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For a concise background summary of "The Open Society and Its Enemies Volume" by Karl Popper refer to Extracts from "Philosophy and the Real World : An Introduction to Karl Popper" by Bryan Magee Published by Open Court Pub Co, July 1985, ISBN: 0875484360 Top notch warts and All Obituary of Karl Popper: THE BRITISH ACADEMY: Obituary of Karl Raimund Popper: 1902 - 1994: by John Watkins: London School of Economics: (Published (December 1997) in Proceedings of the British Academy, Volume 94, pp. 645 to 684): http://www.britac.ac.uk/pubs/src/popper/ Biography and assessment of Karl Popper (at the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy): http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/popper/
samizdat: [Russ., lit., self published.] a system by which manuscripts denied official publication in the Soviet Union are circulated clandestinely in typescript or in mimeograph form, or are smuggled out for publication. verisimilitude: [L. verisimilitudo, from verisimilis; see verisimilar]
Routledge On... Karl Popper ("In 1945 Routledge and Kegan Paul published the first book by an unknown author, Karl Popper. Originally entitled A Social Philosophy for Everyman, it had been turned down by a considerable number of publishers when Herbert Read, then a director of Routledge, determined to take it on. It came out under the title, The Open Society and Its Enemies"): http://www.routledge.com/popper/ Web and literature references on the Toxicology and effects of Hemlock on humans and animals (For those curious about effects of Hemlock vs the reported accounts of deaths of Socrates (by Plato!) and Seneca; and pondering whether the reported toxicology is consistent.)
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Starting Quote Extract from "The Open Society and Its Enemies Volume 2: Hegel and Marx"
by Karl Raimund Popper (Originally published 1945) (Edition extracts taken from version published by
Routledge and Kegan Paul,
5th Edition, 1973 reprint, ISBN 0 7100 4626 X)
(Ordering Routledge books)
"To the debacle of liberal science can be
traced the moral schism of the modern world which so tragically divides enlightened men" Walter Lippmann. |
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Plato, Aristotle and Slavery From: The Rise of Oracular Philosphy: Chapter 11: The Aristotelian Roots of Hegelianism Extract from "The Open Society and Its Enemies Volume 2: Hegel and Marx"
by Karl Raimund Popper (Originally published 1945) (Edition extracts taken from version published by
Routledge and Kegan Paul,
5th Edition, 1973 reprint, ISBN 0 7100 4626 X) (Page 2)
"Aristotle's throught is entirely dominated by Plato's. Somewhat grudglingly, he followed his great teacher as closely as his temperament permitted, not only in his general political outlook but practially everywhere. So he endorsed, and systematized, Plato's naturalistic theory of slavery: 'Some men are by nature free, and others slaves; and for the latter, slavery is fitting as well as just. . . A man who by nature not his own, but another's, is by nature a slave. . . Hellenes do not like to call themselves slaves, but confine this term to barbarians. . . The slave is totally devoid of any faculty of reasoning', while free women have just a little of it. (We owe to Aristotle's criticisms and denunciations most of our knowledge of the Athenian movement against slavery. By arguing against the fighters of freedom, he preserved some of their utterances.)" |
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Hegel philosophy of human relations: Master and Slave From: The Rise of Oracular Philosphy: Chapter 11: The Aristotelian Roots of Hegelianism Extract from "The Open Society and Its Enemies Volume 2: Hegel and Marx"
by Karl Raimund Popper (Originally published 1945) (Edition extracts taken from version published by
Routledge and Kegan Paul,
5th Edition, 1973 reprint, ISBN 0 7100 4626 X) (Page 8 to 9)
"Indeed, Hegel points out that all personal relations can thus be reduced to the fundamental relation of master and slave, of domination and submission. Each must strive to assert and prove himself, and he who has not the nature, the courage, and the general capacity for preserving his independence, must be reduced to servitude. This charming theory of personal relations has, of course, its counterpart in Hegel's theory of international relations. Nations must assert themselves on the Stage of History; it is their duty to attempt the domination of the World. All these far-reaching historicist consequences, which will be approached from a different angle in the next chapter, were slumbering for more than twenty centuries, 'hidden and undeveloped' in Aristotle's essentialism. Aristotelism was more fertile and promising than most of its many admirers know.
"The chief danger to our philosophy, apart from
laziness and woolliness, is scholasticism, . . which is treating what is vague as if it was precise. . ." F. P. Ramsey." |
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age of dishonesty From: The Rise of Oracular Philosphy: Chapter 11: The Aristotelian Roots of Hegelianism Extract from "The Open Society and Its Enemies Volume 2: Hegel and Marx"
by Karl Raimund Popper (Originally published 1945) (Edition extracts taken from version published by
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 5th Edition, 1973 reprint, ISBN 0 7100 4626 X) (Page 21)
"This romantic period of oracular philosophy, called by Schopenhaur the 'age of dishonesty', is described by him as follows: 'The character of honesty, that spirit of undertaking an inquiry together with the reader, which permeates the works of all previous philosophers, disappears here completely. Every page witnesses that these so-called philosophers do not attempt to teach, but to bewitch the reader.' A similar result was produced by Aristotle's doctrine of definition. First it lead to a good deal of hairsplitting. But later, philosophers began to feel that one cannot argue about definitions. In this way, essentialism not only encouraged verbalism, but it also led to the disillusionment with argument, that is, with reason. Scholasticism and mysticism and despair with reason, these are the unavoidable results of the essentialism of Platon and Aristotle. And Plato's open revolt against freedom becomes, with Aristotle, a secret revolt against reason." |
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Christian authoritirianism of the Middle Ages From: The Rise of Oracular Philosphy: Chapter 11: The Aristotelian Roots of Hegelianism Extract from "The Open Society and Its Enemies Volume 2: Hegel and Marx"
by Karl Raimund Popper (Originally published 1945) (Edition extracts taken from version published by
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 5th Edition, 1973 reprint, ISBN 0 7100 4626 X) (Page 24 to 26)
"However this may be, it can hardly be argued that with Justinian's persecution of non-Christians, heretics and philosophers (A.D. 529), the dark ages began. The Church followed in the wake of Platonic-Aristotelian totalitarianism, a development that culminated in the Inquisition. The theory of the Inquisition, more especially, can be described as purely Platonic. It is set out in the last three books of the laws and especially of religious practice and theory, even if they have to kill the wolf, who may admittedly be an honest and honerable man whose diseased conscience unfortunately does not permit him to bow to the threats of the mighty. It is one fo the characteristic reactions to the strain of civilisation in our own time that the alledgedly 'Christian' authoritarianism of the Middle Ages has, in certain intellectualist circles, become one of the latest fashions of the day. This, no doubt, is due not only to the idealisation of an indeed more 'organic' and 'integrated' past, but also to an understandable revulsion against modern agnosticism which has increased this strain beyond the limit of responsibility. All this has to be admitted. But I do not doubt that the Middle Ages were, even from the point of view of Christianity, not better ruled than out Western democracies. For we can read in the Gospels that the founder of Christianity was questioned by a certain 'doctor of law' about a criterion by which to distinguish between a true and a false interpretation of His words. To this He replied by telling the parable of the priest and the Levite who both, seeing a wounded man in great distress, 'passed by on the other side', while the Samaritan bound up his wounds, and looked after his material needs. This parable, I think, should be remembered by those ' Christians' who long not only for a time when the Church suppressed freedom and conscience, but also for a time in which, under the eye and with the autohrity of the Church, untold oppression drove the people to despair. As a moving comment upon the suffering of the people in those days and, at the same time, upon the 'Christianity' of the now so fashionable romantic medievalism wihch wants to bring these days back, a passage may be quoted here from H. Zinsser's book, Rats, Lice, and History, in which he speaks about epidemics of dancing mania in the Middle Ages, known as 'St. John's dance', 'St. Vitus' dance', etc. (I do not wich to invoke Zinsser as an authority on the Middle Ages - there is no need to do so since the facts at issue are hardly controversial. But his comments have the rare and peculiar touch of the practical Samaritan - of a great and humane physician.) 'These strange seizures, though not unheard of in earlier times, became common during and immediately after the dreadful miseries of the Black Death. For the most part, the dancing manias present none of the characteristics which we associate with epidemic infectious diseases of the nervious system. They seem, rather, like mass hysterias, brought on by terror and despair, in populations oppressed, famished, and wretched to a degree almost unimaginable today. To the miseries of constant war, political and social disintegration, there was added the dreadful affliction of inescapable, mysterious, and deadly disease. Mankind stood helpless as though trapped in a world of terror and peril against which there was no defence. God and the devil were living conceptions to the men of those days cowered under the afflictions which they believed imposed by supernatural forces. For those who broke down under the strain there was no road to escape except to the inward refuge of mental derangement which, under the circumstances oft he times, took the direction of religious fanaticism.' Zinsser then goes on to draw some parallels between these events and certain reactions of our time in which, he says, 'economic and political hysterias are substituted for religious ones of earlier times'; and after this, he sums up his characterization of people who lived in those days of authoritarianism as 'a terror-stricken and wretched population, which had broken down under the stress of almost incredible hardship and danger'. It is necessary to ask which attitude is mroe Christian, one that longs to return to the 'unbroken harmony and unity' of the MIddle Ages, or one that wishes to use reason in order to free mankind from pestilence and oppression? But some part at least of the authoritarian Church of the Middle Ages succeeded in branding such practical humanitarianism as 'wordly', as characteristic of 'Epicureanism', and of men who desire only to 'fill their bellies like the beasts'. The terms 'Epicureanism', 'materialism', and 'empiricism', that is to say, the philosophy of Democritus, one of the greatest of the Great Generation, became in the way synonyms of wickedness, and the tribal Idealism of Platon and Aristotle, was exalted as a kind of Christianity before Christ. Indeed, this is the source of the immense authority, of Plato and Aristotle, even in our own day, that their philosophy was adopted by medieval authoritarianism. But it must not be forgotten that, outside the totalitarian camp, their fame has outlived their practical influence upon our lives. And although the name of Democritus is seldom remembered, his science as well as his morals still live with us." |
