existence. Accordingly, there is only one outcome possible. The bourgeoisie will disappear.

But does the second conclusion follow? Is it true that the workers' victory must lead to a classless society? I do not think so. From the fact that of the two classes only one reamins, it does not follow that there will be a classless society. Classes are not like individuals, even if we admit that they behave nearly like individuals so long as there are two classes who are joined in battle. The unity or solidarity of a class, according to Marx's own analysis, is part of the class consciousness, which in turn is very largely a product of the class struggle. There is no earthly reason why the individual who form the proletariat should retain their class unity once the pressure of the struggle against the common class enemy has ceased. Any latent conflict of interests is now likely to develop into a new class struggle. (The principles of dialectics would suggest that a new antithesis, a new class antagonism, must soon develop. Yet, of course, dialectics is sufficiently vague and adaptable to explain anything at all, and therefore a classless society also, as a dialectically necessary synthesis of an antithetical development.)

The most likely development is, of course, that those actually in power at the moment of victory - those of the revolutionary leaders who have survived the struggle for power and the various purges, together with their staff - will form a New Class: the new ruling class of the new society, a kind of new aristocracy or bureaucracy; and it is most likely that they will attempt to hid this fact. This they can do, most conveniently, by retaining as much as possible of the revolutionary ideology, taking advantage of these sentiments instead of wasting their time in efforts to destroy them (in accordance with Pareto's advice to all rulers). fsAnd it seems likely enough that they will be able to make fullest use of the revolutionary ideology if at the same time they exploit the fear of counter-revolutionary developments. In this way, the revolutionary ideology will serve them for apologetic purposes: it will serve them both as a vindication of the use they make of their power, and as a means of stabilizing it; in short, as a new 'opium for the people'.

Something of this kind are the events which, on Marx's own premises, are likely to happen. Yet it is not my task here to make historical prophecies (or to interpret the past history of many revolutions). I merely wish to show that Marx's conclusion, the prophecy of the coming of a classless society, does not follow from the premises. The third step of Marx's argument must be pronounced to be inconclusive.

More than this I do not maintain. I do think, more particularly, that it is possible to prophesy that socialism will not come, or to say that the premises of the argument make the introductin of socialism unlikely. It is, for instance, possibly that the prolonged struggle and the enthusiasm of victory may contribute to a feeling of solidarity strong enough to continue until laws preventing exploitation and misuse of power are established. (The establishment of institutions for the democratic control of the rulers is the only guarantee for the elimination of exploitation.) The chances of founding such a society will depend, in my opinion, very largely upon the devotion of the workers to the ideas of socialism and freedom, as opposed to the immediate interests of their class. These are matter which cannot be easily forseen; all that can certainly be said is that class truggle as such does not always produce lasting solidarity among the oppressed. There are examples of such solidarity and great devotion to the common cause; but there are also examples of groups of workers who pursue their particular group interest even where it is in open conflict with the interest of the other workers, and with the idea of the solidarity of the oppressed. Exploitation need not disappear with the bourgeoisie, since it is quite possible that groups of workers may obtain privileges which amount to an exploitation of less fortunate groups."

Laissez-faire capitalism being replaced by interventionism

Marx's Prophecy: Chapter 18: The Coming of Socialism

Extract from "The Open Society and Its Enemies Volume 2: Hegel and Marx" by Karl Raimund Popper (Originally published 1945) (Edition extracts taken from version published by Routledge and Kegan Paul, 5th Edition, 1973 reprint, ISBN 0 7100 4626 X) (Page 140 to 141)
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"If we now look a little more closely at these forces, and at our own present economic system, then we can see that our theoretical criticism is borne out by experience. But we must be on our guard against misinterpreting experience in the light of the Marxist prejudice that 'socialism' or 'communism' is the only alternative and the only possible successor to 'capitalism'. Neither Marx nor anybody else has ever shown that socialism, in the sense of a classless society, of 'an association in which the free development of each is the warrant for the free development of all', is the only possible alternative to the ruthless exploitation of that economic system which he first described a century ago (in 1845), and to which he gave the name 'capitalism'. And indeed, if anybody were attempting to prove that socialism is the only possible successor to Marx's unrestrained 'capitalism', then we could simly refute him by pointing to historical facts. For laissez-faire has disappeared from the face of the earth, but it has not been replaced by a socialist or community system as Marx understood it. Only in the Russian sixth of the earth do we find an economic system where, in accordance with Marx's prophecy, the means of production are owned by the state, whose political might however shows, in opposition to Marx's prophecy, no inclination to wither away. But all over the earth, organised political power has begun to perform far-reaching economic functions. Unrestrained capitalism has given way to a new historical period, to our own period of political interventionism of the economic interference of the state. Interventionism has assumed various forms. There is the Russian variety; there is the fascist form of totalitarianism; and there is the democratic interventionism of England, of the United States, and of the 'Smaller Democracies', led by Sweden, where the technology of democratic interventionalism has reached its highest level so far. The development which led to this intervention started in Marx's own day, with British factory legislation. It made it first decisive advances with the introduction of the 48-hour week, and later with the introduction of unemployment insurance and other forms of social insurance. How utterly absurd it is to identify the economic system of the modern democracies with the system Marx called 'capitalism' can be seen at a glance, by comparind it with his 10-point programme for the communist revolution

If we omit the rather insignificant point of the programmer (for instance, '4. Confiscation of the properly of all emigrants and rebels'), then we can say that in the democracies most of these points have been put into practice, either completely, or to a considerable degree; and with them, many more important steps, which Marx never through of, have been made in the direction of social security. I mention only the following points of his programme: 2. A heavy progressive or graduated income tax. (Carried out.) 3. Abolition of all right of inheritance. (Largely realized by heavy death duties. Where more would be disirable is at least doubtful.) 6. Central control by the state of the means of communication and transport. (For military reasons this was carried out in Central Europe before the war of 1914, without very beneficial results. It has also be achieved in the Smaller Democracies.) 7. Increase in the number and size of factories and instruments of production owned by the state . . (Realised in the Smaller Democracies; whether this is always very beneficial is at least doubtful.) 10. Free education for all children in public (i.e. state) schools. Abolition of children's factory labour in its present form . . (The first demand is fulfilled in the Smaller Democracies, and to some extent practically everywhere; the second has been exceeded.)

A number of points in Marx's programme (for instance: 'I. Abolition of all properly in land') have not been realized in the democratic countries. This is why Marxists rightly claim that these countries have not estrablished 'socialism'. But if they infer from this that these countries are still 'capitalist' in Marx's sense, then they only demonstrate the dogmatic character of their presupposition that there is no further alternative. This shows how it is possible to be blinded by the glare of a preconceived system. Not only is Marxism a bad guide to the future, but it also renders its followers incapable of seeing what is happening before their own eyes, in their own historical period, and sometimes even with their own co-operation."

The poverty of post revolution socialist and Marxist policy

Marx's Prophecy: Chapter 18: The Coming of Socialism

Extract from "The Open Society and Its Enemies Volume 2: Hegel and Marx" by Karl Raimund Popper (Originally published 1945) (Edition extracts taken from version published by Routledge and Kegan Paul, 5th Edition, 1973 reprint, ISBN 0 7100 4626 X) (Page 144 to 145)
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"One can say that the split between the Central European Communists and Social Democrats was one between those Marxists who had a kind of irrational failth in the final success of the Russian experiment, and those who were, more reasonably sceptical of it. When I say 'irrational' and 'more reasonable', I judge them by their own standard, by Marxism; for according to Marxism, the proletarian revolution should have been the final outcome of industrailization, and not vice versa; and it should have come first in the highly industrialized countries, and only later in Russia.

This remark is not, however, intended as a defence of the Social Democratic leaders whose policy was fully determined by the Marxist prophecy, by their implicit belief that socialism must come. But this belief was often combined, in the leaders, with a hopeless scepticism concering their own immediate functions and tasks, and what lay immediately ahead. They had learned from Marxism to organize the workers, and to inspire them with a truely wonderful faith in their task, the liberation of mankind. But they were unable to prepare for the realization of their promises. They had learned their textbooks well, they knew all about 'scientific socialism', and they knew that the preparation of recipies for the future was unscientific Utopianism. Had not Marx himself ridiculed a follower of Compte who had critizied him in Revue Positiviste for his neglect of practical programmes? 'The Revue Positiviste accuses me', Marx had said scornfully, 'of a metaphysical treatment of economics, and further - you would hardly guess it - of confining myself to a merely critical analysis of actual facts, instread of prescribing recipes (Comtist ones, perhaps?) for the kitchen in which the future is cooked.' Thus the Marxist leaders knew better than to waste their time on such matters as technology. 'Workers of all countries unite!' - that exhausted their practical programme. When the workers of their countries were united, when there was an opportunity of assuming responsibility of government and laying the foundations for a better world, when their hour had struck, they left the workers high and dry. The leaders did not know what to do. They waited for the promised suicide of capitalism. After the inevitable capitalist collapse, when things had gone thoroughly wrong, when everything was in dissolution and risk of discredit and disgrace to themselves considerably diminished, then they hoped to become saviours of mankind. (And, indeed, we should keep in mind the fact that the success of the Communist in Russia was undoubtedly made possible, in part, by the terrible things that had happened before their rise to power.) But when the great depression, which they first welcomed as the promised collapse, was running its course, they began to realize that the workers were growing tired of being fed and put off with interpretations of history; that it was not enough to tell them that according to the infallible scientific socialism of Marx fascism was definitely the last stand of capitalism before its impending collapse. The suffering masses needed more than that. Slowly the leaders began to realize the terrible consequences of a policy of waiting and hoping for the great political miracle. But it was too late. Their opportunity was gone.

These remarks are very sketchy. But they give some indication of the practical consequences of Marx's prophecy of the coming of socialism."

An increase in wealth and misery

Marx's Prophecy: Chapter 19: The Social Revolution

Extract from "The Open Society and Its Enemies Volume 2: Hegel and Marx" by Karl Raimund Popper (Originally published 1945) (Edition extracts taken from version published by Routledge and Kegan Paul, 5th Edition, 1973 reprint, ISBN 0 7100 4626 X) (Page 146 to 148)
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"The second step of Marx's prophetic arugment has as it most relevant premise that assumption that capitalism must lead to an increase of wealth and misery; of wealth in the numerically declining bourgeoisie, and of misery in the numerically increasing working class. This assumption will be criticized in the next chapter but is here taken for granted. The conclusion drawn from it can be divided into two parts. The first part is a prophecy concering the development of the class structure of capitalism. It affirms that all classes apart from the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, and especially the so-called middle classes, are bound to disappear, and that, in consequence of the increasing tension between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, the latter will become increasingly class-consciour and united. The second part is the prophecy that this tension cannot possibly be removed, and that it will lead to a proletarian social revolution.

I believe that neither of the two conclusions follows from the premise. My criticism will be, in the main, similar to that propounded in the last chapter; that is to say, I shall try to show that Marx's argument neglects a great number of possible developments."

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"Thus, as opposed to Marx's prephecy which insists that there must develop a neat division between two classes, we find that on his own assumptions, the following class structure may possibly develop: (1) bourgeosie, (2) big landed proprietors, (3) other landowners, (4) rural workers, (5) new middle class, (6) industrial workers, (7) rabble proletariat. (An other combination of these classes may, of course, develop too.) And we find, furthermore, that such as development may possibly undermine the unity of (6).