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On Hegel From: The Rise of Oracular Philosphy: Chapter 12: Hegel and the New Tribalism Extract from "The Open Society and Its Enemies Volume 2: Hegel and Marx"
by Karl Raimund Popper (Originally published 1945) (Edition extracts taken from version published by
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 5th Edition, 1973 reprint, ISBN 0 7100 4626 X) (Page 27)
"The philosophy of Hegel, then, was . . a scrutiny
of thought so profound that it was for the most part unintelligible" J. H. Stirling. "Hegel, the source of all contemporary historicism, was a direct follower of Heraclitus, Platon, and Aristotle. Hegel achieved the most miraculous things. A master logician, it was child's play for his powerful dialectical methods to draw real physical rabbits out of purely metaphysical silk-hats. Thus, starting from Plato's Timaeus and it number-mysticism, Hegel succeeded in 'proving' by purely philosophical methods (114 years after Newton's Principia) that the planets must move according to Kepler's laws. He even accomplished the deduction of the actual position of the planets, thereby provinn that no planet could be situated between Mars and Jupiter (unfortunately, it had escaped his notice that such a planet had been discovered a few months earlier)" |
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On Hegel From: The Rise of Oracular Philosphy: Chapter 12: Hegel and the New Tribalism Extract from "The Open Society and Its Enemies Volume 2: Hegel and Marx"
by Karl Raimund Popper (Originally published 1945) (Edition extracts taken from version published by
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 5th Edition, 1973 reprint, ISBN 0 7100 4626 X) (Page 28)
"There are still some who still believe in Hegel's sincerity, or who still doubt whethr his secret might not be profundity, fullness of thought, rather than emptiness. I should like them to read carefully the last sentence--the only intelligible one--of this quotation, because in this sentence, Hegel gives himself away. For clearly it means nothing but: 'The heating up of sounding bodies. . is heat . . together with sound.' The question arises whether Hegel deceived himself, hypnotized by his own inspiring jargon, or whether he boldly set out to deceive and bewitch others. I am satisfied that the latter is the case, especially in view of what Hegel wrote in one of his letters. . . . " |
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On Hegel From: The Rise of Oracular Philosphy: Chapter 12: Hegel and the New Tribalism Extract from "The Open Society and Its Enemies Volume 2: Hegel and Marx"
by Karl Raimund Popper (Originally published 1945) (Edition extracts taken from version published by
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 5th Edition, 1973 reprint, ISBN 0 7100 4626 X) (Page 29)
"And one can way that outside the continent of Europe, especially in the last twenty years, the interest of philosophers in Hegel has slowly been vanishing. But if this is so, why worry any more about Hegel? the answer is that Hegel's influence has remained a most powerful force, in spite of the fact that scientists never took him seriously, and that (aprat from the 'evolutionists') many philosophers are beginning to lose interest in him. Hegel's influence, and especially his cant, is still very powerful in moral and social philosophy and in the social and political sciences (with the sole exception of economics). Especially the philosophers of history, of politics, and of education are still to a very large extent under his sway. In politics, this is shown most drastically by the fact that the Maxist extreme left wing, as well as the conservative centre, and the fascist extreme right, all base their political philosophies on Hegel; the left wing replaces the war of nations which appears in Hegel's historicist scheme by the war of classes, the extreme right replaces it by the war of races; but both follow him more or less consciously. (The conservative centre is as a rule less conscious of its indebtedness to Hegel.) How can this immense influence be explained? My main intention is not so much to explain this phenomenon as to combat it. But I may make a few explanatory suggestions. For some reason, philosophers have kept around themselves, even in our day, something of the atmosphere of the magician. Philosophy is considered as a strange and abstruse kind of thing, dealing wiht those mysteries with which religion deals, but not in a way which can be 'revealed unto babes' or to common people; it is considered too profound for that, and to be the religion and theology of the intellectuals, of the learned and wise. Hegelianism fits these views admirably; it is exactly what this kind of popular superstition supposes philosophy to be. It knows all about everything. It has a ready answer to every question. And indeed, who can be sure that the answer is not ture? But this is not the main reason for Hegel's sucess. His influence, and the need to combat it, can perhaps be better understood if we briefly consider the general historical situation...." |
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On Hegel From: The Rise of Oracular Philosphy: Chapter 12: Hegel and the New Tribalism Extract from "The Open Society and Its Enemies Volume 2: Hegel and Marx"
by Karl Raimund Popper (Originally published 1945) (Edition extracts taken from version published by
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 5th Edition, 1973 reprint, ISBN 0 7100 4626 X) (Page 32 to 33)
"My assertion that Hegel's philosophy was inspired by ulterior motives, namely, by his interest in the restoration of the Prussian government of Frederick William III, and that it cannot therefore be taken seriously, is not new. the story is well known to al who knew the political situation, and it was freely told by the few who were independent enough to do so. The best witness is Schopenhauer, himself a Platonic idealist and a conservative if not a reactionary, but a man of supreme integrity who cherished truth beyond anything else. There can be no doubt that he was as competent a judge in philosophical matters as could be found at the time. Schopenhauer, who had the pleasure of knowing Hegel personally and who suggested that use of Shakespeare's words, 'such stuff as madmen tongue and brain not', as the motto of Hegel's philosophy, drew the following excellent picture of the master: 'Hegel, installed from above by that powers that be, as the certified Great Philosopher, was a flat-headed, insipid, nausiating, illiterate charlatan, who reached the pinnacle of audacity in scribbling together and dishing up the craziest mystifying nonsense. This nonsense has been noisily proclaimed as immortal wisdom by mercenary followers and readily accepted as such by all fools, who thus joined in as a perfect chorus of admiration as had ever been heard before. The extensive field of spiritual influence with which Hegel was furnished by those in power has enabled him to achieve the intellectual corruption of a whole generation.' And in another place, Schopenhauer describes the political game of Hegalianism as follows: 'Philosophy, brought afresh repute by Kant. . . had soon to become a tool of interests; of state interests from above, of personal interests from below. . . The driving forces of this movement are, contrary to all solemn airs and assertations, not idea; they are very real purposes indeed, namely personal, official, clerical, political, in short, material interests. . . Party interests are vehemently agitating the pens of so many pure lovers of wisdom. . . Truth is certainly the last thing they have in mind. . . Philosophy is misused, from the side of the state as a tool, from the other side as a means of gain. . . Who can really believe that the truth also will thereby come to light, just as a by-product?. . Governments make of philosophy a means of serving their state interests, and scholars make of it a trade. . .' " |
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Influence of Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason" From: The Rise of Oracular Philosphy: Chapter 12: Hegel and the New Tribalism Extract from "The Open Society and Its Enemies Volume 2: Hegel and Marx"
by Karl Raimund Popper (Originally published 1945) (Edition extracts taken from version published by
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 5th Edition, 1973 reprint, ISBN 0 7100 4626 X) (Page 38)
"Kant, in his Critique of Pure Reason, asserted under the influence of Hume that pure speculation or reason, whenever it ventures into a field in which it cannot possibly be checked by experience, is liable to get involved in contradictions or 'antinomies' and to produce what he unambigously described as 'mere fancies'; 'nonsense'; 'illusions'; 'a sterile dogmatism'; and 'a superficial pretension to the knowledge of everything'. He tried to show that to every metaphysical assertion or thesis, concerning for example the beginning of the world in time, or the existance of God, there can be contrasted a counter-assertion or antithesis; and both, he held, may proceed from the same asumptions, and can be proved with an equal degree of 'evidence'. In other words, when leaving the field of experience, our speculation can have no scientific status, since to every argument there must be an equally valid counter-argument. Kan't intention was to stop once and forever the 'accursed fertility' of the scribblers to use rational argument; they only gave up the attempt to teach, but not the attempt to bewitch the public (as Schopenhauer puts it). For this development, Kant himself undoubtedly bears a very considerable share of the blame; for the obscure style of his work (which he wrote in a great hurry, although only after long years of meditation) contributed considerably to a further lowering of the low standard of clarity in German theoretical writing." |
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Dialectics From: The Rise of Oracular Philosphy: Chapter 12: Hegel and the New Tribalism Extract from "The Open Society and Its Enemies Volume 2: Hegel and Marx"
by Karl Raimund Popper (Originally published 1945) (Edition extracts taken from version published by
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 5th Edition, 1973 reprint, ISBN 0 7100 4626 X) (Page 43)
"As a second example of this use of dialectics, I select Hegel's treatment of the demand for a political constitution, which he combines with his treatment of equality and liberty. In order to appreciate the problem of the constitution, it must be remembered that Prussian absolutism knew no constitutional law (apart from such principles as the full sovereignty of the king) and that the slogan of the campaign for democratic reform in the various German principalities was that the prince should 'grant the country a constitution'. But Frederick William agreed with his councillor Ancillon in the conviction that he must never give way to 'the hotheads, that very active and loud-voice group of persons who for some years have set themselves up as the nation and have cried for a constitution'. And although, under great pressure, the king promised a constitution, he never fulfilled his word. (There is a story that an innocent comment on the king's 'constitution' led to the dismissal of his unfortunate court- physician.) Now how does Hegel treat this ticklish problem?" |
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Paradox of Freedom From: The Rise of Oracular Philosphy: Chapter 12: Hegel and the New Tribalism Extract from "The Open Society and Its Enemies Volume 2: Hegel and Marx"
by Karl Raimund Popper (Originally published 1945) (Edition extracts taken from version published by
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 5th Edition, 1973 reprint, ISBN 0 7100 4626 X) (Page 44)
"Now this argument which tries to show that a 'liberty' is the same as 'a liberty' and therefore the same as 'law', from which it follows that the more laws, the more liberties is clearly nothing than a clumsy statement (clumsy because it relies on a kind of pun) of the paradox of freedom, first discovered by Plato, and briefly discussed above; a parados that can be expressed by saying that unlimited freedom leads to its opposite, since without its protection and restriction by law, freedom must lead to a tyranny of the strong over the weak. This paradox vaguely restated by Rousseau, was solved by Kant, who demanded that the freedom of each man should be restricted, but not beyond what is necessary to safeguard an equal degree of freedom for all. Hegel of course knows Kant's solution, but he does not like it, and he presents it, without mentioning its author, in the following disparaging way: 'To-day, nothing is more familiar than the idea that each must restrict his liberty in relation to the liberty of others; that the state is a condition of such reciprocal restrictions; and that the laws are restrictions. But', he goes on to criticize Kant's theory, 'this expresses the kind of outlook that views freedom as casual good-pleasure and self-will.' With this cryptic remark, Kant's equalitarian theory of justic is dismissed." |
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Plato, Rousseau and "Who Should Rule?" From: The Rise of Oracular Philosphy: Chapter 12: Hegel and the New Tribalism Extract from "The Open Society and Its Enemies Volume 2: Hegel and Marx"
by Karl Raimund Popper (Originally published 1945) (Edition extracts taken from version published by
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 5th Edition, 1973 reprint, ISBN 0 7100 4626 X) (Page 52)
"Plato, it will be remembered, unfortunately formulated his fundamental political problem by asking: Who should rule? Whose will should be law? Before Rousseau, the usual answer to this question as : The prince. Rousseau gave a new and most revolutionary answer. Not the prince, he maintained, but the people should rule; the not will of one man but the will of all. In this way, he was lead to invent the people's will, the collective will, or the 'general will', as he called it; and the people, once endowed with a will, had to be exalted into a super-personality; 'in relation to what is external to it' (i.e., in relation to other peoples), Rousseau says, 'it becomes one single being, one individual'. Thwere was a good deal of romatic collectivism in this invention, but no tendency towards nationalism. But Rousseau's theories clearly contain the germ of nationalism, whose most characteristic doctrine is that the various nations must be conceived as personalities. And a great practical step in the nationalist direction was made when the French Revolution inaugurated a people's army, based on national conscription." |
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Fichte, Kant and the "Critique of All Revelation" From: The Rise of Oracular Philosphy: Chapter 12: Hegel and the New Tribalism Extract from "The Open Society and Its Enemies Volume 2: Hegel and Marx"
by Karl Raimund Popper (Originally published 1945) (Edition extracts taken from version published by
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 5th Edition, 1973 reprint, ISBN 0 7100 4626 X) (Page 54)
"When the press extolled Fichte's work as one of Kant's, Kant was forced to make a public statement that the work was Fichte's, and Fichte, upon whom fame had suddenly descended, was made professor in Jena. But Kant was later forced to make another declaration, in order to dissociate himself from this man, a declaration in which occur the words: 'May God protect us from our friends. From our enemies, we can try to protect ourselves.'" |
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"Our time" and Hegel From: The Rise of Oracular Philosphy: Chapter 12: Hegel and the New Tribalism Extract from "The Open Society and Its Enemies Volume 2: Hegel and Marx"
by Karl Raimund Popper (Originally published 1945) (Edition extracts taken from version published by
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 5th Edition, 1973 reprint, ISBN 0 7100 4626 X) (Page 59)
"In our time, Hegel's hysterical historicism is still the fertilizer to which modern totalitarianism owes its rapid growth. Its use has prepared the ground, and has educated the intelligentia to intellectual dishonesty, as will be shown in section v of this chapter. We have to learn the lesson that intellectural honesty is fundamental for everything we cherish. But is this all? And is it just? Is there nothing in the claim that Hegel's greatness lies in the fact that he was the creator of a new, or a historical way of thinking - of a new historical sense? Many of my friends have criticized me for my attitude toward Hegel, and for my inability to see his greatness. They were, of course, quite right, since I was indeed unable to see it. (I am so still.) In order to remedy this fault, I made a systematic inquiry into the question, Wherein lies Hegel's greatness? The result was disappointing. . . " |
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Quoting Kolnai: Civilised government vs Nationalist Government From: The Rise of Oracular Philosphy: Chapter 12: Hegel and the New Tribalism Extract from "The Open Society and Its Enemies Volume 2: Hegel and Marx"
by Karl Raimund Popper (Originally published 1945) (Edition extracts taken from version published by
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 5th Edition, 1973 reprint, ISBN 0 7100 4626 X) (Page 71 to 72)
"Kolnai, to whose book I am deeply indebted for a great deal of material to which I would otherwise have had no access, says most strikingly : 'All of us . . who stand for . . rational, civilized methods of government and social organisation, agree that war is in itself an evil . . ' adding that in the opinion of most of us (except the pacifists) it might become, under certain circumstances, a necessary evil, he continues: 'The nationalist attitude is different, though it need not imply a desire for perpetual or frequent warfare. It sees in a war a good rather than an evil, even if it be a dangerous good, like an exceedingly heady wine that is best reserved for rare occasions of high festivity.' War is not a common and abundant evil but a precious though rare good: - this sums up the views of Hege and of his followers. One of Hegal's feats was the revival of the Heraclitean idea of fate; [text deleted] 'The principle of Race', Kolnai says, 'is meant to embody and express the utter negation of human freedom, the denial of equal rights, a challenge in the face of mankind.' And he rightly insists that racialism tends to 'oppose Liberty by Fate, individual consciousness by the compelling urge of the Blood beyond the control of argument" |
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Hegel and reviving Fame From: The Rise of Oracular Philosphy: Chapter 12: Hegel and the New Tribalism Extract from "The Open Society and Its Enemies Volume 2: Hegel and Marx"
by Karl Raimund Popper (Originally published 1945) (Edition extracts taken from version published by
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 5th Edition, 1973 reprint, ISBN 0 7100 4626 X) (Page 72)
"Together with the idea of fate, its counterpart, that of fame is also revived by Hegel: 'Individuals. . are instruments. . . What they personally gain . . through the individual share they take in the substantial business (prepared and appointed independently of them) is . . Fame, which is their reward.' And Stapel, a propogator of the new paganized Christianity, promptly repeats: 'All great deeds were done for the sake of fame or glory.' But this 'Christian' moralist is even more radical than Hegel: 'Metaphysical glory is the one true morality', he teaches, and the 'Categorical Imperitive' of this one true morality runs accordingly: 'Do such deeds as spell glory!'" |
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The tribal ideal of Heroic Man From: The Rise of Oracular Philosphy: Chapter 12: Hegel and the New Tribalism Extract from "The Open Society and Its Enemies Volume 2: Hegel and Marx"
by Karl Raimund Popper (Originally published 1945) (Edition extracts taken from version published by
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 5th Edition, 1973 reprint, ISBN 0 7100 4626 X) (Page 75)
"The tribal ideal of the Heroic Man, especially in its fascist form, is based upon different views. It is a direct attack upon those things which make heroism admirable to most of us - such things as the furthering of civilization. For it is an attack on the idea of civil life itself; this is denounced as shallow and materialistic, because of the idea of security which it cherishes." |
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"The History of the World is no theatre of happiness From: The Rise of Oracular Philosphy: Chapter 12: Hegel and the New Tribalism Extract from "The Open Society and Its Enemies Volume 2: Hegel and Marx"
by Karl Raimund Popper (Originally published 1945) (Edition extracts taken from version published by
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 5th Edition, 1973 reprint, ISBN 0 7100 4626 X) (Page 75)
"Hegel, always faithful to his historicism, basese his anti-utilitarian attitude (in distinction to Aristotle's utilitarian comments upon the 'dangers of prosperity') on his interpretation of history: 'The History of the World is not theatre of happiness. Periods of happiness are blank pages in it, for they are periods of harmony.' Thus, liberalism, freedom and reason are, as usual, objects of Hegel's attacks. The hysterical cries: We want our history! We want our destiny! We want our fight! We want our chains! resound through the edifice of Hegelianism, through this stronghold of the closed society and of the revolt against freedom." |
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Schopenhauer's advice to a dishonest guardian From: The Rise of Oracular Philosphy: Chapter 12: Hegel and the New Tribalism Extract from "The Open Society and Its Enemies Volume 2: Hegel and Marx"
by Karl Raimund Popper (Originally published 1945) (Edition extracts taken from version published by
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 5th Edition, 1973 reprint, ISBN 0 7100 4626 X) (Page 77 to 78)
"And in view of the last of Heidegger's quotations, they should ask themselves whether Schopenhauer's advice to a dishonest guardian has not been successfully administered by many educationalists to many promising youths, inside and outside of Germany. I have in mind the passage: 'Should you ever intend to dull the wits of a young man and to incapacitate his brains for any kind of thought whatever, then you cannot do better than give him Hegel to read. For these monstrous accumulations of words that annul and contradict one another drive the mind into tormenting itself with vain attempts to think anything whatever in connection with them, until finally it collapses from sheer exhaustion. Thus any ability to think is so thoroughly destroyed that the young man will ultimately mistake empty and hollow verbiage for real thought. A guardian fearing that his ward might become too intelligent for his schemes might prevent this misfortune by innocently suggesting the reading of Hegel.'" |