We can say, therefore, that the first conclusion of the second step of Marx's argument does not follow. But as in my criticism of the third step, here also I must say that I do not intend to replace Marx's prophecy by another one. I do not assert that the prophecy cannot come true, or that the alternative developments I have described will come to pass. I only assert that they may come to pass. (And, indeed, this possibility can hardly be denied by members of the radical Marxist wings who use the accusation of treachery, bribery, and insufficient class solidarity as favourite devices for explaining away developments which do not conform to the prophetic schedule.) That such things may happen should be clear to anybody who has observed the development which has led to fascism, in which all the possibilities I have mentioned played a part. But the mere possibility is sufficeint to destroy the first conclusion reached in the second step of Marx's argument.

This of course affectcs the second conclusion, the prophecy of the coming social revolution. But before I can enter into a criticism of the way in which this prophecy is arrived at, it is necessary to discuss at some length the role played by it within the whole argument, as well as Marx's use of the term 'social revolution'."

Characterizing democracy

Marx's Prophecy: Chapter 19: The Social Revolution

Extract from "The Open Society and Its Enemies Volume 2: Hegel and Marx" by Karl Raimund Popper (Originally published 1945) (Edition extracts taken from version published by Routledge and Kegan Paul, 5th Edition, 1973 reprint, ISBN 0 7100 4626 X) (Page 160 to 162)
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"But this criticism, practical as it is, and corroborated by experience is only superficial. The main defects of the doctrine lie deeper. The criticism I now wish to offer attempts to show that both the presupposition of the doctrine and its tactical consequences are such that they are likely to produce exactly that anti-democratic reaction of the bourgeoisie which the theory predicts, yet claims (with ambiguity) to abhor : the strengthening of the anti-democratic element in the bourgeoisie, and, in consequence, civil war. And we know that this may lead to defeat, and to facism.

The criticism I have in mind in, briefly, that Engle's tactical doctrine, and, more generally, the ambiguities of violence and of power-conquest, make the working of democracy impossible, once they are adopted by an important political party. I base this criticism on the contention that democracy can work only if the main parties adhere to a view of its functiona which may be summarized in some rules such as these (cp. also section II of chapter 7):

(1) Democracy cannot be fully characterised as the rule of the majority, although the institution of general elections is most important. For a majority might rule in a tyrannical way. (The majority of those who are less than 6 ft. high may decide that the minority of those over 6 ft. shall pay all taxes.) In a democracy, the powers of the rulers must be limited; and the criterion of a democracy is this: In a democracy, the rulers - that is to say, the government - can be dismissed by the ruled without bloodshed. Thus if the men in power do not safeguard those institutions which secure to the minority the possibility of working for a peaceful change, then their rule is a tyranny.

(2) We need only distinguish between two forms of government, viz. such as possess institutions of this kind, and all others; i.e. democracies and tyrannies.

(3) A consistent democratic constitution should exclude only one type of change in the legal system, namely a change which would endanger its democratic character.

(4) In a democracy, the full protection of minorities should not extend to those who vilate the law, and especially not to those who incite others to the violent overthrow of the democracy.

(5) A policy of framing institutions to safeguard democracy must always proceed on the assumption that there may be anti-democratic tendencies latent among the ruled as well as mong the rulers.

(6) If democracy is destroyed, all rights are destroyed. Even if certain economic advantages enjoyed by the ruled should persist, they would persist only on sufference.

(7) Democracy provides an invaluable battle-ground for any reasonable reform, since it permits reform without violence. But if the preservation of democracy is not made the first consideration in any particular battle fought out on this battle-ground, then the latent anti-democratic tendencies which are always present (and which appeal to those who suffer under the strain of civilisation, as we called it in chapter 10) may bring about a breakdown of democracy. If an understanding of these principles is not yet developed, its development must be fought for. The opposite policy may prove fatal; it may bring about the loss of the most important battle, the battle for democracy itself.

As opposed to such a policy, that of Marxist parties can be characterized as one of making the workers suspicious of democracy. 'In reality the state is nothing more', says Engels, 'than a machine for the oppression of one class by another, and this holds for a democratic republic no less than for a monarchy.' But such views must produce:

(a) A policy of blaming democracy for all the evils which it does not prevent, instead of recognizing that the democrats are to be blamed, and the opposition usually no less than the majority. (Every opposition has the majority it deserves.)

(b) A policy of educating the ruled to consider the state not as theirs, but as belonging to the rulers.

(c) A policy of telling them that there is only one way to improve things, that of the complete conquest of power. But this neglects the one really important thing about democracy, that it check and balances power.

Such a policy amounts to doing the work of the enemies of the open society; it provides them with an unwitting fifth column. And against the Manifesto which says ambigiously : 'The first step in the revolution of the working class is to raise the proletariat to the position of the ruling class - to win the battle of democracy', I assert that if this is accepted as the first step, then the battle of democracy will be lost.

These are the general consequences of Engle's tactical doctrines, and of the ambiguities grounded in the theory of the social revolution. Ultimately, they are merely the last consequences of Plato's way of posing the problem of politics by asking 'who should rule the state?' (cp. chapter 7). It is high time for us to learn that the question 'who is to wield the power in the state?' matters only little as compared with the question 'how is the power wielded?' and 'how much power is wielded?' We must learn that in the long run, all political problems are institutional problems, problems of the legal framework rather than of persons, and that progress towards more equality can be safeguarded only by institutional control of power."

Talking War and Acting Peace

Marx's Prophecy: Chapter 19: The Social Revolution

Extract from "The Open Society and Its Enemies Volume 2: Hegel and Marx" by Karl Raimund Popper (Originally published 1945) (Edition extracts taken from version published by Routledge and Kegan Paul, 5th Edition, 1973 reprint, ISBN 0 7100 4626 X) (Page 162 to 164)
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"As in the previous chapter, I shall now illustrate the scond step by showing something of the way in which the prophecy influenced recent historical developments. All political partids have some sort of 'vested interest' in their opponent's unpopular moves. They live by them and are therefore liable to dwell upon, to emphasize, and even to look forward to them. They may even encourage the political mistakes of their opponents as long as they can do so without becoming involved in the responsibility for them. This, together with Engel's theory, has led some Marxist parties to look forward to the political moves made by their opponents against democracy. Instead of fighting such moves tooth and nail, they were pleased to tell their followers : 'See what these people do. This is what they call democracy. That is what they call freedom and equality! Remember it when the day of reckoning comes.' (An ambigous phrase which may refer to election day or to the day of revolution.) This policy of letting one's opponents expose themselves must, if extended to moves against democracy, lead to disaster. It is a policy of talking big and doing nothing in the face of real and increasing danger to democratic institutions. It is a policy of talking war and acting peace; and it taught the facists the invaluable method of talking peace and acting war."

[TEXT DELETED]

The facts of the development described can, if one wishes be interpreted differently; they may lead to the conclusion that democracy is 'not good'. This is indeed a conclusion which many Marxists have drawn. After having been defeated in what they believed to be the democratic struggle (which they had lost in the momment they formulated their tactical doctrine), they said: 'We have been too lenient, too humane - next time we will make a really bloody revolution!' It is as if a man who loses a boxing match should conclude: boxing is no good - I should have used a club . . The fact is that Marxists taught the theory of class war to the workers, but the practice of it to the reactionary diehards of the bourgeoisie. Marx talked war. His opponenets listened attentively; then they began to talk peace and accuse the workers of belligerency; this charge the Marxists could not deny, since class war was their slogan. And the fascists acted."

Law of Increasing Misery

Marx's Prophecy: Chapter 20: Capitalism and its Fate

Extract from "The Open Society and Its Enemies Volume 2: Hegel and Marx" by Karl Raimund Popper (Originally published 1945) (Edition extracts taken from version published by Routledge and Kegan Paul, 5th Edition, 1973 reprint, ISBN 0 7100 4626 X) (Page 169 to 170)
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"This may suffice to explain the term 'increasing misery'. But it is still necessary to explain the law of increasing mysery which Marx claimed to have discovered. By this I mean the doctrine of Marx on which the whole prophetic argument hinges; namely, the doctrine that capitalism cannot possibly afford to decrease the misery of the workers, since the mechanism of capitalist accumulation keeps the capitalist under a strong economic pressure which he is forced to pass on to the workers, even if they wished to do so; this is why 'capitalism cannot be reformed but can only be destroyed'. It is clear that this law is the decisive conclusion of the first step. The other conclusion, the law of increasing wealth, would be a harmless matter, if only it were possible for the increase of wealth to be shared by the workers. Marx's contention that this is impossible will therefore be the main subject of our critical analysis. But before proceeding to a presentation and criticism of Marx's arguments in favour of this contention, I may briefly comment on the first part of the conclusion, the theory of increasing wealth.

The tendency towards the accumulation and concentration of wealth, which Marx observed, can hardly be questioned. His theory of increasing productivity is also, in the main, unexceptionable. Although there may be limits to the beneficial effects exerted by the growth of an enterprise upon it productivity, there are hardly any limits to the beneficial effects of the improvement and accumulation of machinery. But in regard to the tendency towards the centralization of capital in fewer and fewer hands, matters are not quite so simple. Undoubtedly there is a tendency in that directio, and we may grant that under an unrestrained capitalist system there are few counteracting forces. Not much can be said against this part of Marx's analysis as a description of an unrestrained capitalism. But considered as a prophecy, it is less tenable. For we know that now there are many means by which legislations can intervene. Taxation and death duties can be used most effectively to counteract centralization, and they have been so used. And anti-trust legislation can also be used, although perhaps with less effect. To evaluate the force of Marx's prophetic argument we must consider the possibility of great improvements in this direction; and as in previous chapters, I must declare that the argument on which Marx bases his prophecy of centralization or of a decrease in the number of capitalists is inconclusive."

Marx's Theory of Value

Marx's Prophecy: Chapter 20: Capitalism and its Fate

Extract from "The Open Society and Its Enemies Volume 2: Hegel and Marx" by Karl Raimund Popper (Originally published 1945) (Edition extracts taken from version published by Routledge and Kegan Paul, 5th Edition, 1973 reprint, ISBN 0 7100 4626 X) (Page 170)
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"Marx's theory of value, usually considered by Marxists as well as by anti-Marxists as a corner-stone of the Marxist creed, is in my opinion one of its rather unimportant parts; indeed, the sole reason why I am going to treat of it, instead of proceeding at once to the next section, is that it is generally held to be important, and that I cannot defend by reasons for differing from this opinion without discussing the theory. But I wish to make it clear at once that in holding that the theory of value is a redundant part of Marxism, I am defneding Marx rather than attacking him. For there is little doubt that the many critics who have shown that the theory of value is very weak in itself are in the main perfectly right. But even if they were wrong, it would only strengthn the position of Marxism if it could be established that its decisive historico-political doctrines can be developed entirely independently of such a controversial theory."

Marx's Theory of the Trade Cycle

Marx's Prophecy: Chapter 20: Capitalism and its Fate

Extract from "The Open Society and Its Enemies Volume 2: Hegel and Marx" by Karl Raimund Popper (Originally published 1945) (Edition extracts taken from version published by Routledge and Kegan Paul, 5th Edition, 1973 reprint, ISBN 0 7100 4626 X) (Page 179 to 180)
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"The significance of Marx's analysis rest very largely upon the fact that a surplus population actually existed at this time, and down to our day (a fact which has hardly received a really satisfactory explanation yet, as I said before). So far, however, we have not yet discussed Marx's argument in support of his contention that it is the mechanism of capitalist production itself that always produces the surplus population which it needs for keeping down the wages of the employed workers. But this theory is not only ingenious and interesting in itself; it contains at the same time Marx's theory of the trade cycle and of general depressions, a theory which clearly bears upon the prophecy of the crash of the capitalist system because of the intolerable misery which is must produce. In order to make as strong a case for Marx's theory as I can, I have altered it slightly (namely, by introducing a distinction between two kinds of machinery, the one for the mere extension, and the other for the intensification of production). Thus this alternation need not arouse the suspicion of Marxist readers, for I am not going to criticize the theory at all."