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'For if we are silent, who will speak?' From: The Rise of Oracular Philosphy: Chapter 12: Hegel and the New Tribalism Extract from "The Open Society and Its Enemies Volume 2: Hegel and Marx"
by Karl Raimund Popper (Originally published 1945) (Edition extracts taken from version published by
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 5th Edition, 1973 reprint, ISBN 0 7100 4626 X) (Page 80)
"It seems to me a fitting conclusion to this chapter if I leave the last word to Schopenhauer, the anti-nationalist who said of Hegel a hundred years ago: 'He exerted, not on philosophy alone but on all forms of German literature, a devastating, or more strictly speaking, a stupefying, one could also say, a pestiferous, influence. To combat this influence forcefully and on every occasion is the duty of everybody who is able to judge independently. For if we are silent, who will speak?'" |
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Introduction to Marx Marx's Method: Chapter 13: Marx's Sociological Determinism Extract from "The Open Society and Its Enemies Volume 2: Hegel and Marx"
by Karl Raimund Popper (Originally published 1945) (Edition extracts taken from version published by
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 5th Edition, 1973 reprint, ISBN 0 7100 4626 X) (Page 81 to 82)
"The collectivists . . have the zest for progress,
the sympathy for the poor, the burning sense of wrong, the impulse for great deeds, which have been lacking in latter-day liberalism. But their science is founded on a profound misunderstanding. ., and their actions, therefore, are deeply destructive and reactionary. So men's hearts are torn, their minds divided, they are offered impossible choices. Walter Lippmann. "It has always been the strategy of the revolt against freedom 'to take advantage of sentiments, not wasting one's energies in futile efforts to destroy them'. The most cherished ideas of the humanitarians were often loudly acclaimed by their deadliest enemies, who in this way penetrated into the humanitarian camp under the guise of allies, causing disunion and thorough confusion. This strategy has otfen been highly successful, as is shown by the fact that many genuine humanitarians still revere Plato's idea of 'justice', the medieval idea of 'Christian' authoritarianism, Rousseau's ida of the 'general will', or Fichte's and Hegel's ideas of 'national freedom'. yet this method of penetrating, dividing and confusing the humanitarian camp and of building up a largely unwitting and therefore doubly effective intellectual fifth column achieved its greatest success only after Hegelianism had established itself as the basis of a truly humanitarian movement: of Marxism, so far the purest, the most developed and most dangerous form of historicism. It is tempting to dwell upon the similarities between Marxism, the Hegelian left-wing, and its fascist counterpart. Yet it would be utterly unfair to overlook the difference between them. Althought their intellectual origin is nearly identical, there can be no doubt of the humanitarian impulse of Marxism. Moreover, in contrast to the Hegelians of the right-wing, Marx made an honest attempt to apply rational methods to the most urgent problems of social life. The value of this attempt is unimpaired by the fact that it was, as I shall try to show, largely unsuccessful. Science progresses through trial and error. Marx tried, and although he erred in his main doctrines, he did not try in vain. He opened and sharpened our eyes in many ways. A return to pre-Marxian social science is inconceivable. All modern writers are indebted to Marx, even if they do not know it. This is especially true of those who disagree with his doctrines, as I do; and I readily admit that my treatment, for example of Platon and Hegel, bears the stamp of his influence. One cannot do justice to Marx whiout recognizing his sincerity. His open-mindedness, his sense of facts, his distrust of verbiage, and especially of moralizing verbiage, made him one of the world' most influential fighters against hypocrisy and pharisaism. He had a burning desire to help the oppressed, and was fully conscious of the need for proving himself in deeds, and not only in words. His main talents eing theoretical, he devoted immense labour to forging what he believed to be scientific weapons for the fight to improve the lot of the vast majority of men. His sincerity in his search for truth and hit intellectual honesty distinguished him, I believe, from many of his followers (although unfortunately he did not altogether escape the corrupting influence of an upbringing in the atmosphere of Hegelian dialectics, described by Schopenhauer as 'destructive of all intelligence'). Marx's interest in social science and social philosophy was fundamentally a practical interest. He saw in knowledge a means of promoting the progress of man. Why, then, attack Marx? In spite of his merits, Marx was I believe, a false prophet. He was a prophet of the course of history, and his prophecies did not come true; but this is not my main accusation. It is much more important that he misled scores of intelligent people into believing that historical prophecy is the scientific way of approaching social problems. Marx is responsible for the devastating influcence of the historicist method of thought within the ranks of those who wish to advance the cause of the open society." |
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John Stuart Mill's Psychologism Marx's Method: Chapter 14: The Automony of Sociology Extract from "The Open Society and Its Enemies Volume 2: Hegel and Marx"
by Karl Raimund Popper (Originally published 1945) (Edition extracts taken from version published by
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 5th Edition, 1973 reprint, ISBN 0 7100 4626 X) (Page 91)
"Thus 'all phenomena of society are phenomea of human nature', as Mill said; and 'the Laws of phenomena of individual human nature. Men are not, when brought together, converted into another kind of substance. . ' This last remark of Mill's exhibits one of the most praiseworthy aspects of psychologism, namely, its sane opposition to collectivism and holism, its refusal to be impressed by Rousseau's or Hegel's romanticism - by a general will or national spirit, or perhaps, by a group mind." |
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Psychologism, Historicism and Conspiricy theories Marx's Method: Chapter 14: The Automony of Sociology Extract from "The Open Society and Its Enemies Volume 2: Hegel and Marx"
by Karl Raimund Popper (Originally published 1945) (Edition extracts taken from version published by
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 5th Edition, 1973 reprint, ISBN 0 7100 4626 X) (Page 94 to 96)
"The fact that psychologism is forced to operate with the idea of a psychological origin of society constitutes in my opinion a decisive argument against it. But it is not the only one. Perhaps the most important criticism of psychologism is that it fails to understand the main task of explanatory social sciences. This task is not, as the historicist believes, the prophecy of the future course of history. It is, rather, the discovery and explanation of the less obvious dependencies, which stand in the way of social action - the study, as it were, of the unwieldiness, the resilence or the brittleness of the social stuff, or its resistance to our attempts to mould it and to work with it. In order to make my point clear, I shall briefly describe a theory which is widely help but which assumes what I consider the very opposite of the true aim of social sciences; I call it the 'conspiracy theory of society'. It is the view that an explanation of a social phenomenon consists in the discovery of the men or groups who are interested in the occurrence of this phenomenon (sometimes it is a hidden interest which has first to be revealed), and who have planned and conspired to bring it about. This view of the aims of the social sciences arises, of course, from the mistaken theory, that, whatever happens in society - especially happenings such as war, unemployment, poverty, shortages, which people as a rule dislike - is the result of direct design by some poweful individuals and groups. This theory is widely help; it is older even than historicism (which, as shown by its primitive theistic form, is a derivative of the conspiracy theory). In its modern forms it is, like modern historicism, and a certain modern attitude towards 'natural laws', a typical result of the secularisation of a religious superstition. The belief in the Homeric gods whose conspiracies explain the history of the Trojan War is gone. The gods are abandoned. But their place if filled by powerful men or groups - sinister pressure groups whose wickedness is responsible for all the evils we suffer from - such as the Learned Elders of Zion, or the monopolists, or the capitalists, or the imperialists. I do not wish to imply that conspiracies never happen. On the contrary, they are typical social phenomena. They become important, for example, whenever people who believe in the conspiracy theory get into power. And people who sincerely believe that they know how to make heaven on earth are most likely to adopt the conspiracy teory, and to get involved in a counter-conspiracy theory against non-existing conspirators. For the only explanation of their failure to produce their heaven is the evil intention of the Devil, who has a vested interest in hell. Conspiracies occur, it must be admitted. But the striking fact which, in spite of their occurrence, disproved the conspiracy theory is that few of these conspiracies are ultimately successful. Conspirators rarely consummate their conspiracy. Why is this so? Why do achievements differ so widely from aspirations? Because this is usually the case in social life, conspiracy or no conspiracy. Social life is not only a trial of strength between opposing groups: it is action within a more or less resilent or brittle framework of institutions and traditions, and it creates - apart from any conscious counter-action - many unforseen reactions in this framework, some of them perhaps even unforseeable. To try to analyse these reactions and to forsee them as far as possible is, I believe, the main task of the social sciences. It is the task of analysing the unintended social repercussions of intentional human actions - those repercussions whose significance is neglected both by conspiracy theory and by psychologism, as already indicated. An action which proceeds precisely according to intention does nto create a problem for social science (except that there may be a need to explain why is this particular case no unintended repercussions occurred). One of the most primative economic actions may serve as an example in order to make the idea of unintended consequences of our actions quite clear. If a man wishes urgently to buy a house, we can safely assume that he does not wish to raise the market price of houses. But the very fact that he appears on the market as a buyer will tend to raise market prices. And analogous remarks hold for the seller. Or to take an example from a very different field, if a man decides to insure his life, he is unlikely to have the intention of encouraging some people to invest their money in insurance shares. But he will do so nevertheless. We see here clearly that not all consequences of our actions are intended consequences; and accordingly, that the conspiracy theory of society cannot be true because it amounts to the assertion that all results, even those which at first sight do not seem to be intended by anybody, are the intended results of the actions of people who are interested in these results. The examples given do not refute psychologism as easily as they refute the conspiracy theory, for one can argue that it is the seller's knowledge of the buyer's presence in the market, and their hope of getting a higher price - in other words, psychological factors - which explain the reprecussions described. This, of course, is quite true; but we must not forget that this knowledge and this hope are not ultimate data of human nature, and that they are, in their turn, explicable in terms of the social situation - the market situation. " |
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Marx and Vulgar Marxists Marx's Method: Chapter 15: Economic Historicism Extract from "The Open Society and Its Enemies Volume 2: Hegel and Marx"
by Karl Raimund Popper (Originally published 1945) (Edition extracts taken from version published by
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 5th Edition, 1973 reprint, ISBN 0 7100 4626 X) (Page 100 to 101)
"To see Marx presented in this way, that is to say, as an opponent of any psychological theory of society, may possibly surprise some Marxists as wall as some Anti-Marxists. For there seem to be many who believe in a very different story. Marx, they think, taught the all-pervading influence of the economic motive in the life of men; he succeeded in explaining its over-powering strength by showing that 'man's overmastering need was to get the means of living'; he thus demonstrated the fundamental importance of such categories as the profit motive or the motive of class interest for the actions not only of individuals but also of social groups; and he showed how to use these categories for explaining the course of history. Indeed, they thing that the very essence of Marxism is the doctrine that economic motives and espeically class interest are the driving forces of history, and that it is precisely this doctrine to which the name 'materialistic interpretation of history' or 'historical materialism' alludes, a name by which Marx and Engels tried to characterize the essence of their teaching. Such opinions are very common; but I have no doubt that they misinterpret Marx. Those who admire him for having held them, I may call Vulgar Marxists (alluding to the name 'Vulgar Economist' given by Marx to certain of his opponents). The average Vulgar Marxist believes that Marxism lays bare the sinister secrets of social life by revealing the hidden motives of greed and lust for material gain which actuate the powers behind the scenes of history; powers that cunningly and consciously create war, depression, unemployment, hunger in the midst of plenty, and all the other forms of social misery, in order to gratify their vile desires for profit. (And the Vulgar Marxist is sometimes seriously concerned with the problems of reconciling the claims of Marx with those of Freud and Adler; and if he does not choose the one of the other of them, he may perhaps decide that hunger, love and the lust for power are the Three Greate Hidden Motives of Human Nature brought to light by Marx, Frued and Adler, the Three Great Makers of the modern man's philosophy. . .) Whether or not such views are tenable and attractive, they certainly seem to have very little to do with the doctrine which Marx called 'historical materialism'. It must be admitted that be sometimes speaks of such psychological phenomena as greed and the profit moties, etc., but never in order to explain history. He interpreted them, rather, as symptoms of the corrupting influence of the social system, i.e. of a system of institutions developed during the course of history; as effects rather than causes of corruption; as repercussions rather than moving forces of history. Rightly or wrongly, he saw in such phenomena as war, depression, unemployment, and hunger in the midst of plenty, not the result of cunning conspiracy on the part of 'big business' or of 'imperialist war-mongers', but the unwanted social consequences of actions, directed towards different results, by agents who ware caught in the network of the social system. He looked upon the human actors ont he stage of history, including the 'big' ones, as mere puppets, irresistibly pulled by economic wires - by historical forces over which they have no control. The stage of history, he taught, is set in a social system which binds us all; it is set in the 'kingdom of necessity'. (But one day the puppets will destroy the system and attain the 'kingdom of freedom') This doctrine of Marx's had been abandoned by most of his followers - perhaps for propagandist reasons, perhaps because they did not understand him - and a Vulgar Marxist Conspiracy Theory has very largely replaced the ingenious and highly original Marxian doctrine. It is a sad intellectual come-down, this come-down from the level of Capital to that of The Myth of the 20th Century." |
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Marx: Blind Puppets of the Social System Marx's Method: Chapter 16: The Classes Extract from "The Open Society and Its Enemies Volume 2: Hegel and Marx"
by Karl Raimund Popper (Originally published 1945) (Edition extracts taken from version published by
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 5th Edition, 1973 reprint, ISBN 0 7100 4626 X) (Page 112 to 114)
"Marx gives some indication of how this process of determination works. As we leared from him in the last chapter, we can be free only in so far as we emancipate ourselves from the productive process. But now we shall learn that, in any hithero existing society, we were not free even to that extent. For how could we, he asks, emancipate ourselves from the productive process? Only by making others do the dirty work for us. We are thus forced to use them as means for our ends; we must degrade them. We can buy a greater freedom at the cost of the ruled class, the slaves. But this fact has the consequences that the members of the ruling class must pay for their freedom by a new kind of bondage. They are bound to oppress and to fight the ruled, if they wish to preserve their own freedom and their own status; they are compelled to do this, since he who does not do so ceases to belong to the ruling class. Thus the rulers are determined by their class situation; they cannot escape from their social relation to the ruled; they are bound to them since they are bound to the social metabolism. Thus all, rulers as well as ruled, are caught in the net, and forced to fight one another. According to Marx, it is this bondage, this determination which brings their struggle within the reach of scientific method, and of scientific historical prophecy; which makes it possile to treat the history of society scientifically, as the history of class struggle. This social net is which the classes are caught, and forced to struggle against one another, is what Marxism call the economic struggle of society, or the social system. According to this theory, social systems or class systems change with the conditions of production, since on these conditions depends the way in which the rulers can exploit and fight the ruled. To every particular period of economic development corresponds a particular social system of classes; this is why we speak of 'feudalism', 'capitalism', etc. 'The hand-mill', Marx writes, 'gives you a society with the fuedal lord; the steam-mill gives you a society with the industrial capitalist.' The class relations that characterize the social system are independent of the individual man's will. The social system thus resembles a vast machine in which the individuals are caught and crushed. 'In the social production of their means of existence', Marx writes, 'men enter into definite and unavoidable relations which are independent of their will. These productive relationships correspond to the particular stage in the development of their material productive forces. The system of all these productive relationsihps constitutes the economic structure of society', i.e. the social system. Although it has a kind of logic of its own, this social system works blindly, not reasonably. Those who are caught in its machinery are, in general, blind too - or nearly so. They cannot even forsee some of the most important repercussions of their actions. One man might make it impossible for many to procure an article which is available in large quantities; he may buy it just a trifle and thereby prevent a slight decrease of price at a crucial moment. Another may in the goodness of his heart distribute his riches, but by this contributing to a lessening of the class struggle, he may cause a delay in the liberation of the oppressed. Since it is quite impossible to forsee the more remote social repercussions of our actions, since we are one and all caught in the network, we cannot seriously attempt to cope with it. We obviously cannot influence it from outside; but blind as we are, we cannot even make any plan for its improvements from within. Social engineering is impossible, and a social technology therefore useless. We cannot impose our interest upon the social system; instead, the system forces upon us what we are led to believe to be our interests. It does so by forcing us to act in accordance with our class interest. It is vain to lay on the individual, even on the individual 'capitalist' or 'bourgeios', the blame for the injustice, for the immorality of social conditions, since it is this very system of conditions that forces the capitalist to act as he does. And it is also vain to hope that circumstances may be improved by improving men; rather men will be better if the system in which they live is better. 'Only in so far', Marx writes in Capital, 'as the capitalist is personified capital does he play a historical role. . But exactly to that extent his motive is not to obtain and to enjoy useful commodoties, but to increase the production of commodities for exchange' (his real historical task). 'Fanatically bent upon the expansion of value, he ruthlessly drives human beings to produce for production's sake. . With the miser, he shares the passion for wealth. But what is a kind of mania in the miser is in the capitalist the effect of the social mechanism in which he is only a driving-wheel. . Capitalism subjects any individual capitalist to the immanent laws of capitalist production, laws which are external and and coercive. Without respite, competition forces him to extend his capital for the sake of maintaining it.' " |
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Class Consciousness Marx's Method: Chapter 16: The Classes Extract from "The Open Society and Its Enemies Volume 2: Hegel and Marx"
by Karl Raimund Popper (Originally published 1945) (Edition extracts taken from version published by
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 5th Edition, 1973 reprint, ISBN 0 7100 4626 X) (Page 115)
"In view of subsequent arguments, a linguistic remark may be added here on the Marxist terms usually translated by the words 'class-conscious' and 'class consciousness'. These terms indicate, first of all, the result of the process analysed above, by which the objective class situation (class interest as well as class struggle) gains consciousness in the minds of its members, or, to express the same through in a language less dependent on Hegel, by which member of a class become conscious of their class situation. Being class-consious, they know not only their place but their true class interest as well. But over and above this, the original German word used by Marx suggests something which is usually lost in the translation. The term is derived from, and alludes to, a common German word which became part of Hegel's jargon. Though its literal translation would be 'self conscious', this word has even in common use rather the meaning of being conscious of one's worth and powers, i.e. of being proud and rully assured of oneself, and even self-satisfied. Accordingly, the term translated as 'class-consious' means in German not simply this, but rather, 'assured or proud of one's class'. and bound to it by the consciousness of the need for solidarity. This is why Marx and the Marxists apply it nearly exclusively to the workers, and hardly ever to the 'bourgeosie'. The class-conscious proletarian - this is the worker who is no only aware of his class situation, but who is also class-proud, fully assured of his class situation, but who is also class-proud, fully assured of the historical mission of his class, and believing that its unflinching fight will bring about a better world." |