[TEXT DELETED] "In Marx's day, nobody ever thought of that technique of state intervention which is now called 'counter cycle policy'; and, indeed, such a thought myst be utterly foreign to an unrestrained capitalist system. (But even before Marx's time, we find the beginning of doubts about, and even investigations into, the wisdom of the credit policy of the bank of England during a depression(29).)" Unemployment insurance, however, means intervention, and therefore an increase in the responsibility of the state, and it is likely to lead to experiments in coutner cycle policy. I do not maintain that these experiments must necessarily be successful (although I do believe that the problem may in the end prove not so very difficult, and that Sweden (30), in particular, has already shown what can be done in this field)."

[TEXT DELETED]

"When the Marxists way, as they sometimes do, that Marx has proved the uselessness of a counter cycle policy and of similar piecemean measures, then they simply do not speak the truth; Marx investigated an unrestrained capitalism, and he never dreamt of interventionism. He therefore never investigated the possibility of systematic interference with the trade cycle, much less did he offer a proof of its impossiblity. It is strange to find that the same people who complain of the irresponsibility of the capitalist in the face of human suffering are irresponsible enough to oppose, with dogmatic assertions of this kind, experiments from which we may learn how to relieve human suffering (how to become masters of our social environment as Marx would have said), and how to control some of the unwanted social repercussions of our actions. But the apologists of Marxism are quite unaware of the fact that in the name of their own vested interests they are fighting against progress; they do not see that it is the danger of any movement like Marxism that it soon comes to represent all kinds of vested interests, and that there are intellectual investments, as well as material ones."

The British inconsiderately falsifying Marxist Prophecies

Marx's Prophecy: Chapter 20: Capitalism and its Fate

Extract from "The Open Society and Its Enemies Volume 2: Hegel and Marx" by Karl Raimund Popper (Originally published 1945) (Edition extracts taken from version published by Routledge and Kegan Paul, 5th Edition, 1973 reprint, ISBN 0 7100 4626 X) (Page 186 to 187)
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"Marx's terrible picture of the economy of his time is only too true. But his law that misery must increase together with accumulation does not hold. Means of production have accumulated and the productivity of labour has increased since his day to an extent which even he would hardly have thought possible. But child labour, working hours, and agony of toil, and the precariousness of the worker's existence, have not increased; they have declined. I do not say that this process must continue. There is no law of progress, and everything will depend on ourselves. But the actual sitation is briefly and fairly summed up by Parkes (36) in one sentence: 'Low wages, long hours, and child labour have been characteristic of capitalism not, as Marx predicted, in its old age, but in its infancy.

Unrestrained capitalism is gone, Since the day of Marx, democratic interventionism has made immense advances, and the improved productivity of labour - a consequence of the accumulation of capital - has made it possibly virtually to stamp out misery. This shows that much has been achived, in spite of undoubtedly grave mistakes, and it should encourage us to believe that more can be done. For much reamins to be done and to be undone. Democratic interventionism can only make it possible. it rests with us to do it.

I have no illusions concerning the force of my arguments. Experience shows that Marx's prophecies were fales. But experience can always be explained away. And, indeed, Marx himself, and Engels, began with the elaboration of an auxiliary hypothesis designed to explain why the law of increasing misery does not work as they expected it to do.

[TEXT DELETED]

Marx blamed capitalism for 'proletarianizing the middle class and the lower bourgeoisie', and for reducing the workers to pauperism. Engels now blames the system - it is still blamed - for making bourgeois out of workers. But the nicest touch in Engel's complaint is the indignation that makes him call the British who behave to inconsiderately as to falsify Marxist prophecies 'this most bourgeois of all nations'. According to Marxist doctrine, we should expect from the 'most bourgeois of all nations' a development of misery and class tension to an intolerable degree; instead, we hear that the opposite takes place. But the good Marxist's hair rises when he hears of the incredible wickedness of a capitalist system that tranforms good proletarians into bad bourgeois; quite forgetting that Marx showed that the wickedness of the system consisted solely in the fact that it was working the other way round."

What Marx would have called 'the inner contradictions' of their policy.

Marx's Prophecy: Chapter 20: Capitalism and its Fate

Extract from "The Open Society and Its Enemies Volume 2: Hegel and Marx" by Karl Raimund Popper (Originally published 1945) (Edition extracts taken from version published by Routledge and Kegan Paul, 5th Edition, 1973 reprint, ISBN 0 7100 4626 X) (Page 190 to 192)
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"The position of the Communist parties was different. They strictly adhered to the theory of increasing misery, believing in an increase not only of its extent but also of its intensity, once the causes of the emporary bourgeoisification of the workers were removed. This belief contributed considerably to what Marx would have called 'the inner contradictions' of their policy.

The tactical situation seems simple enough. Thanks to Marx's prophecy, the Communists knew for certain that misery must soon increase. They also knew that the party could not win the confidence of the workers without fighting for them, and with them, for an improvement of their lot. These two fundamental assumptions clearly determined the principles of their general tactics. Make the workers demand their share, back them up in every particular episode in their unceasing fight for bread and shelter. Fight with them tenaciously for the fulfilment of their practical demands, whether economic or political. Thus you will win their confidence. At the same time, the workers will learn that it is impossible for them to better their lot by these petty fights, and that nothing short of a wholesale revolution can bring about an improvement; we know from Marx that the capitalists simply cannot continue to compromise and that, ultimately, misery must increase. Accordingly, the only result - but a valuable one - of the workers' daily fight against their oppressors is an increase in their class consciousness; it is that feeling of unity which can be won only in battle, together with a desparate knowledge that only revolution can help them in their misery. When this stage is reached, then the hour has struck for the final show-down.

This is the theory and the Communists acted accordingly. At first they support the workers in their fight to improve their lot. But, contrary to all expectations and prophecies, the fith is successful. The demands are granted. Obviously, the reason is that they had been too modest. Therefore one must demand more. But the demands are granted again (44). And as misery decreases, the workers bcome less embittered, more ready to bargain for wages than to plot for revolution.

Now the Communists find that their policy must be reversed. Something must be done to bring the law of increasing misery into operation. For instance, colonial unrest must be stirred up (even where there is no chance of a successful revolution), and with the general purpose of counteracting the bourgeoisification of the workers, a policy of formenting catastrophes of all sorts must be adopted. But this new policy destroys the confidence of the workers. The Communists lose their members, with the exception of those who are inexperienced in real political fights. They lose exactly whom they describe later as the 'vanguard of the working class'; their tacitly implied principle; 'The worse things are, the better they are, since misery must precipitate revolution', makes the workers suspicious - the better the application of this principle, the worse are the suspicions entertained by the workers. For they are realists; to obtain their confidence, one must work to improve theirl ot. MO< Thus the policy must be reversed again: one is forced to fight for the immediate betterment of the workers' lot and to hope at the same time for the opposite.

With this, the 'inner contradictions' of the theory produce the last stage of confusion. It is the stage where it is hard to know who is the traitor, since treachery may be faithfulness and faithfulness treachery. It is the stage when those who followed the party not simply because it appeared to them (rightly, I am afraid) as the only vigorous movement with humanitarian ends, but especially because it was a movement based on a scientific theory, must either leave it, or sacrifice their intellecutal integrity; for they must now learn to believe blindly in some authority. Ultimately, they must become mystics - hostile to reasonable argument.

It seems that it is not only capitalism which is labouring under the inner contradictions that threaten to bring about its downfall . . ."

Marx's failure at historical prophecy.

Marx's Prophecy: Chapter 21: An Evaluation of the Prophecy

Extract from "The Open Society and Its Enemies Volume 2: Hegel and Marx" by Karl Raimund Popper (Originally published 1945) (Edition extracts taken from version published by Routledge and Kegan Paul, 5th Edition, 1973 reprint, ISBN 0 7100 4626 X) (Page 193)
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"The arguments underlying Marx's historical prophecy are invalid. His ingenious attempt to draw prophetic conclusions from obvervations of contemporary economic tendencies filed. The reason for this failure does not lie in any insufficiency of the empirical basis of the argument. Marx's socialogical and economic analyses of contemporary society may have been somewhat one-sided, but in spite of their bias, they were excellent in so far as they were descriptive. The reason for his failure as a prophet lies entirely in the poverty of historicism as such, in the simple fact that even if we observe to-day what appears to be a historical tendency or trend, we cannot know whether it will have the same appearance to-morrow.

We must admit that Marx saw many things in the right light. If we consider only his prophecy that the system of unrestrained capitalism, as he knew it, was not going to last much longer, and that its apologists who thought it would last forever were wrong, when we must say that he was right. he was right, too, in holding that it was largely the 'class struggle', i.e. the association of the workers, that was going to bring about its transformation into a new economic system. But we must not go so far as to say that Marx predicted that new system, interventionism(1), under another name, socialism. The truth is that he had no inkling of what was lying ahead. What he called 'socialism; was very dissimilar from any form of interventionaism, even from the Russian form; for he strongly believed that the impending development would diminish the influence, political as well as economic, of the state, while interventionism has increased it everywhere."

Marx's belief in progress.

Marx's Prophecy: Chapter 21: An Evaluation of the Prophecy

Extract from "The Open Society and Its Enemies Volume 2: Hegel and Marx" by Karl Raimund Popper (Originally published 1945) (Edition extracts taken from version published by Routledge and Kegan Paul, 5th Edition, 1973 reprint, ISBN 0 7100 4626 X) (Page 197 to 198)
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"Marx shared the belief of the progressive industrialist, of the 'bougeois' of his time : the believe in a law of progress. But this naive historicist optimism, of Hegel and Comte, of Marx and Mill, is no less superstitious than a pessimistic historicism like that of Platon or Spengler. And it is a very bad outfit for a prophet, since it must bridle historical imagination. Indeed, it is necessary to recognize as one of the principmles of any unprejudiced view of politics that everything is possible in human affairs; and more particularly that no conceivable development can be excluded on the grounds that it may violate the so-called tendency of human progress, or any other alleged laws of 'human nature'. 'The fact of progress', write H. A. L. Fisher, 'is written plain and large on the page of history; but progress is not a law of nature. The ground gained by one generation may be lost by the next.'

In accordance with the principle that everything is possible it may be worth while to point out that Marx's prophecies might well have come true. A faith like the progressivist optimism of the nineteenth century can be a powerful political force; it can help to bring about what it has predicted. Thus even a correct prediction must not be accepted to readily as a corroboration of a theory, and of its scientific character. I may rather be a consequence of its religious character and a proof of the force of the religious fail which it has been able to inspire in men. And in Marxism more particularly the religious element is unmistakable. In the hour of their deepest misery and degradation, Marx's prophecy gave the workers an inspiring belief in their mission, and in the great futrue which their movement was to prepare for the whole of mankind"

[TEXT DELETED] "But things developed differently. The prophetic element in Marx's creed was dominant in the minds of his followers. It swept everything else aside, banishing the power of cool and critical judgement and destroying the belief that by the use of reason we may change the world. All that remained of Marx's teaching was the oracular philosophy of Hegel, which in its Marxist trapping threatens to paralyse the struggle for the open society."