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Problems of taking Marx to Seriously Marx's Method: Chapter 16: The Classes Extract from "The Open Society and Its Enemies Volume 2: Hegel and Marx"
by Karl Raimund Popper (Originally published 1945) (Edition extracts taken from version published by
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 5th Edition, 1973 reprint, ISBN 0 7100 4626 X) (Page 116 to 117)
"One of the dangers of Marx's formula is that if taken too seriously, it misleads Marxists into interpretting all political conflicts as struggles between exploiters and exploited (or else as attempts to cover up the 'real issue', the underlying calss conflict). As a consequence there were Marxists, especially in Germany, who interpreted a war such as the First World War as one between the revolutionary or 'have-not' Central Powers and an alliance of conservative or 'have' countries - a kind of interpretation which might be used to excuse any aggression. This is only one example of the danger inherant in Marx's sweeping historicist generalization. On the other hand, his attempt to use what may be called the #logic of the class situation' to explain the working of the institutions of the industrial system seems to me admirable, in spite of certain exaggerations and the neglect of some important aspects of the situation; admirable, at least, as a sociological analysis of that stage of the industrial system which Marx has mainly in mind: the system of 'unrestrained capitalism' (as I shall call it) of one hundred years ago. " |
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The Impotence of All Politics Marx's Method: Chapter 17: The Legal and the Social System Extract from "The Open Society and Its Enemies Volume 2: Hegel and Marx"
by Karl Raimund Popper (Originally published 1945) (Edition extracts taken from version published by
Routledge and Kegan Paul,
5th Edition, 1973 reprint, ISBN 0 7100 4626 X) (Page 118 to 124)
"We are now ready to approach what is probably the most crucial point in our analysis as well as in our criticism of Marxism; it is Marx''s theory of the state and - paradoxical as it may sound to some - of the impotence of all politics. " [text deleted] "I am far from defending Marx's theory of the state. His theory of the impotence of all politics, more particularly, and his view of democracy, appear to me to be not only mistakes, but fatal mistakes. But it must be admitted that behind these grim as well as ingenious theories, there stodd a grim and depressing experience. And although Marx, in my opinion, failed to understand the future which he so keenly wished to foresee, it seems to me that even his mistaken theories are proof of his keen sociological insight into the conditions of his own time, and of his invincible humanitarianism and sense of justice. " [text deleted] "But it was not only Marx's general views of the relations between the economic and the political system that were in this way influenced by his historical experience; his views on liberalism and democracy, more particularly, which he considered to be nothing but veils for the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, furnished an interpretation of the social situation of his time, which appeared to fit only too well, corroborated as it was by sad experience. For Marx lived, espeically in his younger years in a period of the most shameless and cruel exploitation. And this shameless exploitation was cynically defended by hypocritical apologists who appealed to the principle of human freedom, to the right of man to determinate his own fate, an to enter freely into any contract he considers favourable to his interests. Using the slogan 'equal and free competition for all', the unrestrained capitalism of this period resisted successfully all labour legislation until the year 1833, and its practical execution for many years more. The consequence was a life of desolation and misery which can hardly be imagined in our day. Especially the exploitation of women and children led to incredible suffering. Here are two examples, quoted from Marx's Capital : 'William Wood, 9 years old, was 7 years and 10 months when he began to work . . He came to work every day in the week at 6 a.m., and left off about 9 p.m. . . ' 'Fifteen hours of labour for a child 7 years old!' exclaims an official report of the Children's Employment Commission of 1863. Other children were forced to start work at 4 a.m., or to work, through the night until 6 a.m., and it was not unusual for children of only six years to be forced to a daily toil of 15 hours. - 'Mary Anne Walkley had worked without pause 26 1/2 hours, together with sixty other girls, thirty of them in one room . . A doctor, Mr. Keys, called in too late, testified before the coroner's jury that "Mary Anne Walkley had died from long hours of work in an over-crowded workroom . .". Wishing to give this gentleman a lecture in good manners, the coroner's jury brought in a verdict to the effect that "the deceased had died of apoplexy, but there is reason to fear that her death had been accelerated by overwork in an overcrowded workroom".' Such were the conditions of the working class even in 1863, when Marx was writing Capital; his burning protest against these crimes, which were then tolerated, and sometimes defended, not only by professional economists but also by churchmen, will secure him forever a place among the liberators of mankind. " [text deleted] "I believe that the injustice and inhumanity of the unrestrained 'capitalist system' described by Marx cannot be questioned; but it can be interpreted in terms of what we called, in a previous chapter, the paradox of freedom. Freedom, we have seen, defeats itself, if it is unlimited. Unlimited freedom means that a strong man is free to bully one who is weak and to rob him of his freedom. This is why we demand that the state should limit freedom to a certain extent, so that everyone's freedom is protected by law. Nobody should be at the mercy of others, but all should have a right to be protected by the state. Now I believe that these considerations, originally meant to apply to the realm of brute-force, of physically intimidation, must be applied to the economic realm also. Even if the state protects its citizens from being bullied by physical violence (as it does, in principle, under the system of unrestrained capitalism), it may defeat our ends by its failure to protect them from the misuse of economic power. In such a state, the economically strong is still free to bully one who is economically weak, and to rob him of his freedom. Under these circumstances, unlimited economic freedom can be just as self-defeating as unlimited physical freedom, and economic power may be nearly as dangerious as physical violence; for those who possess as surplus of food can force who are starving into a 'freely' accepted servitude, without using violence. And assuming that the state limits its activities to the suppression of violence (and to the protection of properly), a minority which is economically strong may in this way exploit the majority of those who are economically weak. If this analysis is correct, when the nature of the remedy is clear. It must be a political remedy - a rememdy similar to the one which we use against physical violence. We must construct social institutions, enforced by the power of the state, for the protection of the economically weak from the economically strong. The state must see to it that nobody need enter into an inequitable arrangement out of fear of starvation, or economic ruin. " [text deleted] "As has been rightly emphasized by various writers (among them Bertrand Russell and Walter Lippmann), it is only the active intervention of the state - the protection of property by laws backed by physical sanctions - which makes of wealth a potential source of power; for without this intervention, a man would soon be without his wealth. Economic power is therefore entirely dependent on political and physical power. Russell gives historical examples which illustrate this dependence, and sometimes even helplessness, of wealth; 'Economic power within the state,' he writes, 'although ultimately derived from law and public opinion, easily acquires a certain independent. It can influence law by corruption and public opinion by properganda. It can pu politicians under obligations which interfere with their freedom. It can threaten to cause a financial crisis. But there are very definite limits to what it can achieve. Caesar was helped to power by his creditors, who saw no hope of repayment except through his success; but when he had succeeded he was poweful enough to defy them. Charles V borrowed from the Fuggers the money reuqired to buy the position of Emmporer, but when he had bcome Emporer he snapped his fingers at them and they lost what they had lent.' The dogma that economic power is at the root of all evil must be discarded. Its place must be taken by an understanding of the dangers of any form of uncontrolled power. Money as such is not particularly dangerous. It becomes dangerous only if it can buy power, either directly, or by enslaving the economically weak who must sell themselves in order to live. We must think in these matters in even more materialist terms, as it were, than Marx did. We must realize that the control of physical power and of physical exploitation remains the central political problem. In order to establish this control, we must establish 'merely formal freedom'. Once we have achieved this, and have learned how to use it for the control of political power, everything rests with us. We must not blame anybody else any longer, nor cry out against the sinister economic demons behind the scemes. For in a democracy, we hold the keys to the control of the demons. We can tame them. We must realize this and use the keys; we must construct institutions for the democratic control of economic power, and for our protection from economic exploitation. " |
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Ruling using Institutional vs Discretionary Powers Marx's Method: Chapter 17: The Legal and the Social System Extract from "The Open Society and Its Enemies Volume 2: Hegel and Marx"
by Karl Raimund Popper (Originally published 1945) (Edition extracts taken from version published by
Routledge and Kegan Paul,
5th Edition, 1973 reprint, ISBN 0 7100 4626 X) (Page 133 to 134)
"In spite of this, the obvious policy of preferring where possible the institutional method is far from being generally accepted. The failure to accept it is, I suppose, due to different reasons. One is that it needs a certain detachment to embark on the long-term taks of re-designing the 'legal framework'. But governments live from hand to mouth, and discretionary powers belong to this style of living - quite apart from the fact that rulers are inclined to love those powers for their own sake. But the most important reason is, undoubtedly, that the significance of the distinction between the two methods is not understood. The way to its understanding is blocked to the followers of Platon, Hegel and Marx. They will never see that the old question 'Who shall be the rulers?' must be superseded by the more real one 'How can we tame them?'