Ethical basis of Marx's writings.

Marx's Ethics: Chapter 22: The Moral Theory of Historicism

Extract from "The Open Society and Its Enemies Volume 2: Hegel and Marx" by Karl Raimund Popper (Originally published 1945) (Edition extracts taken from version published by Routledge and Kegan Paul, 5th Edition, 1973 reprint, ISBN 0 7100 4626 X) (Page 199)
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"The task which Marx set himself in Capital was to discover inexorable laws of social development. It was not the discovery of economic laws which would be useful to the social technologist. It was neither the analysis of the economic conditions which would permit the realiazation of socialist aims at just prices, equal distribution of wealth, security, reasonable planning of production and, above all, freedom, not was it an attempt to analyse and to clarify these aims.

But although Marx was strongly opposed to Utopian technolgoy as well as to any attempt at a moral justification of socialist aims, his writings contained, by implication, an ethical theory. This he expressed mainly by moral evaluations of social institutions. After all, Marx's condemnation of capitalism is fundamentally a moral condemnation. The system is condemned, for the cruel injustice inherent in it which is combined with full 'formal' justice and righteousness. The system is condemned because by forcing the exploiter to enslave the expoited it robs both of their freedom. Marx did not combat wealth, nor did he praise poverty. He hated capitalism, not for its accumulation of wealth, but for its oligarchical character; he hated it because in this system wealth means political power in the sense of power over other men. Labour power is made the commodity; that means that men must sell themselves on the market. Marx hated the system because it resembled slavery. "

Marx's faith and attitude towards Christianity

Marx's Ethics: Chapter 22: The Moral Theory of Historicism

Extract from "The Open Society and Its Enemies Volume 2: Hegel and Marx" by Karl Raimund Popper (Originally published 1945) (Edition extracts taken from version published by Routledge and Kegan Paul, 5th Edition, 1973 reprint, ISBN 0 7100 4626 X) (Page 199)
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[TEXT DELETED]

"Marx's faith, I believe, was fundamentally a faith in the open society.

Marx's attitude towards Christianity is closely connected with these convictions, and with the fact that a hypocritical defence of capitalist exploitation was in his day characteristic of official Christianity. (His attitude was not unlike that of his contemporary Kiekegaard, the great reformer of Christian ethics, who exposed (1) the official Christian morality of his day as anti-Christian and anti-humanitarian hypocrisy.) A typical representative of this kind of Christianity was the High Church priest J. Townsend, author of A Dissertation on the Poor Laws, by a Wellwisher of Manking, an extremely crude apologist for exploitation whom Marx exposed. 'Hunger', Townsend begins his eulogy (2), 'is not only a peaceable, silent, unremitted pressure but, as the most natural motive of industry and labour, it calls forth the most powerful exertions.' In Townsend's 'Christian' world order, everything depends (as Marx observes) upon making hunger permanent among the working class; and Townsend believes that this is indeed the divine purpose of the principle of the growth of population; for he goes on: 'It seem to be a law of nature that the poor should be to a certain degree improvident, so that there may always be some to fulfil the most servile, the most sordid, the most ignoble offices in the community. The stock of human happiness is thereby much increased, whilst the more delicate . . . are left at liberty without interruption to pursue those callings which are suited to their various dispositions.' And this 'delicate priestly sycophant', as Marx called him for this remark, adds that the Poor Law, by helping the hungry, 'tends to destroy the harmony and beauty, the symmetry and order, of that system which God and nature have established in the world.'

If this kind of 'Christianity' has disappeared to-day from the face of the better part of our globe, it is in no small degree due to the moral reformation brought about by Marx. I do not suggest that the reform of the Church's attitude towards the poor in England did not commence long before Marx had any influence in England; but he influenced this development especially on the Continent, and the rise of socialism had the effect of strengthening it in England also. His influence on Christianity may be perhaps compared with Luther's influence on the Roman Church. Both were a challenge, both led to a counter-reformation in the camps of their enemies, to a revision and re-valuation of their ethical standards. Christianity owes not a little to Marx's influence that the Church has listened to the voice of Kierkegaard, who, in his Book of the Judge, described his own activity as follow (3) : 'He whose taks it is to produce a corrective idea, has only to study precisely and deeply, the rotten parts of the existing order - and then, in the most partial way possible, to stress the opposite of it.' ('Since that is so', he adds, 'an apparently clever man will easily raise the objection of partiality against the corrective idea - and he will make the pubilc believe that this was the whole truth about it.') In this sense one might say that the early Marxism, with it ethical rigour, its emphasis on deeds instead of mere words, was perhaps the most important corrective idea of our time (4). This explains its tremendous moral influence."

"Might is Right" vs "Coming Might is Right"

Marx's Ethics: Chapter 22: The Moral Theory of Historicism

Extract from "The Open Society and Its Enemies Volume 2: Hegel and Marx" by Karl Raimund Popper (Originally published 1945) (Edition extracts taken from version published by Routledge and Kegan Paul, 5th Edition, 1973 reprint, ISBN 0 7100 4626 X) (Page 206 to 207)
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"In previous chapers I have mentioned moral positivism (especially that of Hegel), the theory that there is no moral standard but the one which exists; that what is, is reasonable and good; and therefore, that might is right. The practical aspect of this theory is this. A moral criticism of the existing state of affairs is impossible, since this state itself determines the moral standard of things. Now the historicist moral theory we are considering is nothing but another form of moral positivism. For it holds that coming might is right. The future is here substituted for the present - that is all. And the practical aspect of the theory is this. A moral criticism of the coming state of affairs is impossible, since this state determines the moral standard of things. The difference between 'the present' and 'the future' is here, of course only a matter of degree. One can say the future starts to-morrow, or in 500 years, or in 100. In their theoretical structure there is no difference between moral conservatism, moral modernism, and moral futurism. Not is there much to choose between them in regard to moral sentiments. If the moral futurist criticizes the cowardice of the moral conservative who takes sides with the powers that be, then the moral conservative can return the charge; he can say that the moral futurist is a coward since he takes sides with the powers that will be, with the rulers of to-morrow."

[TEXT DELETED]

"But moral futurists forget that we are not going to live to witness the 'ultimate' outcome of present events. 'History will be out judge!' What does this mean? That success will judge. The worship of success and of forture might is the highest standard of many who would never admit that present mighti s right. (They forget that the present is the future of the past.) The basis of all this is a half-hearted compromise between a moral optimism and a omral secpticism. It seems to be hard to believe in one's conscience. And it seems to be hard to resist the impulse to be on the winning side."

An Unjust Social System

Marx's Ethics: Chapter 22: The Moral Theory of Historicism

Extract from "The Open Society and Its Enemies Volume 2: Hegel and Marx" by Karl Raimund Popper (Originally published 1945) (Edition extracts taken from version published by Routledge and Kegan Paul, 5th Edition, 1973 reprint, ISBN 0 7100 4626 X) (Page 211)
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"Marx showed that a social system can as such be unjust; that if the system is bad, then all the righteousness, is mere hypocrisy. For our responsibility extends to the system, to the institutions which we allow to persist.

It is the moral radicalism of Marx which explains his influence; and this is a hopeful fact in itself. This moral radicalism is still alive. It is out taks to keep it alive, to prevent it from going the way which his political radicalism will have to go. 'Scientific' Marxism is dead. Its feeling of social responsibility and its love for freedom must survive."

Historicist Philosophies a product of times of social change

The Aftermath: Chapter 23: The Sociology of Knowledge

Extract from "The Open Society and Its Enemies Volume 2: Hegel and Marx" by Karl Raimund Popper (Originally published 1945) (Edition extracts taken from version published by Routledge and Kegan Paul, 5th Edition, 1973 reprint, ISBN 0 7100 4626 X) (Page 211)

"Rationality, in the sense of an appeal to a universal
and impersonal standard of truth, is of supreme
importance. . ., not only in ages in which it easily
prevails, but also, and even more, in those less
fortunate times in which it is despised and rejected
as the vain dream of men who lack the virility to
kill where they cannot agree

Bertrand Russell.

"It can hardly be doubted that Hegel's and Marx's historicist philosophies are characteristic products of their time - a time of social change. Like the philosophies of Heraclitus and Plato, and like those of Comte and Mill, Lamarck and Darwin, they are philosophies of change, and they witness to the tremendous and undoubtedly somewhat terrifying impression made by a changing social environment in the minds of those who live in this environment. Plato reacted to this situation by attempting to arrest all change. . . "

The demand for Equality before the Law

The Aftermath: Chapter 24: The Revolt Against Reason

Extract from "The Open Society and Its Enemies Volume 2: Hegel and Marx" by Karl Raimund Popper (Originally published 1945) (Edition extracts taken from version published by Routledge and Kegan Paul, 5th Edition, 1973 reprint, ISBN 0 7100 4626 X) (Page 234 to 235)
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"It cannot, of course, be denied that human individuals are, like all other things in our world, in very many respects very unequal. Nor can it be doubted that this inequality is of great importance and even in many respsect highly desirable (12). (The fear that the development of mass production and collectivization may react upon men by destroying their inequality or individuality is one of the nightmares (13) of our times.) But all this simply has no bearing upon the question whether or not we should decide to treat men, espeically in political issues, as equals, or as much like equals as possible; that is to say, as possessing equal rights, and equal claims to equal treatment; and it has no bearing upon the question whether we ought to construct political institutions accordingly. 'Equality before the law' is not a fact but a political demand (14) based upon a moral decision ; and it is quite independent of the theory - which is probably false - that 'all men are born equal'. "

There can only be historical interpretations

Conclusion: Chapter 25: Has History any Meaning?

Extract from "The Open Society and Its Enemies Volume 2: Hegel and Marx" by Karl Raimund Popper (Originally published 1945) (Edition extracts taken from version published by Routledge and Kegan Paul, 5th Edition, 1973 reprint, ISBN 0 7100 4626 X) (Page 267 to 268)
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"I said before that interpretations may be incompatible; but as long as we consider them merely as crystallizations of points of view, then they are not. For example, the interpretation that man steadily progresses (towards the open society or some other aim) is compatible with the interpretation that he steadily slips back or retrogresses. But the 'point of view' of one who looks on human history as a history of progress is not necessarily incompatible with that of one who looks on it as a history of retrogression; that is to say, we couold write a history of human progress towards freedom (containing, for example, the story of the fight against slavery) and another history of human retrogression and oppression (containing perhaps such things as the impact of the white race upon the coloured races); and these two histories need not be in conflict; rather, they may be complementary to each other, as would be two views of the same landscape seen from two different points. This consideration is of considerable importance. For since each generation has its own troubles and problems, and therefore its own interests and its own point of view, it follows that each generation has a right to look upon and re-interpret history in its own way, which is complementary to that of previous generations. After all, we study history because we are interested in it (9), and perhaps because we wish to learn something about our own problems. But history can serve neither of these two purposes if, under the influence of an inapplicable idea of objectivity, we hesitate to present historical problems from our point of view. And we should not think that our point of view, if consciously and critically applied to the problem, will be inferior to that of a writer who naively believes that he does not interpret, and that he has reached a level of objectivity permitting him to present 'the events of the past as they actually did happen'. (This is why I believe that even such admittedly personal comments as can be found in this book are justified, since they are in keeping with historical method.) The main thing is to say, to aviod, as far as this is possible, unconscious and therefore uncritical bias, in the presentation of the facts. In every other respect, the interpretation must speak for itself; and it merits will be its fertility, its ability to elucidate the facts of history, as well as its topical interest, its ability to elucidate the problems of today.

To sum up, there can be no history of 'the past as it actually did happen'; there can only be historical interpretaitons, and none of them final; and every generation has the right to frame its own. But not only has it a right to frame its own interpretations, it also has a kind of obligation to do so; for there is indeed a pressing need to be answered. We want to know how our troubles are related to the past, and we want to see the line along which we may progress towards the solution of what we feel, and what we choose, to be our main tasks. It is this need which, if not answered by rational and fair means, produces historicist interpretations. Under its pressure the historicist substitutes for a reational question: 'What are we to choose as out most urgent problems, how did they arise, and along what roads may be proceed to solve them?' the irrational and apparently factual question : 'Which way are we going? What, in essence, is the part that history has destined us to play?'"

Is there a meaning to history?

Conclusion: Chapter 25: Has History any Meaning?

Extract from "The Open Society and Its Enemies Volume 2: Hegel and Marx" by Karl Raimund Popper (Originally published 1945) (Edition extracts taken from version published by Routledge and Kegan Paul, 5th Edition, 1973 reprint, ISBN 0 7100 4626 X) (Page 269 to 270)
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[TEXT DELETED]

"Historicism is out to find The Path on which mankind is destined to walk; it is out to discover The Clue to History (as J. Macmurray calls it), or The Meaning of History.

But is there such a clue? Is there a meaning to history?

I do not wish to enter here into the problem of the meaning of 'meaning'; I take it for granted that most people know with sufficient clarity whta they means when they speak of 'meaning of history' or of the 'meaning or purpose of life' (10). And in this sense, in the sense in which the question of the meaning of history is asked, I answer : History has no meaning.

In order to gives reasons for this opinion, I must first say something about that 'history' which people have in mind when they ask whether it has meaning. So far, I have myself spoken about 'hsitory' as if it did not need any explanation. That is no longer possible; for I which to make it clear that 'history' in the sense in which most people speak of it simply does not exist; and this is at least one reason why I say that is has no meaning.

How do most people come to use the erm 'history'? (I mean 'history' in the sense in which we say of a book that it is about the history of Europe - not in the sense in which we say that is is a history of Europe.) They learn about it in school and at the University. They read books about it. They see what is treated in the books under the name 'history of the world' or 'the history of mankind', and they get used to looking upon it as a more or less definite series of facts. And these facts constitute, they believe, the history of mankind.

But was have already see that the realm of facts is infinitely rich, and that there must be selection. According to our interests, we could, for instance, write about the history of art; or of language; or of feeding habits; or of typus fever (see Zinsser's Rats, Lice and History). Certainly, none of these is the history of mankind (nor all of them taken together). What people have in mind when they speak of the history of mankind is, rather, the history of Egyptian, Babylonian, Persian, Macedonian, and Roman empires, and so on, down to our own day. In other words: They speak aout the history of mankind, but what they mean, and what they have learned about in school, is the history of political power.

There is no history of mankind, there is only an indefinite number of histories of all kinds of aspects of human life. and one of these is the history of political power. This is elevated into the history of the world. But this, I hold, is an offence against every decent conception of mankind. It is hardly better than to treat the history of embezzlement or of robbery or of poisoning as the history of mankind. For the history of power politics is nothing but the history of international crime and mass murder (including, it is true, some of the attempts to suppress them). This history is taught in schools, and some of the greatest criminals are extolled as its heroes.

[TEXT DELETED]

I know taht these views will meet with the strongest opposition from many sides, including some apologists for Christianity; for although there is hardly anything in the New Testament to support this doctrine, it is often considered a part of the Christian dogma that God reveals Himself in history; that history has meaning; and that its meanins is the purpose of God. Historicism is thus held to be a necessary element of religion. But I do not admit this. I contend that this view is pure idolatry and superstition, not only from the point of view of a rationalist or humanist but from the Christian point of view itself.

What is behind this theistic historicism? With Hegel, it looks upon history - political history - as a stage, or rather, as a kind of lengthy Shakespearian play; and the audience conceive either the 'great historical personalities', or mankind in the abstract, as the heroes of theplay. Then they ask, 'Who has written this play?' And they think that they give a pious answer when they reply, 'God'. But they are mistaken. Their answer is pure blasphemy, for the play was (and they know it) written not by God, but, under the supervision of generals and dictators, by the professors of history."

Kierkegaard and the incompatibility of historicism and Christianity

Conclusion: Chapter 25: Has History any Meaning?

Extract from "The Open Society and Its Enemies Volume 2: Hegel and Marx" by Karl Raimund Popper (Originally published 1945) (Edition extracts taken from version published by Routledge and Kegan Paul, 5th Edition, 1973 reprint, ISBN 0 7100 4626 X) (Page 274 to 275)
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[TEXT DELETED]

"A forceful support of some of these view, and especially of the incompatibility of historicism and Christianity, can be found in Kierkegaard's criticism of Hegel. Although Kierkegaard never freed himself entire from the Hegelian tradition in which he was educated (18), there was hardly anybody who recognized more clearly what Hegelian historicism meant. 'There were', Kierkegaard wrote (19), 'philosophers who tried, before Hegel, to explain . . history. And providence could only smile when it saw these attempts. But providence did not laugh outright, for there was a human sincerity about them. But Hegel - ! Here I need Homer's language. How did the gods roar with laughter! Such a horrid little professor who has simply seen though the necessiry of anything and everything there is, and who now plays the whole affair on his barrel-organ: listen, ye gods of Olympus!' And Kierkegaard continues, referring to the attach (20) by the athiest Schopenhauer upon the Christian apologist Hegel : 'Reading Schopenhauer has given me more pleasure than I can express. What he says is perfectly true; and then - it serves the Germans right - he is as rude as only a German can be.' But Kierkegaard goes on to say that Hegelianism, which he calls 'this brilliant spirit of putridity', is the 'most repugnant of all forms of looseness'; and he speaks of its 'mildew of pomposity', its 'intellectual voluptuousness', and its 'infamous splendour of corruption'.

And, indeed, our intellectual as well as our ethical education is corrupt. It is perverted by the admiration of brilliance, of the way things are said, which takes the place of a critical appreciation of the things that are said (and the things that are done). It is perverted by the romantic idea of the splendour of the stage of History on which we are the actors. We are educated to act with an eye to the gallery.

The whole problem of educating man to a sane appreciation of his own importance relative to that of other individuals is thoroughly muddled by these ethics of fame and fate, bu a morality which perpetuates an educational system that is still based upon the classics with their romantic view of history and power and their romantic tribal morality which goes back to Heraclitus; a system whose ultimate basis is the worship of power. Instead of a sober combination of individualism and altruism. . . ."

Love is not a sound principle for political doctrine

Conclusion: Chapter 25: Has History any Meaning?

Extract from "The Open Society and Its Enemies Volume 2: Hegel and Marx" by Karl Raimund Popper (Originally published 1945) (Edition extracts taken from version published by Routledge and Kegan Paul, 5th Edition, 1973 reprint, ISBN 0 7100 4626 X) (Page 236 to 238)
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"Now the adoption of an anti-equalitarian attitude is political life, i.e. in the field of problems concered with the power of man over man, is just what I should call criminal. For it offers a justification of the attitude that different categories of people have different rights; that the master has the right to enslave the slave; that some men have the right to use others as their tools. Ultimately, it will be used, as in Platon (15), to justify murder.

I do not overlook the fact that there are irrationalists who love mankind, and that not all forms of irrationalism engender criminality. But I hold that he who teaches that not reason but love should rule opens the way for those who rule by hate. (Socrates, I believe, saw something of this when he suggested (16) that mistrust or hatred of argument is related to mistrust or hatred of man.) Those who do not see this connection at once, who believe in a direct rule of emotional love, should consider that love as such certainly does not promote impartiality. And it cannot do away with conflict either. That love as such may be unable to settle a conflict can be shown by considering a harmless test case, which may pass as representative of more serious ones. Tom likes the theatre and Dick likes dancing. Tom lovingly insists on going to a dance while Dick wants for Tom's sake to go to the theatre. This conflict cannot be settled by love; rather, the greater the love, the stronger will be the conflict. There are only two solutions; one is the use of emotion, and ultimately of violence, and the other is the use of reason, of impartiality, of reasonable compromise. All this is not intended to indicate that I do not appreciate the difference between love and hate, or that I think that life would be worth living without love. (And I am quite prepared to admit that the Christian idea of love is not meant in a purely emotional way.) But I insist that no emotion, not even love, can replace the rule of institutions controlled by reason.

This, of course, is not the only argument against the idea of a rule of love. Loving a person means wishing to make him happy. (This, by the way, was Thomas Aquinas' defition of love.) But of all political ideals, that of making the people happy is perhaps the most dangerous one. It leads invariably to the attempt to impose our scale of 'higher' values upon others, in order to make them realize what seems to us of greatest importance for their happiness; in order, as it were, to save their souls. It leads to Utopianism and Romanticism. We all feel certain that everybody would be happy in the beautiful, the perfect community of our dreams. And no doubt, there would be heaven on earth if we could all love one another. But, as I have said before (in Chapter 9 [Vol 1]), the attempt to make heaven on earth invariably produces hell. It leads to intolerance. It leads to religious wars, and to the saving of souls through the inquisition. And it is, I believe, based on a complete misunderstanding of our moral duties. It is our duty to make others happy, since this does not depend on us, and since it would only too often mean intruding on the privacy of those towards whom we have such amiable intensions. The political demand for piecemeal (as opposed to Utopian) method corresponds to the decision that the fight against suffering must be considered a duty, while the right to care for the happiness of other must be considered a privilege confined to the close circle of friends. In their case, we may perhaps have a certain right to try to impose our scale of values - our preferences regarding music, for example. (And we may even feel it our duty to open to them a world of values which, we trucst, can so much contribute to their happiness.) This right of ours exists only if, and because, they can get rid of us; because friendships can be ended. But the use of political means for imposing our scale of values upon others is a different matter. Pain, suffering, injustice, and their prevention, these are the eternal problems of public morals, the 'agenda' of public policy (as Bentham would have said). The 'higher' values should very large be considered 'non-agenda', and should be left to the realm of laissez-faire."

Rationalism

Conclusion: Chapter 25: Has History any Meaning?

Extract from "The Open Society and Its Enemies Volume 2: Hegel and Marx" by Karl Raimund Popper (Originally published 1945) (Edition extracts taken from version published by Routledge and Kegan Paul, 5th Edition, 1973 reprint, ISBN 0 7100 4626 X) (Page 238 to 239)
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"Rationaism is therefore bound up with the idea that the other fellow has a right to be heard, and to defend his arguments. It thus implies the recognition of the claim of tolerance, at least (18) of all those who are not intolerant themselves. One does not kill a man when one adopts the attitude of first listening to his arguments. (Kant was right when he based the 'Golden Rule' on the idea of reason. To be sure, it is impossible to prove the rightness of any ethical principle, or even to argue in its favour in just the manner in which we argue in favour of a scientific statement. Ethics is not a science. But although there is no 'rational scientific basis' of ethics, there is an ethical basis in science, and of rationalism.) Also the idea of impartiality leads to that of responsibility; we have not only to listen to arguments, but we have a duty to respond, to answer, where our actions affect others. Ultimately, in this way, rationalism is linked up with the recognition of the necessity of social institutions to protect freedom of criticism, freedom of thought, and thus the freedom of men. And it estrablishes something like a moral obligation towards the support of these institutions. This is why rationalism is closely linked up with the political demand for practical social engineering - piecemeal engineering, of course - in the humanitarian sense, with the demand for the rationalization of society (19), for planning for freedom, and for its control by reason; not by 'science', not by a Platonic, a pseudo-rational authority, but by that Socratic reason which is aware of its limitations, and which therefore respects the other man and does not aspire to coerce him - not even into happiness. The adoption of rationalism implies, moreover, that there is a common medium of communication, a common language of reason; it establishes something like a moral obligation towards that language, the obligation to keep up its standards of clarity (20) and to use it in such a way that it can retain its function as the vehicle of argument. That is to say, to use it plainly; to use it as an instrument of rational communication, of significant information, rather than as a means of 'self-expression', as the vicious romantic jargon of most of our educationalists has it."