If we now look back at Marx's theory of the impotence of politics and of the power of historical forces, then we must admit that it is an imposing edifice. It is the direct result of his sociological method; of his economic historicism, of the doctrine that the development of the economic system, or of man's metabolism, determines his social and political development. The experience of his time, his humanitarian indignation, and the need of bringing to the oppressed thte consolation of al prophecy, the hope, or even the certainty, of their victory, all this is united in one gradiose philosophical system, comparable or even superior to the holistic systems of Platon and Hegel. [TEXT DELETED] With this, I conclude my critical analysis of Marx's philosophy of the method of social science, of his economic determination as well as of his prophetic historicism. The final test of a method, however, must be its practical results. I therefore proceed now to a more detailed examination of the main result of his method, the prophecy of the impending advent of a classless society." |
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The Coming of Socialism Marx's Prophecy: Chapter 18: The Coming of Socialism Extract from "The Open Society and Its Enemies Volume 2: Hegel and Marx"
by Karl Raimund Popper (Originally published 1945) (Edition extracts taken from version published by
Routledge and Kegan Paul,
5th Edition, 1973 reprint, ISBN 0 7100 4626 X) (Page 135 to 139)
"Economic historicism is the method applied by Marx to an analysis of the impending changes in our society. According to Marx, every particular social system must destroy itself, simply because it must create the forces which produce the next historical period. A sufficeintly penetrating analysis of the feudel system, undertaken shortly before the industrial revolution, might have led to the detection of the forces which were about to destroy feudelism, and to the prediction of the most important characteristics of the coming period, capitalism, and to predict the most important characteristics of the nwe historical period which lies ahead of us. For there is surely no reason to believe that capitalism, of all social systems, will last for ever. On the contrary, the material conditions of production, and with them, the ways of human life, have never changed so quickly as they have done under capitalism. By changing its own foundations in this way, capitalism is bound to transform itself, and to produce a new period in the history of mankind. According to Marx's method, the principles of which have been discussed above, the fundamental or essential forces which will destroy or transform capitalism must be searched for in the evolution of the material means of production. Once these fundamental forces have been discovered, it is possible to trace their influence upon the social relationships between classes as wel as upon the juridicial and political systems. The analysis of the fundamental economic forces and the suicidal historical tendencies of the period which he called 'capitalism' was undertaken by Marx in Capital, the great work of his life. The historical period and the economic system he dealt with was that of western Europe and especially England, from about the middle of the eighteenth century to 1867 (the year of the first publication of Capital). The 'ultimate aim of this', as Marx explained in his preface, was 'to lay bare the economic law of motion of modern society', in order to prophesy its fate. A secondary aim was the refutation of the apologists of capitalism, of the economists who presented the laws of the capitalist mode of production as if they were inexorable laws of nature, declaring with Burke: 'The laws of commerce are the laws of nature, and therefore the laws of God.' Marx contrasted these allegedly inexorable laws with those which he maintained to be the only inexorable laws of society, namely, its laws of development; and he tried to show that what the economists declared to be eternal and immutable laws were in fact merely temporary regularities, doomed to be destroyed together with capitalism itself. Marx's historical prophecy can be described as a closely knit argument. But Capital elaborates only what I shall call the 'first step' of this argument, the analysis of the fundamental economic forces of capitalism and their influence upon the relations between the classes. The 'second step', which leads to the conclusion that a social revolution is inevitable, and the 'third step', which leads t the prediction of the emergence of a classless, i.e. socialist society, are only sketched. In this chapter, I shall first explain more clearly what I call the three steps of Marxist argument, and then discuss the third of these steps in detail. In the two following chapters, I shall discuss the second and the first steps. To reverse the order of the steps in this way turns out to be the best for a detailed critical discussion; the advantage lies in the fact that it is then easier to assume without prejudice that truth of the premises of each step of the argument, and to concentrate entirely upon the question whether the conclusion reached in this particular step follows from its premises. Here are the three steps. In the first step of his argument, Marx analyses the method of capitalist production. He finds that there is a tendency towards an increase of productivity of work, connected with technical improvements as well as with what he calls the increasing accumulation of the means of production. Starting from here, the argument leads him to conclusion that in the realm of the social relations between the classes this tendency must lead to the accumulation of more and more wealth in fewer and fewer hands; that is to say, the conclusion is reached that there will be a tendency towards an increase of wealth and misery; of wealth in the ruling class, the bourgeoisie, and of misery in the ruled class, the workers. This first step will be treated in chapter 20 ('Capitalism and its Fate'). In the second step of the argument, the result of this first step is taken for granted. From it, two conclusions are drawn; first, that all classes except a small ruling bourgeoisie and a large exploited working class are bound to disappera, or to become insignificant; secondly, that the increasing tension between these two classes must lead to a social revolution. This step will be analysed in Chapter 19 ('The Social Revolution'). In the third step of the argument, the conclusions of the second step are taken for granted in their turn; and the final conclusion reached is that, after the citory of the workers over the bourgeoisie, there will be a society consisting of one class only, and, therefore, a classless society, a society without exploitation; that is to say, socialism.
I now proceed to the discussion of the third step, of the final prophecy of the coming of socialism. The main premises of this step, to be criticized in the next chapter but here to be taken for granted, are these: the development of capitalism has led to the elimination of all classes but two, a small bourgeoisie and a huge proletariat; and the increase in misery has forced the latter to revoled against its exploiters. The conclusions are, first, that the workers must win the struggle, secondly that, by eliminating the bourgeoisie, they must establish a classless society, since only one class remains. Now I am prepared to grant the conclusion follows from the premises (in conjuction with a few premises of minor importance which we need not question). Not only is the number of the bourgeoisie small, but their physical existence, their 'metabolism', depends upon the proletariat. The exploiter, the drone, starves without the exploited; in any case, if he destroys the exploited then he ends his own career as a drone. Thus he cannot win; he can, at the best, put up a prolonged struggle. The worker, on the other hand, does not depend for his material subsistence on his exploiter; once the worker revolts, once he has decided to challenge the existing order, the exploiter has no essential social function any longer. The worker can destroy his class enemy without endangering his own existence. Accordingly, there is only one outcome possible. The bourgeoisie will disappear. But does the second conclusion follow? Is it true that the workers' victory must lead to a classless society? I do not think so. From the fact that of the two classes only one reamins, it does not follow that there will be a classless society. Classes are not like individuals, even if we admit that they behave nearly like individuals so long as there are two classes who are joined in battle. The unity or solidarity of a class, according to Marx's own analysis, is part of the class consciousness, which in turn is very largely a product of the class struggle. There is no earthly reason why the individual who form the proletariat should retain their class unity once the pressure of the struggle against the common class enemy has ceased. Any latent conflict of interests is now likely to develop into a new class struggle. (The principles of dialectics would suggest that a new antithesis, a new class antagonism, must soon develop. Yet, of course, dialectics is sufficiently vague and adaptable to explain anything at all, and therefore a classless society also, as a dialectically necessary synthesis of an antithetical development.) The most likely development is, of course, that those actually in power at the moment of victory - those of the revolutionary leaders who have survived the struggle for power and the various purges, together with their staff - will form a New Class: the new ruling class of the new society, a kind of new aristocracy or bureaucracy; and it is most likely that they will attempt to hid this fact. This they can do, most conveniently, by retaining as much as possible of the revolutionary ideology, taking advantage of these sentiments instead of wasting their time in efforts to destroy them (in accordance with Pareto's advice to all rulers). fsAnd it seems likely enough that they will be able to make fullest use of the revolutionary ideology if at the same time they exploit the fear of counter-revolutionary developments. In this way, the revolutionary ideology will serve them for apologetic purposes: it will serve them both as a vindication of the use they make of their power, and as a means of stabilizing it; in short, as a new 'opium for the people'. Something of this kind are the events which, on Marx's own premises, are likely to happen. Yet it is not my task here to make historical prophecies (or to interpret the past history of many revolutions). I merely wish to show that Marx's conclusion, the prophecy of the coming of a classless society, does not follow from the premises. The third step of Marx's argument must be pronounced to be inconclusive. More than this I do not maintain. I do think, more particularly, that it is possible to prophesy that socialism will not come, or to say that the premises of the argument make the introductin of socialism unlikely. It is, for instance, possibly that the prolonged struggle and the enthusiasm of victory may contribute to a feeling of solidarity strong enough to continue until laws preventing exploitation and misuse of power are established. (The establishment of institutions for the democratic control of the rulers is the only guarantee for the elimination of exploitation.) The chances of founding such a society will depend, in my opinion, very largely upon the devotion of the workers to the ideas of socialism and freedom, as opposed to the immediate interests of their class. These are matter which cannot be easily forseen; all that can certainly be said is that class truggle as such does not always produce lasting solidarity among the oppressed. There are examples of such solidarity and great devotion to the common cause; but there are also examples of groups of workers who pursue their particular group interest even where it is in open conflict with the interest of the other workers, and with the idea of the solidarity of the oppressed. Exploitation need not disappear with the bourgeoisie, since it is quite possible that groups of workers may obtain privileges which amount to an exploitation of less fortunate groups." |
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Laissez-faire capitalism being replaced by interventionism Marx's Prophecy: Chapter 18: The Coming of Socialism Extract from "The Open Society and Its Enemies Volume 2: Hegel and Marx"
by Karl Raimund Popper (Originally published 1945) (Edition extracts taken from version published by
Routledge and Kegan Paul,
5th Edition, 1973 reprint, ISBN 0 7100 4626 X) (Page 140 to 141)
If we omit the rather insignificant point of the programmer (for instance, '4. Confiscation of the properly of all emigrants and rebels'), then we can say that in the democracies most of these points have been put into practice, either completely, or to a considerable degree; and with them, many more important steps, which Marx never through of, have been made in the direction of social security. I mention only the following points of his programme: 2. A heavy progressive or graduated income tax. (Carried out.) 3. Abolition of all right of inheritance. (Largely realized by heavy death duties. Where more would be disirable is at least doubtful.) 6. Central control by the state of the means of communication and transport. (For military reasons this was carried out in Central Europe before the war of 1914, without very beneficial results. It has also be achieved in the Smaller Democracies.) 7. Increase in the number and size of factories and instruments of production owned by the state . . (Realised in the Smaller Democracies; whether this is always very beneficial is at least doubtful.) 10. Free education for all children in public (i.e. state) schools. Abolition of children's factory labour in its present form . . (The first demand is fulfilled in the Smaller Democracies, and to some extent practically everywhere; the second has been exceeded.) A number of points in Marx's programme (for instance: 'I. Abolition of all properly in land') have not been realized in the democratic countries. This is why Marxists rightly claim that these countries have not estrablished 'socialism'. But if they infer from this that these countries are still 'capitalist' in Marx's sense, then they only demonstrate the dogmatic character of their presupposition that there is no further alternative. This shows how it is possible to be blinded by the glare of a preconceived system. Not only is Marxism a bad guide to the future, but it also renders its followers incapable of seeing what is happening before their own eyes, in their own historical period, and sometimes even with their own co-operation."