History has no meaning

Conclusion: Chapter 25: Has History any Meaning?

Extract from "The Open Society and Its Enemies Volume 2: Hegel and Marx" by Karl Raimund Popper (Originally published 1945) (Edition extracts taken from version published by Routledge and Kegan Paul, 5th Edition, 1973 reprint, ISBN 0 7100 4626 X) (Page 278 to 279)
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"History has no meaning, I contend. But this contention does not imply that all we can do about it is to look aghast at the history of political power, or that we must look on it as a cruel joke. For we can interpret it, with an eye to those problems of power politics whose solution we choose to attempt in our time. We can interpret the history of power politics from the point of view of our fight for the open society, for a rule of reason, for justice, freedom, equality, and for the control of international crime. Although history has no ends, we can impose these ends of ours upon it; and although history has no meaning, we can give it a meaning.

It is the problem of nature and convention which we meet here again (23). Neither nature nor history can tell us what we ought to do. Fact, whether those of nature or those of history cannot make the decision for us, they cannot determine the ends we are going to choose. It is we who introduce purpose and meaning into nature and into history. Men are not equal; but we can decide to fight for equal rights. Human institutions such as the state are not rational, but we can decide to fight to make them more rational. We ourselves and our ordinary language are, on the whole, emotional rather than rational; but we can try to become a little more rational, and we can train ourselves to use language as an instrument not of self-expression (as our romantic educationalists would say) but of rational communication (24).

This dualism of facts and decisions (26) is, I believe, fundamental. Facts as such have no meaning; they can gain it only through our decisions. Historicism is only one of many attempts to get over this dualism; it is born of fear, for it shrinks from realizing that we bear the ultimate responsibility even for the standards we choose. But such an attempt seems to me to represent precisely what is usually described as superstition. For it assumes that we can reap where we have not sown; it tries to persuede us that if we merely fall into step with history everything will and must go right, and that no fundamental decision on our part is required; it tries to shift out responsibility on to history, and thereby on to the play of demonic powers beyond ourselves; it tries to base our actions upon the hidden intensions of thsee powers, which can be revealed to us only in mystical inspirations and intuitions; and it thus puts out actions and ourselves on the moral levell of a man who, inspired by horoscopes and dreams, chooses his lucky number in a lottery (27). Like gambling, historicism is born of our despair in the rationality and responsibility of our actions. it is a debased hope and a debased faith, an attempt to replace the hope and the faith that springs from our moral enthusiasm and the contempt for success by a certainty that springs from a speudo-science; a pseudo-science of the stars, or of 'human nature', or of historical destiny."

Extract of Note 3: Aristotle and Slavery

Chapter 11/Note 3: Page 282

Extract from "The Open Society and Its Enemies Volume 2: Hegel and Marx" by Karl Raimund Popper (Originally published 1945) (Edition extracts taken from version published by Routledge and Kegan Paul, 5th Edition, 1973 reprint, ISBN 0 7100 4626 X) (Page 282)
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"Zeller, in his long list of the personal virtues of Aristotle (op cit, I, 44), mentions his 'nobility of principles' and his 'benevolence to slaves'. I cannot help remembering the perhaps less noble but certainly more benevolent principle put forward much earlier by Alcidamas and Lycophron, namely, that there should be no slaves at all."

Extract of Note 6: Huxley and A Liberal Education

Chapter 11/Note 6: Page 284

Extract from "The Open Society and Its Enemies Volume 2: Hegel and Marx" by Karl Raimund Popper (Originally published 1945) (Edition extracts taken from version published by Routledge and Kegan Paul, 5th Edition, 1973 reprint, ISBN 0 7100 4626 X) (Page 284)
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"'The mental power' T.H. Huxley wrote in A Liberal Education, 'which will be of most importance in your . . life will be the power of seeing things as they are without regard to authority . . . But at school and at college, you shall know of no source of truth but authority.'"

Extract of Note 54: Simplicius

Chapter 11/Note 54: Page 299

Extract from "The Open Society and Its Enemies Volume 2: Hegel and Marx" by Karl Raimund Popper (Originally published 1945) (Edition extracts taken from version published by Routledge and Kegan Paul, 5th Edition, 1973 reprint, ISBN 0 7100 4626 X) (Page 299)
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"Simplicius, one of the best of our sources on these very doubtful matters, presents Antisthenes (ad Arist. Categ., pp. 66b, 67b) as an opponent of Plato's theory of Forms and Ideas, and in fact, of the doctrine of essentialism and intellectual intuition altogether. 'I can see a horse, Plato', Antisthenes is reported to have said, 'but I cannot see its horseness.' (A very similar argument is attributed by a lesser source, D.L., VI, 53, to Diogenes the Cynic, and there is no reason why the latter should not have used it to.)"

Extract of Note 57:

Chapter 11/Note 57, Page 301

Extract from "The Open Society and Its Enemies Volume 2: Hegel and Marx" by Karl Raimund Popper (Originally published 1945) (Edition extracts taken from version published by Routledge and Kegan Paul, 5th Edition, 1973 reprint, ISBN 0 7100 4626 X) (Page 301)
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"The quotation is from Toynbee, A Study of History, vol. VI, p. 202; the passage deals with the motive for the persecution of Christianity by the Roman rulers, who were usually very tolerant in the matters of religion. 'The element of Christianity', Toynbee writes, 'that was intolerable to the Imperial Government was the Christians' refusal to accept the Governement's claim that it was entitled to compel its subject to act against their conscience. . . So far from checking the propogation of Christianity, the martyrdoms proved the most effective agencies of conversion. .'"

Extract of Note 61:

Chapter 11/Note 57, Page 302 to 303

Extract from "The Open Society and Its Enemies Volume 2: Hegel and Marx" by Karl Raimund Popper (Originally published 1945) (Edition extracts taken from version published by Routledge and Kegan Paul, 5th Edition, 1973 reprint, ISBN 0 7100 4626 X) (Page 302 to 303)
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"I admire the medieval cathedrals as much as anybody, and I am perfectly preapred to recognize the greatness and uniqueness of medieval craftsmanship. But I believe that aestheticism must never be used as an argument against humanitarianism.

The eulogy of the Middle Ages seems to begin with the Romantic movement in Germany, and it has become fashionable with the renasissance of this Romantic movement which unfortunately we are witnessing at the present time. It is, of course, an anti-rationalist movement; it will be discussed from another point of view in chapter 24.

The two attitudes towards the Middle Ages rationalism and anti-rationalism, correspond to two interpretations of 'history' (cp. chapter 25).

(I) The rationalis interpretation of history view with hope those periods in which men attempted to look upon human affairs rationally. It sees in the Great Generation and especially in Socrates, in early Christianity (down to Constantine), in the Renasissance and the period fo the Enlightenment, and in modern science, parts of an often interrupted movement, the efforts of men to free themselves, to break out of the cage of the closed society, and to form an open society. It is aware that this movement does not represent a 'law or progress' or anything of the sort, but that it depends solely upon outselves, and must disappear if we do not defend it against its antagonists as well as against laziness and indolence. This interpretation sees in the intervening periods dark ages with their Platonizing authorities, their hierarchies of priest and tribalist orders of knights.

A classical formulation of this interpretation has been made by Lord Acton (op. cit., p. I; italics mine). 'Liberty,' he writes, 'next to religion, has been the motive of good deeds and the common pretext of crime, from the sowing of the seed at Athens, two thousand five hundred and sixty years ago . . In every age its progress has been beset by its natural enemies, by strong man's craving for power, and the poor man's craving for food. During long intervals it has been utterly arrested. . No obstacle has been so constant, or so difficult to overcome, as uncertainty and confusion touching the nature of true liberty. If hostile interests have wrought much injury, false ideas have wrought still more.'

It is strange how strong a feeling of darkness prevails in the dark ages. Their science and their philosophy are both obsessed by the feeling that the truth has once been known, and has been lost. This expresses itself in the belif in the lost secret of the ancient philosophers' stone and in the ancient wisdom of astrology no less than in the belief that an idea cannot be of any value if it is new, and that every idea needs the backing of ancient authority (Aristotle and the Bible). But the men who felf that the secret key to wisdom was lost in the past were right. For this key is faith in reason and liberty. it is the free competition of thoughts, which cannot exist without freedom of thought.

(2) The other interpretation agrees with Toynbee in seeing, in Greek as well as in modern rationalism (since the Renaissance), an aberration from the pathj of faith. 'To the present writer's eye', Toynbee says (A Study of History, vol. V, p. 6 f., note; italics mine), 'the common element of rationalism which may be discerable in the Hellenic and Western Civilization is not so distinctive as to mark this pair of societies off from all other representatives of the speicies. . . If we regard the Christian element of our Western Civilization as being the essence of it, then our reversion to Hellenism might be taken to be, not a fulfilment of the potentialities of Western Christendom, but an aberraton from the proper path of Western growth - in fact, a false step which it may or may not be possible now to retrieve'

In contrast to Toynbee, I do not doubt for a minute that it is possible to retrieve this step and to return to the cage, to the oppressions, superstition, and pestilences, of the Middle Ages. But I believe that we had much better not do so. And I contend that what we ought to do will have to be decided by ourselves, through free decisions, and not by historicist essentialism; nor, as Toynbee holds (see also note 49 (2) to this chapter), by 'the question of what the essential Character of Western Civilixation may be'."

Extract of Note 62:

Chapter 11/Note 62, Page 304

Extract from "The Open Society and Its Enemies Volume 2: Hegel and Marx" by Karl Raimund Popper (Originally published 1945) (Edition extracts taken from version published by Routledge and Kegan Paul, 5th Edition, 1973 reprint, ISBN 0 7100 4626 X) (Page 304)
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"See H. Zinsser, Rats, LIce and History (1937), pp. 80 and 83; italics mine.

Concerning my remark in the text, at the end of this chapter, that Democritus' science and morals still ive with us, I may mention that a direct historical connection leads from Democritus and Epicurus via Lucretius not only to Gassendi but undoubtedly to Locke also. 'Atoms and the void' is the characteristic phrase whose presence always reveals the influence of this tradition; and as a rule, the natural philosophy of 'atoms and the void' goes together with the moral philosophy of altruistic hedonism or utilitarianism. In regard to hedonism and utilitarianism, I believe that it is indeed necessary to replace their principle: maximize pleasure! by one which is more probably keeping with the original views of Democritus and Epicurus, more modest, and much more urgent. I mean the rule: minimize pain! I believe (cp. chapters 9, 24 and 25) that it is not only impossible but very dangerous to attempt to maximize the pleasure or the hapiness of the people since such an attempt must lead to totalitarianism. But there is little doubt that most of the followers of Democritus (down to Bertrand Russell, who is still interested in atoms, geometry, and hedonism) would have little quarrel with the suggested re-formulation of their pleasure principle provided it is taken for what it is meant, and not for an ethical criterion."

Extract of Note 11:

Chapter 12/Note 11, Page 305

Extract from "The Open Society and Its Enemies Volume 2: Hegel and Marx" by Karl Raimund Popper (Originally published 1945) (Edition extracts taken from version published by Routledge and Kegan Paul, 5th Edition, 1973 reprint, ISBN 0 7100 4626 X) (Page 305)
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"From Schiller, Hegel took (incidentally without acknowledgement or even indicaton whtat he was quoting) his famous dictum 'The history of the world is the World's court of justice'. But this dictum (at the end of 340 of the Phil. of Law; cp. text to note 26) implies a good deal of Hegel's historicist political philsophy; not only his worsihp of success and thus of power, but also his peculiar moral positivism, and his theory of the reasonableness of history."

Extract of Note 43:

Chapter 12/Note 43, Page 310

Extract from "The Open Society and Its Enemies Volume 2: Hegel and Marx" by Karl Raimund Popper (Originally published 1945) (Edition extracts taken from version published by Routledge and Kegan Paul, 5th Edition, 1973 reprint, ISBN 0 7100 4626 X) (Page 310)
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"Hegel himself summarizes his twist (Selections, 401 = WW, xi, 82) : 'At an earlier stage of the discussion, we established . . first, the Idea of Freedom as the absolute and final aim. . . We then recognized the State as the moral Whole and the Reality of Freedom. . ' Thus we begin with freedom and end with the totalitarian state. one can hardly present the twist more cynically.

(2) For another example of the dialectic twist, viz., that of reason into passion and violence, see end of (g) in section IV, below, of the presetn chapter (text to note 84). Particularly interesting is this connection is Hegel's criticism of Platon (See notes 7 and 8 above, and text.) Hegel, paying lip-service to all modern and 'Christian' values, not only to freedom, but even to the 'subjective freedom' of the individual, criticizes Plato's holism or collectivism (Phil. of Law, 187) : 'The principle of the self sufficient . . personality of the individual, the principle of subjective freedom, is denied its right by . . Plato. This princimple dawned . . in the Christian religion and . . in the Roman World.' This criticism is excellent, and it proves that Hegel knew what Plato was about; in fact, Hegel's reading of Plato agrees very well with my own. For the untrained reader of Hegel, this passage might even prove the injustice of branding Hegel as a collectivist. But was have only to turn to 70L of the same work in order to see that Plato's most radical collectivist saying, 'You are created for the sake of the whole , and not the whole for the sake of you', is fully subscribed to by Hegel, who writes : 'A single person, it hardly needs saying, is something subordinate, and as such he must dedicate himself to the ethical whole', i.e. the state. This is Hegel's 'individualism'.

But why, then does he criticize Plato? Why does he emphasize the importance of 'subjective freedom'? 316 and 317 of the Philosophy of Law give an answer to this question. Hegel is convinced that revolutions can be avoided only by granting the people, as a kind of safety valve, a certain small amount of freedom which should not go beyond an irrelevant opportunity to give vent to their feelings. Thus he writes (op. cit., 316, 317L, italics mine): 'In our day . . the principle of subjective freedom is of great importance and significance . . Everybody wishes to participate in discussions and deliberations. But once he has had his say, . . his subjectivity is granted and he will put up with a lot. In Grance, freedom of speech has proved far less dangerious than silence imposed by force; with the latter . . men have to swallow everything, while if they are permitted to argue, they have an outlet as well as some satisfaction; and in this way, a thing may be pushed ahead more easily.' It must be difficult to surpass the cynicism exhibited by this discussion in which Hegel gives vent, so freely, to his feeling concering 'subjective freedom' or, as he often calls it so solemnly, 'the principle of the modern world'."

Extract of Note 58:

Chapter 12/Note 58, Page 313

Extract from "The Open Society and Its Enemies Volume 2: Hegel and Marx" by Karl Raimund Popper (Originally published 1945) (Edition extracts taken from version published by Routledge and Kegan Paul, 5th Edition, 1973 reprint, ISBN 0 7100 4626 X) (Page 313)
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"Cp. Kant's Works, vol VIII, 516. Kant, who had been immediately ready to help when Fichte appealed to him as an unknown author in distree, hesitated for seven years after the anonymous publication of Fichte's first book to speak his mind about Fichte, although he was pressed to do so from various sides, for example by Fichte himself, who posed as the fulfiller of the Kantian promise. Ultimately, Kant published his Public Explanation Regarding Richte, as a reply 'to the solemn demand made by a reviewer in the name of the public', that he should speak his mind. he declared that, in his view, 'Fichte's system was totally untenable'; and he declined to have anything to do with a philosophy which consisted of 'barren subtleties'. And after praying (as quoted in the text) that God may projects us from our friends, Keant goes on to say : 'For there may be also . . fraudulent and perfidious friends who are scheming for our ruin, although they speak the language of benevolence; one cannot be sufficiently caustious in order to avoid the traps they set for us.' If Kant, a most balanced, benevolent and conscientious person, who was move to say things such as these, then we have every reason to consider his judgement seriously. But I have seen so far no history of philosophy which clearly states that, in Kant's opinion, Fichte was a dishonest imposter; although I have seen many histories of philosophy that try to explain away Schopenhauer's indictments, for example, by hinting that he was envious.

But Kant' and Schopenhauer's accusations are by no means isolated. A. von Feuerback (in a letter of January 30th, 1799; cp; Schopenhauer's Works, vol. V, 102) expressed himself as strongly as Schopenhauer; Schiller arrived at a similar opinion, and so did Goethe; and Nicolovius called Fichte a 'sycophant and a deceiver'. (Cp. also Hegemann, op. cit., pp. 119 ff)

It is astonishing to see that, thanks to a conspiracy of noise, a man like Ficthe succeeded in perverting the teaching of his 'master', in spite of Kant's protests, and in Kant's lifeftime. This happened only a hundred years agao and can easily be checked by anybody who takes the trouble to read Kant's and Fichte's letters, and Kant's public announcements; and it shows that my theory of Plato's perversion of the teaching of Socrates is by no means so fantastic as it may appear to Platonists. Socrates was dead then, and he had left no letters. (Were the comparison not one that does too much honour to Fichte and Hegel, one would be tempted to say : without Plato, there could have been no Aristotle; and without Fichte, no Hegel.)"

Extract of Note 14:

Chapter 15/Note 14, Page 326

Extract from "The Open Society and Its Enemies Volume 2: Hegel and Marx" by Karl Raimund Popper (Originally published 1945) (Edition extracts taken from version published by Routledge and Kegan Paul, 5th Edition, 1973 reprint, ISBN 0 7100 4626 X) (Page 326)
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"It is easy to make very general prophecies; for instance, to prophesy that, within a reasonable time, it will rain. Thus there would not be much in the prophecy that,in some decades, there will be a revolution somewhere. But, as we see, Marx said just a little more than that, and just enough to be falsified by events. Those who try to interpret this falsification away remove the last bit of empirical significance from Marx's system."

Extract of Note 15:

Chapter 17/Note 15, Page 329

Extract from "The Open Society and Its Enemies Volume 2: Hegel and Marx" by Karl Raimund Popper (Originally published 1945) (Edition extracts taken from version published by Routledge and Kegan Paul, 5th Edition, 1973 reprint, ISBN 0 7100 4626 X) (Page 329)
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"Cp. Capital, 257 f. Marx's comment in his footnote I to this page is most interesting. He shows that such cases as these were used by the pro-slavery Tory reactionaries for propaganda for slavery. And he shows that among other, Thomas Carlyle, the oracle (a forerunner of facism), participated in this pro-slavery movement. Carlyle, to quote Marx, reduced 'the one great event of contemporary history, the American Civil War, to this level, that the Peter of the North wants to break the Paul of the South because the Peter of the North hires his workers "by the day, and the Paul of the South hires them by the lifetime",' Marx is here quoting Carlyle's article Ilias Americana in Nuce (Macmillan's Magazine, August, 1863). And Marx concludes: 'Thus the bubble of the Tory sympathy for the urban workers (The Tories never had any sympathy for agricultural workers) has burst at last. Inside it we find - slavery!'"

Extract of Note 4:

Chapter 18/Note 4, Page 333 to 334

Extract from "The Open Society and Its Enemies Volume 2: Hegel and Marx" by Karl Raimund Popper (Originally published 1945) (Edition extracts taken from version published by Routledge and Kegan Paul, 5th Edition, 1973 reprint, ISBN 0 7100 4626 X) (Page 333 to 334)
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"Marx fought against what he called 'Utopianism', and rightly so. (CP. chapter 9.) But since he was himself a romantic, he failed to discern the most dangerous element in Utopianism, its romantic hysteria, it aestheticist irrationalism; instead, he fought against its (addmittedly more immature) attempts at rational planning, opposing to them his historicism. (CP. note 21 in the present chapter.)

For all his acute reasoning and for all his attempts to use scientific method, Marx permitted irrational and aesthetic sentiments to usurp, in places, complete control of his thoughts. nowadays one calls this wishful thinking. It was romantic, irrational, and even mystical wishful thinking that led Marx to assume that the collective class unity and class solidarity of the workers would last after a change in the class situation. It is this wishful thinking, a mystical collectivism, and an irrational reaction to the strain of civilization which lead Marx to prophesy the necessary advent of socialism.

This kind of romanticism is one of the elements of Marxism which appeals most strongly to many of its followers. It is expressed, for example, most touchingly in the dedication of Hecker's Moscow Dialogues. Hecker speaks here of socialism as of 'a social order where the strife of class and race shall be no more, and where truth, goodness and beauty shall be the share of all'. Who would not like to have heaven on earth! And yet, it must be one of the first principles of rational politics that we cannot make heaven on earth. We are not going to become Free Spirits or angels at least not for the next couple of centuries or so. We are bound to this earth by our metabolism, as Marx once wisely declared; or as Christianity puts it, we are spirits and flesh. Thus we must be more modest. In politics and in medicine, he who promises too much is likely to be a quack. We must try to improve things, but we must get rid of the idea of a philosopher's stone, of a formula which will convert our corrupt human society into pure, lasting gold.

At the back of all this is the hope of casting out the devil from our world. Plato thought he could do it by banishing him to the lower classes, and ruling over him. The anarchists dreamt that once the state, the Political System, was destroyed, everything must turn out well. And Marx dreamt a similar dream of banishing the devil by destorying the economic system.

These remarks are not intended to imply that it is impossible to make even rapid advances, perhaps even through the introduction of comparatively small reforms, such as, for example, a reform of taxation, or a reduction of the rate of interest. I only wish to insist that we must expect every elimination of an evil to create, as its unwanted repercussion, a host of new though possibly very much lesser evils, which may be on an altogether different plane of urgency. Thus the second principle of sane politics would be : all politics consists in choosing the lesser evil (as the Viennese poet and critic K. Kraus put it). And politicians should be zealous in the search for the evils their actions must necessarily produce instead on concealing them, since a proper evaluation of competing evils must otherwise become impossible."