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The poverty of post revolution socialist and Marxist policy Marx's Prophecy: Chapter 18: The Coming of Socialism Extract from "The Open Society and Its Enemies Volume 2: Hegel and Marx"
by Karl Raimund Popper (Originally published 1945) (Edition extracts taken from version published by
Routledge and Kegan Paul,
5th Edition, 1973 reprint, ISBN 0 7100 4626 X) (Page 144 to 145)
This remark is not, however, intended as a defence of the Social Democratic leaders whose policy was fully determined by the Marxist prophecy, by their implicit belief that socialism must come. But this belief was often combined, in the leaders, with a hopeless scepticism concering their own immediate functions and tasks, and what lay immediately ahead. They had learned from Marxism to organize the workers, and to inspire them with a truely wonderful faith in their task, the liberation of mankind. But they were unable to prepare for the realization of their promises. They had learned their textbooks well, they knew all about 'scientific socialism', and they knew that the preparation of recipies for the future was unscientific Utopianism. Had not Marx himself ridiculed a follower of Compte who had critizied him in Revue Positiviste for his neglect of practical programmes? 'The Revue Positiviste accuses me', Marx had said scornfully, 'of a metaphysical treatment of economics, and further - you would hardly guess it - of confining myself to a merely critical analysis of actual facts, instread of prescribing recipes (Comtist ones, perhaps?) for the kitchen in which the future is cooked.' Thus the Marxist leaders knew better than to waste their time on such matters as technology. 'Workers of all countries unite!' - that exhausted their practical programme. When the workers of their countries were united, when there was an opportunity of assuming responsibility of government and laying the foundations for a better world, when their hour had struck, they left the workers high and dry. The leaders did not know what to do. They waited for the promised suicide of capitalism. After the inevitable capitalist collapse, when things had gone thoroughly wrong, when everything was in dissolution and risk of discredit and disgrace to themselves considerably diminished, then they hoped to become saviours of mankind. (And, indeed, we should keep in mind the fact that the success of the Communist in Russia was undoubtedly made possible, in part, by the terrible things that had happened before their rise to power.) But when the great depression, which they first welcomed as the promised collapse, was running its course, they began to realize that the workers were growing tired of being fed and put off with interpretations of history; that it was not enough to tell them that according to the infallible scientific socialism of Marx fascism was definitely the last stand of capitalism before its impending collapse. The suffering masses needed more than that. Slowly the leaders began to realize the terrible consequences of a policy of waiting and hoping for the great political miracle. But it was too late. Their opportunity was gone. These remarks are very sketchy. But they give some indication of the practical consequences of Marx's prophecy of the coming of socialism." |
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An increase in wealth and misery Marx's Prophecy: Chapter 19: The Social Revolution Extract from "The Open Society and Its Enemies Volume 2: Hegel and Marx"
by Karl Raimund Popper (Originally published 1945) (Edition extracts taken from version published by
Routledge and Kegan Paul,
5th Edition, 1973 reprint, ISBN 0 7100 4626 X) (Page 146 to 148)
I believe that neither of the two conclusions follows from the premise. My criticism will be, in the main, similar to that propounded in the last chapter; that is to say, I shall try to show that Marx's argument neglects a great number of possible developments." [TEXT DELETED] "Thus, as opposed to Marx's prephecy which insists that there must develop a neat division between two classes, we find that on his own assumptions, the following class structure may possibly develop: (1) bourgeosie, (2) big landed proprietors, (3) other landowners, (4) rural workers, (5) new middle class, (6) industrial workers, (7) rabble proletariat. (An other combination of these classes may, of course, develop too.) And we find, furthermore, that such as development may possibly undermine the unity of (6). We can say, therefore, that the first conclusion of the second step of Marx's argument does not follow. But as in my criticism of the third step, here also I must say that I do not intend to replace Marx's prophecy by another one. I do not assert that the prophecy cannot come true, or that the alternative developments I have described will come to pass. I only assert that they may come to pass. (And, indeed, this possibility can hardly be denied by members of the radical Marxist wings who use the accusation of treachery, bribery, and insufficient class solidarity as favourite devices for explaining away developments which do not conform to the prophetic schedule.) That such things may happen should be clear to anybody who has observed the development which has led to fascism, in which all the possibilities I have mentioned played a part. But the mere possibility is sufficeint to destroy the first conclusion reached in the second step of Marx's argument. This of course affectcs the second conclusion, the prophecy of the coming social revolution. But before I can enter into a criticism of the way in which this prophecy is arrived at, it is necessary to discuss at some length the role played by it within the whole argument, as well as Marx's use of the term 'social revolution'." |
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Characterizing democracy Marx's Prophecy: Chapter 19: The Social Revolution Extract from "The Open Society and Its Enemies Volume 2: Hegel and Marx"
by Karl Raimund Popper (Originally published 1945) (Edition extracts taken from version published by
Routledge and Kegan Paul,
5th Edition, 1973 reprint, ISBN 0 7100 4626 X) (Page 160 to 162)
"But this criticism, practical as it is, and corroborated by experience is only superficial. The main defects of the doctrine lie deeper. The criticism I now wish to offer attempts to show that both the presupposition of the doctrine and its tactical consequences are such that they are likely to produce exactly that anti-democratic reaction of the bourgeoisie which the theory predicts, yet claims (with ambiguity) to abhor : the strengthening of the anti-democratic element in the bourgeoisie, and, in consequence, civil war. And we know that this may lead to defeat, and to facism. The criticism I have in mind in, briefly, that Engle's tactical doctrine, and, more generally, the ambiguities of violence and of power-conquest, make the working of democracy impossible, once they are adopted by an important political party. I base this criticism on the contention that democracy can work only if the main parties adhere to a view of its functiona which may be summarized in some rules such as these (cp. also section II of chapter 7): (1) Democracy cannot be fully characterised as the rule of the majority, although the institution of general elections is most important. For a majority might rule in a tyrannical way. (The majority of those who are less than 6 ft. high may decide that the minority of those over 6 ft. shall pay all taxes.) In a democracy, the powers of the rulers must be limited; and the criterion of a democracy is this: In a democracy, the rulers - that is to say, the government - can be dismissed by the ruled without bloodshed. Thus if the men in power do not safeguard those institutions which secure to the minority the possibility of working for a peaceful change, then their rule is a tyranny. (2) We need only distinguish between two forms of government, viz. such as possess institutions of this kind, and all others; i.e. democracies and tyrannies. (3) A consistent democratic constitution should exclude only one type of change in the legal system, namely a change which would endanger its democratic character. (4) In a democracy, the full protection of minorities should not extend to those who vilate the law, and especially not to those who incite others to the violent overthrow of the democracy. (5) A policy of framing institutions to safeguard democracy must always proceed on the assumption that there may be anti-democratic tendencies latent among the ruled as well as mong the rulers. (6) If democracy is destroyed, all rights are destroyed. Even if certain economic advantages enjoyed by the ruled should persist, they would persist only on sufference. (7) Democracy provides an invaluable battle-ground for any reasonable reform, since it permits reform without violence. But if the preservation of democracy is not made the first consideration in any particular battle fought out on this battle-ground, then the latent anti-democratic tendencies which are always present (and which appeal to those who suffer under the strain of civilisation, as we called it in chapter 10) may bring about a breakdown of democracy. If an understanding of these principles is not yet developed, its development must be fought for. The opposite policy may prove fatal; it may bring about the loss of the most important battle, the battle for democracy itself. As opposed to such a policy, that of Marxist parties can be characterized as one of making the workers suspicious of democracy. 'In reality the state is nothing more', says Engels, 'than a machine for the oppression of one class by another, and this holds for a democratic republic no less than for a monarchy.' But such views must produce: (a) A policy of blaming democracy for all the evils which it does not prevent, instead of recognizing that the democrats are to be blamed, and the opposition usually no less than the majority. (Every opposition has the majority it deserves.) (b) A policy of educating the ruled to |