Extract of Note 9:

Chapter 18/Note 9, Page 335

Extract from "The Open Society and Its Enemies Volume 2: Hegel and Marx" by Karl Raimund Popper (Originally published 1945) (Edition extracts taken from version published by Routledge and Kegan Paul, 5th Edition, 1973 reprint, ISBN 0 7100 4626 X) (Page 335)
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"The term 'capitalism' is much too vague to be used as a name of a definite historical period. The term 'capitalism' was originally used in a disparaging sense, and it has retained this sense ('system favouring big profits made by people who do not work') in popular usage. But as the same time it has also been used in a neutral scientific sense, but with meny different meanings. In so far as, according to Marx, all accumulations of means of production may be termed 'capital', we may even say that 'capitalism' is in a certain sense synonymous with 'industrialisation'. We could in this sense quite correctly describe a communist society, in which the state owns all capital, as 'state-capitalism'. For these reasons, I suggest using the name 'unrestrained capitalism' for that period which Marx analysed and christend 'capitalism', and the name interventionalism for our own period. The name 'interventionalism' could indeed cover the three main types of social engineering in our time: the collectivist interventionalism of russia; the democratic interventionalism; of Swedend and the 'Smaller Democracies' and the New Deal in America; and even the fascist methods of regimented economy. What Marx called 'capitalism' - i.e. unrestrained capitalism - has completely 'withered away' in the twentieth century."

Extract of Note 10:

Chapter 18/Note 10, Page 335

Extract from "The Open Society and Its Enemies Volume 2: Hegel and Marx" by Karl Raimund Popper (Originally published 1945) (Edition extracts taken from version published by Routledge and Kegan Paul, 5th Edition, 1973 reprint, ISBN 0 7100 4626 X) (Page 335)
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"The Swedish 'social democrats', the party which inaugurated the Swedish experiment, had once been Marxist; but it gave up its Marxist theories shortly after its decision to accept governmental responsibilties and to embark upon a great programme of social reform."

Extract of Note 20:

Chapter 18/Note 20, Page 337

Extract from "The Open Society and Its Enemies Volume 2: Hegel and Marx" by Karl Raimund Popper (Originally published 1945) (Edition extracts taken from version published by Routledge and Kegan Paul, 5th Edition, 1973 reprint, ISBN 0 7100 4626 X) (Page 337)
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"The Marxist movement in Central Europe had few precedents in history. It was a movement which, in spite of the fact that it professed atheism, can truly be called a great religious movement. (Perhaps this may impress some of those intellectuals who do not take Marxism seriously.) Of course, it was a collectivist and even a tribalist movement, in many ways. But it was a movement of the workers to educate themselves for the great task; to emancipate themselves, to raise the standard of their calss interests and of their pastimes ; to substitute mountaineering for alcohol, classical music for swing, be achieved by the workers themselves' was their belief. (For the deep impression made by this movement on some observers, see, for example, G. E. R. Gedye's Fallen Bastions, 1939)"

Extract of Note 21:

Chapter 11/Note 3: Page 282

Extract from "The Open Society and Its Enemies Volume 2: Hegel and Marx" by Karl Raimund Popper (Originally published 1945) (Edition extracts taken from version published by Routledge and Kegan Paul, 5th Edition, 1973 reprint, ISBN 0 7100 4626 X) (Page 282)
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". . . . where Marx says approvingly of the Paris Commune of 1871 : 'The working class did not expect miracles from the Commune. They have no ready-made Utopias, to be introduced by the degree of the people. They know that in order to achieve their own emancipations, and with it, those higher forms to which our present society is irresistibly tending, . . they will have to pass through many struggle, through a series of historic processes, transforming circumstances and men. They have no ideals to realize, but to set free the elements of the new society with which the old collapsing bourgeois society itself is pregnent.' There are few passasges in Marx which exhibit the historicist lack of plan more strikingly. 'They have to pass through long struggles . . ', Marx says. But if they have no plan to realize, 'no ideals to realize', as Marx says, what are they struggling for? They 'did not expect miracles', as Marx says; but he himself expected miracles in believing that the historical struggle irresistibly tends to 'higher forms' of social life."

Extract of Note 22:

Chapter 18/Note 22, Page 337

Extract from "The Open Society and Its Enemies Volume 2: Hegel and Marx" by Karl Raimund Popper (Originally published 1945) (Edition extracts taken from version published by Routledge and Kegan Paul, 5th Edition, 1973 reprint, ISBN 0 7100 4626 X) (Page 337)
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"The Marxist leaders interpreted the events as the dialectical ups and downs of history. They thus functioned as cicerones, as guides through the hills (and valleys) of history rather than as political leaders of action. This dubious art of interpreting the terrible events of history instead of fighting them was forcefully denounced by the poet K. Kraus (mentioned in note 4 to this chapter)."

Extract of Note 36:

Chapter 20/Note 36, Page 349

Extract from "The Open Society and Its Enemies Volume 2: Hegel and Marx" by Karl Raimund Popper (Originally published 1945) (Edition extracts taken from version published by Routledge and Kegan Paul, 5th Edition, 1973 reprint, ISBN 0 7100 4626 X) (Page 349)
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"It may be mentioned here that the Marxian theory that revolutions depend on misery has been to some extent confirmed in the last century by the outbreak of revolutions in countries in which misery actually increased. But contrary to Marx's prediction, these countries were not those of developed capitalism. They were either peasant countries or countries where capitalism was at a primative stage of development."

Extract of Note 27:

Chapter 25/Note 27, Page 367

Extract from "The Open Society and Its Enemies Volume 2: Hegel and Marx" by Karl Raimund Popper (Originally published 1945) (Edition extracts taken from version published by Routledge and Kegan Paul, 5th Edition, 1973 reprint, ISBN 0 7100 4626 X) (Page 367)
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"It appears that one of the motives of historicism is that the historicist does not see that there is a third alternative, besides the two which he allows : either that the world is ruled by superior powers, by an 'essential desnity' or Hegelian 'Reason', or that it is a mere wheel of chance, irrational, on the level of a gamble. But there is a third possibility : that we may introduce reason into in (cp. note 19 to chapter 24) ; that although the world does not progress, we may progress, individually as well as in co-operation.

This third possibility is clearly expressed by H. A. K. Fisher in his History of Europe (vol. I, p. vii, italics miner ; partly quoted in text to note 8 to chapter 21) : 'One intellectual excitement has . . . been denied me. Men wiser and more learned than I have discerned in history a plot, a rhythm, a pre-determined pattern. These harmonies are concealed from me. I can see only one emergency following upon another as wave follows wave, only one greate fact with respect to which, since it is unique, there can be no generalizations, only one safe rule for the historian : that he should recognize . . the play of the contingent and the unforeseen.' And immediately after this excellent attack upon historicism (with the passage in italics, cp. note 13 to chapter 13), Fisher continues: 'This is not a doctrine of cynicism and despair. The fact of progress is written plain and large on the page of history; but progress is not a law of nature. The ground gained by one generation may be lost by the next.'

These last three sentences represent very clearly what I have called the 'third possiblity', the belief in our responsibility, the belief that everything rests with us. And it is interesting to see that Fisher's statement is interpreted by Toynbee (A Study of History, vol. V, 414) as representing 'the modern Western belief in the omnipotence of Chance'. Nothing could show more clearly the attitude of the historicist, his inability to see the third possibility. And it explains perhaps why he tries to escape from this alleged 'omnipotence of chance' into a belief in the omnipotence of the power behind the historical scene - that is, into historicism. (Cp. also note 61 to chapter 11.)

I may perhaps quote more fully Toynbee's comments on Fisher's passage (which Toynbee quotes down to the words 'the unforeseen') : 'This brilliantly phrased passage', Toynbee writes, 'cannot be dismissed as a scholars's conceit; for the writer is a Liberal who is formulating a creed which Liberalism has translated from theory into action . . This modern Western belief in the omnipotence of Chance gave brith to the nineteenth century of the Christian Era, when things still seemed to be going well with Western Man, to the policy of laissez faire . . ' (Why the belief in progress for which we ourselves are responsible should imply a belief int he omnipotence of Chance, or why it should produce the policy of laissez faire Toynbee leaves unexplained.)"

Truth: Page 369

Addenda I: Facts, Standards, and Truth: a Further Criticism of Relativism (1961)

Extract from "The Open Society and Its Enemies Volume 2: Hegel and Marx" by Karl Raimund Popper (Originally published 1945) (Edition extracts taken from version published by Routledge and Kegan Paul, 5th Edition, 1973 reprint, ISBN 0 7100 4626 X) (Page 369)
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"Certain arguement in support of relativism arise from the question, asked in the tone of the assured sceptic who knows for certain that there is no answer: 'What is truth?' But Pilate's question can be answered in a simple and reasonable way - though hardly in a way that would have satisfied him - as follows : an assertion, proposition, statement, or belief, is true if, and only if, it corresponds to the facts."

14. Two Wrongs do Not Make Two Rights : Page 387 to 388

Addenda I: Facts, Standards, and Truth: a Further Criticism of Relativism (1961)

Extract from "The Open Society and Its Enemies Volume 2: Hegel and Marx" by Karl Raimund Popper (Originally published 1945) (Edition extracts taken from version published by Routledge and Kegan Paul, 5th Edition, 1973 reprint, ISBN 0 7100 4626 X) (Page 387 to 388)
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"Once we have accepted the absolute theory of truth it is possible to answer an old and serious yet deceptive argument in favour of relativism, of both the intellectual and the evaluative kind, by making use of the analogy beteen true facts and valid standards. The deceptive argument I have in mind appeals to the discovert that other people have ideas and beliefs which differ widely from our. Who are we to insist that ours are the right ones? Already Xenophanes sang, 2500 years ago (Diels-Kranz, B, 16, 15):

The Ethiops say that their gods are flat-nosed and black
While the Thracians say that theirs have blue eyes and red hair.
Yet if cattle or horses or lions had hands and could draw,
And could sulpture like men, then the horses would draw their gods
Like horses, and cattle like cattle; and each they would shape
Bodies of gods in the likeness, each kind, of their own.

The fact on which this argument is based must be admitted; and indeed, we can never rid ourselves of bias. There is, however, no need to accept the argument itself, or its relativistic conclusions. For first of all, we can, in stages, get rid of some of this bias, by means of critical thinking and especially of listening to criticism. For example, Xenophanes doubtless was helped, by his own discovery, to see things in a less biassed way. Secondly, it is a fact that people with the most divergent cultural backgrounds can enter into fruitful discussion, provided they are interested in getting nearer to the truth, and are ready to listen to each other, and to learn from each other. This shows that, though there are cultural and linguistic barriers, they are not insurmountable.

Thus it is of the utmost importance to profit from Xenophanes' discovery in every field; to give up cocksureness, and become open to criticism. Yet it is also of the greatest, for a step towards relativism. If two parties diagree, this may mean that one is wrong, or the other, or both : this is the view of the criticist. It does not mean, as the relativist would have it, that both may be equally right. They may be equally wrong, no doubt, though they need not be. But anybody who ways that to be equally wronge means to be equally right is merely playing with words or with metaphors.

It is a great step forward to learn to be self-critical ; to learn to think that the other fellow may be right - more right than we ourselves. But there is a great danger involved in this : we may think that both, the other fellow and we ourselves, may be right. But this attitiude, modest and self-critical as it may appear to us, is neither as modest nor as self-critical as we may be inclined to think; for it is more likely that both, we ourselves and the other fellow, are wrong. Thus self-criticism should not be an excuse for laziness and for the adoption of relativism. And as two wrongs do not make a right, two wrong parties to a dispute do not make two right parties."


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